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VERY FEW scholarly biographies of Chinese leaders are available in 
Western languages. Chang Chien, the subject of Professor Chu's 
fascinating study, was a most unusual Chinese: a truly transitional 
figure standing astride the late imperial era and the modern day. 
Although eminently fitted for a distinguished official career, he 
forsook officialdom to become a modern entrepreneur. Yet he was a 
most unusual entrepreneur in devoting the profits from his successful 
businesses to the modernization of his native community. With an 
excellent traditional education, he devoted most of his talents to 
the problems of bringing his country into the modern world. 
Chang Chien's active career was almost equally divided between 
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries and between national 
and local problems. He moved with equal ease among officials, 
merchants, and scholars; in the "examination world" of imperial 
days as in the world of assemblies and cabinets of the early repub­
lican era. In his efforts to provide public primary schools, good 
roads, or a modern hospital for his native district he acted in the best 
traditions of the Chinese gentry. In struggling to cope with the 
periodic flooding of the Huai River or to rationalize the national salt 
administration he devoted himself to problems which have con­
cerned public-spirited Chinese officials for centuries. In his efforts to 
modernize Chinese education or to inaugurate a Chinese-owned 
modern textile industry he was actuated by motives of recent-day 
patriotism. 
Chang Chien was, in short, the all-round Chinese scholar-leader, 
characteristic of the best his culture produced, yet highly indivi­
dualistic in his interests and style. A product of his age, he also 
left his mark upon it through many pioneering enterprises. 
Fortunately a great deal of primary information on Chang 
Chien and his environment is available in Chinese. Professor Chu, 
a graduate of the East Asian Institute and a Ph. D. in history at 
Columbia, has used this material most effectively to present a well­
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rounded, analytic biography of this man of many parts. Students of 
China's modernization may draw from this study an appreciation 
of the difficulties confronting a late Ch'ing entrepreneur. An 
illuminating example is the unbelievable difficulties Chang Chien 
encountered in accumulating the capital to start his first cotton-
spinning mill, despite his national reputation and excellent connec­
tions with sponsoring officials. For another example, in the attempt 
to create a modern local school system he had to start at the very 
beginning—to establish China's first modern normal school. 
Student's of traditional Chinese society should find the account of 
Chang Chien's education, his encounters with the examination 
system, and his apprenticeship as a personal secretary to a high 
official very revealing. 
This study, like those before it in the East Asian Institute Series, 
was in large part done at Columbia University using the resources 
of Columbia's East Asian Library. 
C. MARTIN WILBUR 




THE ACTIVE LIFE of Chang Chien as a modernizer, spanning an 
eventful quarter century from the last few years of the nineteenth 
century to the early 1920s, is still recent enough to be recalled by 
many of the older living Chinese of today. Even those of his 
countrymen who had no personal knowledge of him have heard 
of him by reputation. Within the past decade several Chinese 
studies of various aspects of Chang Chien have also appeared. 
Outside China (and the neighboring country of Japan), however, 
he is virtually unknown. In fact, only in the last few years has 
there been any mention of him in Western-language study of modern 
China. My primary purpose then, is to make him better known 
to the world at large. There is, however, a related purpose. Where 
Chang Chien is at all mentioned, he is referred to primarily as an 
industrialist.1 Hence I have felt it appropriate to trace his career 
in some detail, in order to bring out his other important roles of 
educator, conservationist, and public benefactor. In tracing his 
career, I have made an attempt also to sketch in the history and the 
particular characteristics of the institutions with which he was 
dealing, such as the educational system and the salt administration, 
wherever such information would contribute to a clearer under­
standing of Chang Chien's role in these fields of endeavor. 
As a result this study is at once a biography but also something 
less. It is a biography because the actions and thoughts of the 
central figure dominate the discussion at every one of its stages. 
It also follows a generally chronological sequence. Yet it is some­
thing less than a full biography because certain facets of Chang 
Chien's life have been regarded as largely irrelevant to an under­
standing of his career as a modernizer, and therefore slighted or 
omitted altogether. For instance, his reputation as an essayist, poet, 
and calligrapher is acknowledged, but no attempt is made to describe 
his activities in the literary field, or to assess his literary ability. 
Similarly, his collected writings contain numerous correspondences 
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which he carried on with various warlords and national political 
figures after 1915, when his active work was virtually confined to 
his native district of Nan-t'ung. These writings have also been 
ignored, on the ground that they actually accomplished little, and 
are not essential to our understanding of the man or his times. 
A full-length biography should also include as full as possible a 
treatment of the subject's childhood and young manhood (which 
in Chang Chien's case extended to his forty-second year). Since 
this study concentrates on Chang Chien the modernizer, it draws 
upon his earlier years only where certain experiences seem to bear 
directly upon his later career. Finally, Chang Chien's private life 
and personal idiosyncrecies are probably better known than most 
of his contemporaries, but details of his personal life have been 
included only where they contribute to our understanding of his 
actions and motivations. 
It is my hope that what emerges from this study would be an 
account of the public career of a most unusual man, not only for 
China of his time, but in the world at large as well. His career, while 
it can in no sense be considered typical of men of his gentry back­
ground and scholarly tradition, still reflects enough of his class 
status and training so that this study is no mere isolated account of 
a single individual. In a sense it can be regarded as a case study of 
the potentialities and limitations of one man's effort to transform 
the life pattern of a single region, given the benefit of certain 
favorable factors, but also operating within certain self-imposed 
and external restraints. In a specific sense Chang Chien the moder­
nizer represents the pragmatic Confucian who personally made a 
distinction between what was essential in Confucianism and what 
was not, sloughing off the latter to pursue a highly unorthodox 
course of action, yet holding true to the former throughout his 
life. 
In the pursuit of this study I have benefitted from a great many 
persons, to whom my public acknowledgment of gratitude has 
long been overdue. The study was originally suggested by Professor 
Franklin L. Ho, and completed as a doctoral dissertation under the 
joint guidance of Professor C. Martin Wilbur and Professor Ho. My 
debt to my two lao-shih can never be fully acknowledged. I am 
grateful also to Professor Shepard Clough and the late Professor 
J. Bartlet Brebner for greatly widening my mental horizons in the 
latter stages of this study. The kind interest shown to the study 
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by professors L. S. Yang, Mary Wright, and Howard Boorman at 
various times have helped to sustain me in my labors. A special 
note of thanks is due to Mr. King-kong Wong, who, quite unbe­
knownst to me (and I to him), completed an independent study 
of Chang Chien as a master's thesis at the University of Washington. 
By checking my study with Mr. Wong's, I have strengthened both 
its factual content and interpretations. Whenever more than a word 
or phrase have been altered as a direct result of this process, I have 
noted the fact by citing the appropriate section of Mr. Wong's 
study in my notes. Of the staff of the East Asian Library (Columbia), 
Library of Congress, Chinese and Japanese Library (Harvard), 
Sterling Library (Yale), and the Hoover Institute, who have 
generously aided my efforts, I would like to single out Mr. Howard 
Linton and Dr. T. K. Tong of Columbia, Dr. K. T. Wu and 
Dr. Osamu Shimizu of the Library of Congress, and Mr. Eugene Wu 
of Hoover Institute for special thanks. I am also the beneficiary of a 
number of mentors, colleagues, and friends who have kindly gone 
over the draft in whole or in part. Among these are Knight 
Biggerstaff, S. H. Chou, K. C. Hsiao, Chang-tu Hu, K. C. Liu, 
T. K. Tong, and L. S. Yang, all of whom have helped me to remove 
errors of fact and interpretation, leaving the remaining imperfections 
as my sole responsibility. In addition, I am grateful to Mr. T. W. 
Chang and his son, William Chang, for their cordial support of 
my efforts to study their illustrious kinsman, and to the follow­
ing persons for favoring me with remembrances and interviews: 
Mr. K. P. Fengson, Dr. and Mrs. George L. Hagman, Dr. P. W-
Kuo, Mrs. N. C. Lee Pien, and Mr. H. S. Sung. To the usual 
inadequate words of thanks which an author accords his wife, I 
would like to add that my wife acted as a secretary-proofreader 
throughout the writing of this study. Finally, I am grateful to the 
East Asian Institute of Columbia University, and to Professor 
Herschel Webb, Chairman of the Institute Publications Committee, 
for the generous grant which made the publication of this study 
possible. 












Two Early Life 8

Three Dah Sun and Nan-t'ung Industries 17

Four Involvement in National Affairs 53

Five Chang Chien and Educational Reforms 88

Six Land Reclamation and Salt Reform 114

Seven Controlling the Huai 144

Eight The Modernization of Nan-t'ung 162














Nan-t'ung and Lower Kiangsu 119 
Huai Basin and Proposed Drainage Schemes 156 

A Note on Romanization 
I have made it a general practice to follow the Wade-Giles system 
of romanization as much as possible. Two types of general excep­
tions to this practice, however, should be noted. Wherever a 
geographic term is more commonly known in another form (e.g. 
Shanghai, Szechwan), I have used this generally accepted form. 
Also, wherever one of Chang Chien's industries and enterprises 
already had an English equivalent name (e.g. Dah Sun, instead of 
Ta Sheng), it seems entirely too pedantic to insist on the Wade-
Giles romanization, and I have refrained from so insisting. I might 
add that all Chinese and Japanese personal names are given in their 
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Source: Odell, Ralph M, . Cotton Goods in China. Department of Commerce. 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Special Agents Series, 
No. 107. Washington, 1916. P. 26. 







CHINA IN THE latter part of the nineteenth century was caught up 
in a world-wide process of cultural confrontation, the magnitude of 
which the participants were only fragmentarily aware. The dynamic, 
expansive West had thrust itself insistently into every corner of the 
civilized world, calling forth responses varying from ultimate 
resignation, the experience of most of the African continent, to 
viralent resistence on the West's own terms, such as occurred in 
Japan. The Japanese experience demonstrates the fact that, for every 
nation which would meet the West on the same level as the West, 
that nation would have to undergo, to a greater or lesser extent, 
a process of industrialization, social change, and revaluation in 
cultural values; in a word, modernization. The Chinese experience 
was no exception. In China, as in many other countries, responsible 
men were forced by events to realize that the traditional Chinese 
civilization could not withstand the dynamic West without under­
going change. For these men the degree of change was the crux 
of the problem, with various school of thought, ranging from 
those who wished only the most superficial of changes, to those 
who would see the wholesale replacement of Chinese culture by 
Western culture. Between these two extremes stood a group of men 
who advocated a substantive program of modernization for China, 
but one which was to be based on the traditional culture. 
One of the most successful yet least known among the last 
group of these men was Chang Chien. Born of humble background 
in 1853, known as a classical scholar of high reputation, he 
successively undertook the establishment of cotton mills, the 
founding of schools, the reclamation of unproductive land, the 
championing of a constitutional government, the advocacy of salt 
reform and river conservation, and, by the time of his death in 
1926, the transformation of one of the more backward areas of 
Kiangsu Province into a nationally known, model district. The 
career and accomplishments of Chang Chien illustrate concretely 
the interaction between the forces of progress and reaction at work 
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in China in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In a 
larger sense they also reflect the problems faced by modernizes in 
all parts of the world confronted by the West. 
Chang Chien's life spans a transitional period in his country's 
history, a period which was anything but propitious. China was 
then approaching the nadir of her decline, from hegemony in a 
world of her own to being a near-vacuum fought over by the 
Western powers. The causes of her decline were many, and lay 
back over long stretches of time. In the hundred or so years from 
mid-eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century alone, China's 
population underwent a threefold increase, from in excess of 
143 million to slightly less than 430 million.1 The problem of 
feeding this vast population was complicated by recurrent natural 
disasters, the consequences of which increased in severity as the 
public works efforts of the imperial government declined. The 
Manchu rulers of the Ch'ing dynasty had held sway over China 
through the greater part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
During this period, the Imperial Court, pursuing a policy that was 
characterized by extreme conservatism and a dynastic rather than 
national outlook, managed to hold the Chinese officialdom in 
check by maintaining ruling power while dividing responsible 
positions between Manchus and Chinese. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century the regime had become so effete that a succession 
of large-scale rebellions—the most serious of which were the 
T'ai-p'ing Rebellion (1851-64) and the Muslim revolts in the 
outlying southwestern and northwestern parts of China (185 5-73)— 
were pacified with difficulty, largely through the efforts of regional 
Chinese armies. With the subsequent rise of the regional officials, 
a trend toward decentralization of power occurred which the 
Imperial Court was never able to reverse thereafter. 
Into this recognizable pattern of dynastic decline entered the 
new element of Western intrusion. Contact between China and the 
West had been largely peaceful until the nineteenth century, but 
the opening shots of the Opium War (1839-42) between Great 
Britain and China signified a new era of Sino-Western relationship. 
Henceforth contact with the West increasingly came to mean 
pressure from the West. The latter held the trump card of military 
superiority because of its own advanced technology and the 
decadence of the Chinese military machine. Whenever China 
resorted to arms against the West, she was always bested, as was 
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the case in the Opium War, the "Arrow" War (1856-60) against 
an alliance of Great Britain and France, and resistance against the 
French in Annam (1884-85). These defeats cost China her suzerainty 
over Burma and Indo-China among her more important vessal 
states, on top of which she was forced to pay large sums of 
indemnities. She also had to open a number of ports to foreign 
trade—among which were Canton, Shanghai, and Hankow—and 
suffered further indignities in the loss of control over her import 
trade and the granting of territorial concessions. Politically and 
economically China seemed to be following the path of India in 
approaching the point where she would no longer be master of her 
own house. 
In the face of these Western pressures, China was forced to take 
certain steps in the hope of redressing the disparity between herself 
and the West. The most obvious of China's weaknesses was in 
military strength. Accordingly, the first efforts of such outstanding 
officials as Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-t'ang 
was in the improvement of the country's defenses. In 1855, while 
he was fighting the T'ai-p'ing forces, Tseng Kuo-fan established 
a small arsenal in Kiangsi Province. Ten years later Tseng Kuo-fan 
and Li Hung-chang founded the Kiangnan Arsenal at Shanghai, 
which was by far the largest arsenal in China then and for many 
years thereafter. Meanwhile Tso Tsung-t'ang had established a 
shipyard near Foochow in Fukien Province. These three men were 
at the forefront of Chinese efforts to match Western military 
superiority by the establishment of arsenals and shipyards. 
While military advancements occupied the chief attention of the 
most progressive elements of the Chinese officialdom, a modest 
beginning was also made in the field of education. A small school 
created in 1862 to train interpreters, the T'ung-wen Kuan, became 
the antecedent of China's first modern institution of higher educa­
tion. A program to train students abroad was instituted a decade 
later, largely through the efforts of Yung Wing, the first Chinese 
to be educated in America. These measures fitted in well with the 
movement for t^u-ch'iang, self-strengthening, which at that time was 
pushed by Li Hung-chang and others. The narrow scope of the 
movement for self-strengthening slowly evolved to cover more than 
just the making of arms and the training of students. In the field 
of communications, lively debate arose over the advantage of 
building railroads in China. There was less opposition to the 
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erection of telegraph lines, and the first line, established between 
Tientsin and its port of Taku, went into service in 1879. In the 
field of general industry, the establishment of a cotton mill in 
Shanghai was planned in 1882, but it did not materialize until a 
decade later. In all these efforts, Li Hung-chang played a leading role. 
The course of China's reaction to Western pressure was deter­
mined by a number of factors, the chief among which was that of 
leadership. In contrast to Japan, which, among other factors, 
benefitted from the rise of a group of able and energetic leaders 
in her efforts toward modernization, China suffered from a lack of 
unified leadership working toward reform and modernization. To 
be sure, scattered individuals did see the need for China to modernize 
herself along Western lines. Aside from those already mentioned, 
we need only single out such men as Feng Kuei-fen, Kuo Sung-tao, 
Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, and Cheng Kuan-ying.2 Yet the contributions 
of these few stood out precisely because they were exceptional 
rather than representing the norm. The vast majority of the ruling 
official-gentry class was conservative in outlook and regarded 
innovations as possible threats to the basis upon which its privileged 
position in Chinese society was founded. Consequently, the efforts 
of the progressive officials were sporadic at best, and every reform 
was pushed through against determined opposition on the part of 
conservative elements among the official-gentry class. 
Western pressure and Chinese reaction were both greatly inten­
sified in the last years of the nineteenth century and the opening 
decades of the twentieth. Import trade through the treaty ports 
increased in volume by leaps and bounds. Whereas in the early 
nineteenth century opium was just about the only item which the 
West could sell to the self-sufficient Chinese in any quantity, 
decades of exposure to Western commerce had created in the 
Chinese an appetite for factory-made goods. Cotton and cotton 
cloths were in the lead among the items imported, but kerosene, 
sugar, flour, and other consumer goods were not far behind. The 
increasing sale of foreign goods in China seemed to bear out the 
contention held by many Westerners that China was a vast 
untapped market. This estimation further whetted the appetite of 
the Western powers to get a share of this market. 
China's slowness in adjusting herself to Western pressure was 
the more glaring when contrasted with the course of action taken 
by Japan. That island kingdom, in many ways even more isolated 
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from Western influence before the arrival of Commodore Perry in 
1853 than China was before the Opium War, had rapidly come to 
terms with the new situation. By 1890 Japan had promulgated her 
constitution, and thereby served notice to China and the West alike 
that she could no longer be regarded as a backward Asiatic country. 
Meanwhile her continual efforts to enlarge her influence in the 
adjacent lands, particularly in Korea, had brought her into conflict 
with China on a number of occasions. The two countries finally 
went to war over a minor incident in Korea in 1894. Events on 
sea and land rapidly proved the superiority of the Japanese in 
every phase of modern warfare. The outcome of the war was soon 
evident. 
With her victory Japan became one more aggressive power 
scrambling for concessions in China. The latter's inability to best 
even a small non-Western power so lately opened to modernization 
proved the failure of China's self-strengthening movement. China 
was revealed to the world for what she was: a helpless hulk com­
pletely open to the plunder of all who wished to despoil her. And 
the reaction was immediate. In the three years following the 
signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki ending the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1895, France, Russia, Great Britain, and Germany suc­
cessively wrested important territorial and economic concessions 
from her. The day of China's dissolution seemed imminent. 
Faced with the dire situation, those elements in China which had 
been working for gradual reform and modernization were thrust 
aside by what might be termed "the activists." Led by the brilliant 
but intemperate K'ang Yu-wei, a small band of reformers in 1898 
managed to obtain the ear of Kuang-hsii, the reigning emperor. 
There occurred what came to be known as the "Hundred-day 
Reform." In a little over three months edict after edict came from 
the Imperial Throne, embodying many drastic political arid adminis­
trative reforms. This seeming success for the activists, however, 
was short-lived. Before any of the reform edicts could be put into 
effect, a palace revolution took place and the powerful and con­
servative Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi resumed the imperial power 
which she had permitted the Emperor to exercise for the few years 
prior to 1898. Six of the reformers were executed, and K'ang 
Yu-wei himself had to flee for his life. 
Although the activists failed in their attempt to reform China, 
the basic cause of their action, the desire to strengthen China and 
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rid her of the "accursed foreigners," remained. Two years after the 
failure of the Hundred-day Reform, it was the populace that had 
its chance to attempt direct action. This came in the form of a 
mystical patriotic group known as the Boxers. They were aided by 
the conservative elements among the officials, who accepted their 
claim of being able to drive the foreigners bodily out of China by 
force. With little real understanding of the Westerner's source of 
strength, the Boxers embarked on a campaign of arson and murder, 
which soon brought swift retribution. The upshot was China's 
ultimate humiliation at the hands of the joint forces of eight nations, 
to which China was forced to pay a staggering indemnity of 450 
million taels. 
The Boxer debacle proved to even the most conservative elements 
within the Chinese officialdom that some reform was absolutely 
necessary. The Empress Dowager herself, sobered by her precipitous 
flight to the interior to avoid capture by the joint expeditionary 
force, called for reform proposals from the officialdom. A number 
of leading officials came to the fore with their ideas. Of these 
officials none was more progressive or influential than the two 
governor-generals Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i whose 
jurisdictions spanned almost the entire Yangtze valley. 
During the decade from the end of the Boxer debacle to the 
Revolution of 1911, forces of reform were definitely making 
headway. They were further encouraged by the victory of Japan 
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which they interpreted as 
a victory for a constitutional Asiatic country over an autocratic 
European power. When in 1908 both the Empress Dowager and 
the Kuang-hsii Emperor died, there were high hopes within the 
ranks of the reformers that orderly and gradual reform under the 
aegis of the Manchu reigning house was just around the corner. 
That this was not to be can in part be blamed on the basic con­
servatism of the Manchus, who were not genuinely willing to 
institute reform measures which threatened their own privileged 
position over the Chinese. A more decisive factor was the revolu­
tionaries, who were independent of both the conservatives and the 
moderate reformers. As early as 1885, Sun Yat-sen, the future 
revolutionary leader of China, had already expressed his conviction 
that the fall of the dynasty was an inevitable prerequisite to the 
successful transformation of China, but his words then made little 
impression upon the majority of the Chinese at home and abroad. 
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The successive disasters from 1894 to 1900, however, definitely 
strengthened the revolutionaries' hand, and from 1901 onwards 
they increasingly had the sympathies of a large segment of the 
overseas Chinese, from whom they obtained both financial aid and 
moral support. 
When the revolution came, it succeeded like most major revolu­
tions in the world: unplanned, haphazard, and benefitting from a 
number of accidental factors. In some four months' time the 
Manchu imperial house relinquished all power, a provisional 
government was set up, and the first Chinese republic came into 
being. 
Those who expected the downfall of the empire to mark an 
upswing in China's modernization were soon doomed to disappoint­
ment. Instead of a strong and united government working toward 
the reconstruction of the country, there came the scourge of 
warlordism, which kept the country divided and irresolute. 
Republicanism seemed to suffer yet another blow when, during the 
course of World War I, Yuan Shih-k'ai, the first President of the 
Republic, sought to add imperial trimmings to his already dictatorial 
powers. In this he failed, and died soon after. The death of Yuan 
virtually ended all attempts to revive the throne, but while World 
War I was going on the cause of constructive republicanism in 
China seemed as futile as ever. The only good China derived from 
the war was the respite she enjoyed from Western political and 
economic penetration. Although politically Japan's aggressive 
designs more than made up for the preoccupation of Western 
powers in Europe, economically China's infant industries, especially 
her light consumer-goods industries, enjoyed a rapid growth with 
the slackening of foreign competition. Meanwhile all kinds of 
Western ideas were making their impacts on China. The end of the 
war saw China still in a political chaos, but socially and economically 
she was no longer the China of the 1890s. 
It was against this backdrop of events that Chang Chien carried 
out his career. His achievements as a modernizer was directly 
related to these events, and as he progressed in his career, he in 






CHANG CHIEN was born in the village of Ch'ang-lo in the district 
of Hai-men on July i, 1853.1 His family, however, had resided for 
many generations in the adjacent district of Nan-t'ung, to which 
Chang Chien soon returned as a child. Located on the north bank 
of the Yangtze River near its mouth in Kiangsu Province, Nan-t'ung 
was situated within the alluvial delta area of the Yangtze and was 
quite flat, with the exception of five hills on the riverbank: Chun 
Shan (Army Hill), Lang Shan (Wolf Hill), and three lesser hills. 
The people of Nan-t'ung were characterized by one writer of local 
history as industrious, persevering, with strong kinship ties, but 
conservative and superstitious.2 Most of them made their living from 
the cultivation of cotton, as well as the staple crops of rice and 
wheat. Generally speaking Nan-t'ung and other districts north of 
the Yangtze River were much less well endowed in climate, fertility 
of soil, and communications than the localities on the south bank 
of the Yangtze. 
Chang Chien's father, Chang P'eng-nien, had two wives, who 
between them bore him five sons. The elder Mrs. Chang, nee Kuo, 
gave birth to the oldest son, Chang Yii, and the youngest, Chang 
Ching. Between them there were Chang Mo, Chang Ch'a, and 
Chang Chien, all born to the younger Mrs. Chang, nee Chin. 
Chang Mo died at the age of nine of accidental drowning while 
playing with the neighboring boys. Chang Ching and Chang Yii 
died in 1902 and 1914 respectively. Chang Ch'a alone survived 
Chang Chien's death, by six years. Of his four brothers, Chang 
Chien was on intimate terms with only his third brother, Chang 
Ch'a. But the warm and close relationship between the two, whicff 
grew up through years of close collaboration in many projects, was 
something which sustained Chang Chien throughout his life. 
Chang Chien's family had been illiterate farmers for generations. 
His father broke the pattern of the family by acquiring a moderate 
education. Chang P'eng-nien became a farmer of some local 
importance. His education, however, did not go far enough to 
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permit him to qualify for the civil service examinations.3 Chang 
Chien early showed high intelligence and became the favorite of 
his father, who initiated his schooling when he was three years old. 
Throughout his childhood he studied under a succession of tutors, 
first together with his brothers and later alone. He was to spend 
most of his early mature years in study and in the taking of various 
civil service examinations. 
Chang Chien competed in his first examination in 1868, at the 
age of fifteen. It was then necessary for promising youths whose 
ancestors in the three previous generations had not been scholars 
to have guarantors and co -guarantors among the local gentry or in 
his own clan in order to qualify for the examination. Since Chang 
Chien's family came of farming stock, he had to comply. There was 
no lack of willing guarantors, but his father trusted his tutor, 
Sung P'u-chai, explicitly. And when the latter suggested that 
Chang Chien would do well to take the examinations under an 
assumed relationship with a certain Chang Chiung in the neighboring 
town of Ju-kao, Chang P'eng-nien agreed to the deception. Chang 
Chien therefore took his early examinations in Ju-kao under the 
name of Chang Yu-ts'ai. Chang Chiung turned out to be a com­
pletely unscrupulous individual, and, with the connivance of venal 
officials, blackmailed Chang Chien's family out of large sums of 
money and caused it no end of trouble. At one point Chang Chien 
had to leave Ju-kao in the middle of a dark, rainy night to avoid 
the possibility of being imprisoned. Fortunately there came to the 
aid of the hard-pressed father and son several staunch friends, 
among whom were Chang Chien's new tutor, Chao P'eng-yiian, 
and magistrate Sun Yiin-chin. It was largely through their efforts 
that Chang Chien was allowed to regain his own rightful name and 
registration. The whole unpleasant affair dragged on over a period 
of five years and made a lasting impression upon Chang Chien.4 
These early difficulties, however, did not prevent him from 
attaining the hsiu-ts'ai degree on his first try. He successfully passed 
through the hsien, chou, zn&yuan examinations, placing twenty-sixth 
in the latter, and was classified a fu-sheng.h In 1870 he tried for 
chii-jen for the first time, and succeeded in placing sixteenth in the 
k?o examination but failed to pass the provincial examination. He 
was to repeat this pattern of succeeding in the k?o examination and 
failing in the provincial examinations four more times, in 1873, 1875, 
1876, and 1879. These repeated failures were especially galling to 
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Chang Chien, since he won the top position in both the Kiangsu 
k'o examination of 1876 and 1879, advancing from the classification 
oifu-sheng to that oi lin-sheng in 1876. Also during this same period 
he successively came through as the top man in the examinations 
of two local academies (1874), and sui examination of 1877, and the 
examinations of three special academies (1879). The degree of 
chii-jen, however, continued to elude him until 1885, when, having 
traveled to Peking and taken the examination of the Imperial 
Academy, once more coming out on top, he competed in the 
provincial examination at the capital and succeeded in placing 
second highest among those who passed. He was then thirty-two.6 
By this time he had already achieved considerable reputation as 
a scholar. Nevertheless he was to find the road to chin-shih no less 
difficult than the path to chii-jen. This in spite of the fact that he 
had won the confidence of such influential men as P'an Tsu-yin, 
President of the Board of Works, and Weng T'ung-ho, the imperial 
tutor, who were the examiners on various occasions and who did 
everything they could to help him. Some of these instances of help 
were noted by Chang Chien in his personal record. In his second 
attempt at the chin-shih degree in 1889, for instance, P'an, in the 
capacity of the chief examiner, tried to include his paper among 
the ones who passed, but failed to locate it. In 1890 the examiner 
for his section forwarded his paper to the final selection, presided 
over by Weng. Again it failed to pass and another candidate's paper 
was adjudged the best. The extreme irony occurred in Chang 
Chien's fourth attempt in 1892. Once more Weng T'ung-ho was 
the chief examiner. He was determined to see that not only would 
Chang Chien pass, but that he would get the top prize as well. 
When the papers were all in, he and his colleagues went through 
the best papers with care, trying to pick out Chang Chien's paper 
by its style and content. Finally they settled on one as the most 
likely. Yet when the names of the successful candidates were posted, 
Chang Chien's name again failed to be included. A postexamination 
search revealed that his paper had been eliminated in the early 
rounds by an assistant examiner because of minor stylistic errors. 
Weng was deeply chagrined. Chang Chien himself was no less 
disappointed.7 By this time he was approaching forty years of age 
and had devoted twenty-four years of his life to the examination 
grind. By his own calculation he had spent a total of some 120 days 
in examination stalls. He was overwhelmed by the futility of any 
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further attempts and resolved to "put away the examination 
paraphanalia." 
Two years later, however, in 1894, Chang Chien once more took 
the metropolitan examination, at the insistence of his older brother. 
When the list was posted he did not even trouble to be present. 
This time his name was found in the sixtieth position. He improved 
on this in the reexamination by placing tenth, and when the palace 
examination was over, he was chosen to be the chuang-jiiany the 
highest of all. He was duly appointed a Compiler of the First Class 
in the Hanlin Academy. It may be of interest to note that the name 
of his friend, Weng T'ung-ho, was not among the examiners in 
the first two of these examinations but was included on the eight-men 
board of examiners for the final examination.8 
During this long struggle up the ladder of scholastic achievement 
Chang Chien had married and had also proven his abilities in areas 
other than the civil service examination. He was betrothed to his 
wife, nee Hsu, as early as 1870, when Chang Chien was seventeen, 
but circumstances delayed their marriage until four years later. Soon 
after Chang Chien's marriage he entered the employment of Sun 
Yiin-chin in Nanking, who in his previous capacity as the magistrate 
of Nan-t'ung had befriended Chang Chien. Though nominally a 
secretary, he was placed in an academy with Sun's own sons and 
ordered to devote his time to study. This first of a long line of 
Chang Chien's benefactors remained one of his staunchest supporters 
for many years and was instrumental in giving Chang Chien early 
opportunities to gain experience in international affairs and in water 
conservancy. Through Sun's recommendation in 1876, Chang Chien 
transferred into the service of Wu Ch'ang-ch'ing, who was then 
the garrison commander at P'u-k'ou, across the Yangtze from 
Nanking, but who was soon after transferred to Teng-chou in 
Shantung Province. He took Chang Chien with him to his new 
post. General Wu had a number of promising young men under 
his patronage. Among them were Yuan Shih-k'ai, the future first 
President of China, Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, later ambassador to England 
and France, and Ho Ssu-k'un, later a prominent associate of Chang 
Chien's. All were treated with consideration. Chang Chien's duties 
were made light so that he had ample leisure to devote himself to 
study. These circumstances, together with his growing maturity, 
no doubt played a part in his obtaining the top ranking in several 
of his examinations at this time. 
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Chang Chien's connection with Wu Ch'ang-ch'ing led to his 
taking part in the Korean episode of 1882. Relations between 
China and Japan in the modern era had begun in 1870, when Japan 
first attempted to negotiate a commercial treaty with China. Li 
Hung-chang and Minister Soejima Taneomi eventually came to an 
agreement in 1873. In 1874, however, Japanese activities in sending 
a "punitive expedition" to Formosa and the subsequent controversy 
between China and Japan over the Liu-ch'iu Islands (Ryukyus) 
indicated that the two countries had many areas of potential 
conflict. Among these potential danger spots Korea loomed large 
in the eyes of both China and Japan. 
Aware of her own precarious position in Korea, China, in the 
person of Li Hung-chang, pursued a policy of balancing one danger 
off with another. English support was counted on against possible 
Russian designs, and to cope with Japanese ambitions, the Korean 
king was prevailed upon to sign commercial treaties with other 
powers, especially with the United States. Li did not have an 
easy task, however, as the Korean king himself was caught between 
factions, the most powerful of which were the radical faction of 
the queen and the reactionary faction of the Tai-wen-kun, father 
and ex-regent to the young king. Furthermore, nearly the entire 
country was opposed to any kind of connection to the foreigners. 
Under the circumstances it was much to Li's credit that a commercial 
treaty was signed between Korea and the United States in the early 
part of 1882. Other powers quickly followed suit, and Korea signed 
similar treaties with England, France, and Germany.9 
In July, 1882, ultranationalist rebels, of the Tai-wen-kun's 
faction, surrounded the Japanese Legation, killed and wounded 
several Japanese, and forced the Japanese minister, Hanabusa 
Yoshitada, to flee to an English ship for safety. Acting Governor-
general Chang Shu-sheng of Chihli Province, in charge during 
Li Hung-chang's absence at home to observe the traditional mourn­
ing period, at once dispatched Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang and Ma 
Chien-chung to Korea.10 The army of General Wu Ch'ang-ch'ing 
was ordered to mobilize and to leave for Korea forthwith. Upon 
receiving this order on August 9, General Wu, who had come to 
recognize Chang Chien's ability during the six years the latter served 
under him, placed him in a position equivalent to a modern chief-of­
staff for the entire campaign. Chang Chien was then twenty-nine 
years of age. 
 13 EARLY LIFE
His very first task, the mobilization of troops in Teng-chou, 
proved to be a stiff challenge, since the army had to be in Korea 
within twelve days. Because of the fact that many of General Wu's 
protegees had gone back to their respective provinces for the 
triennial provincial examination, Chang Chien found himself 
carrying the entire burden of the administrative work with an 
undersized staff. Fortunately he had the able assistance of Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng, and Ho Ssu-k'un. Even then, Chang 
Chien worked practically round the clock to get the army ready 
for embarkation by the assigned date.11 
On August 16 the army was ready to move. The following day 
it left Cheeloo on board four ships for Korea. Due to efficient 
advance planning the ships reached Masan on the assigned date 
of August 21, even with a one-day delay at Wei-hai-wei occasioned 
by inclement weather. The landing in Korea gave Yuan Shih-k'ai, 
who was placed by Chang Chien at the head of the advanced 
group, a chance to display his coolness and courage under adverse 
conditions. On August 25 the Chinese army crossed the Han River 
and encamped two miles from Seoul.12 
At this point in the campaign the Chinese resorted to a strategem 
to deprive the Korean rebel faction of its head. After consulting 
with Ting Ju-ch'ang and Ma Chien-chung, General Wu paid the 
Tai-wen-kun a courtesy call on the morning of the twenty-sixth. 
Confident of Chinese good will, the Tai-wen-kun returned the 
courtesy that afternoon, at which time he was politely but firmly 
detained and given to understand he had been acting contrary to 
the will of the Chinese Emperor. He was immediately escorted to 
the troopships at Masan and taken to Tientsin. Chinese troops 
attacked and surrounded the main body of the rebels on the 
twenty-ninth. Without their leader, the rebels were speedily defeated. 
After fighting had ceased Chang Chien noticed that many of the 
rebels seemed to have fought only out of family loyalty and personal 
considerations. He persuaded General Wu to hold the prisoners 
and await the arrival of loyal Korean officials, and to punish only 
those adjudged guilty of leading the uprising. Thus there was no 
indiscriminate slaughter of the rebel forces. Afterward both the 
Korean king and General Wu freely praised Chang Chien for his 
part in the whole affair. The King awarded him a ceremonial robe, 
and General Wu, in accordance with a previous promise he had made 
to reward those who did the most to bring success to the expedition, 
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sent a thousand taels to the Chang family in Nan-t'ung.13 Chang 
Chien returned from Korea in 1884. Later that same year Wu 
Ch'ang-ch'ing died and his protegees were scattered. 
The decade following his return from Korea was a comparatively 
quiet one for Chang Chien. He continued to make slow progress 
in the civil service examinations. He aided his father in the latter's 
plan to promote silk production in Nan-t'ung. His literary reputation 
had gained sufficient renown so that he was invited to write local 
histories for several neighboring districts. As we have seen, he 
finally succeeded in gaining the first position in the highest examina­
tion in 1894 at the age of forty-one. But the satisfaction he must 
have felt in reaching the long-sought-for goal was made hollow by 
the death of his father that same year. Also in 1894 China and Japan 
went to war over Korea. The war swiftly proved to the world 
China's utter incapacity to defend her interests. The treaty con­
cluded at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, was generally regarded 
as a national disgrace. It came as a deep personal shock to Chang 
Chien. He forthwith made the decision to forego all active govern­
mental service and returned to his native district of Nan-t'ung. 
In the light of Chang Chien's subsequent career as a modernizer 
it does not seem unreasonable to surmise that his long struggle as 
an examination candidate and his personal experience in Korea had 
a direct bearing upon his outlook toward governmental service and 
his decision to abandon that career. Chang Hsiao-jo, in his biography 
of his father, has stated that the main factors which led Chang Chien 
to turn away from an official career were his concern for the weakness 
of China, his desire to break through the stereotyped conception of 
the uselessness of scholars in practical affairs, and his realization 
that even high officials were at the mercy and whim of the Throne. 
The last point was made vividly clear to Chang Chien in one specific 
episode. He was present in Peking one rainy day when the palanquin 
of the Empress Dowager returned to the capital. The officials 
meeting Tz'u-hsi all kneeled in the mud by the roadside, as court 
etiquette required them to do. They presented a most ridiculous 
sight, especially so since the Empress Dowager did not even deign 
to acknowledge their homage.14 
The reasons given above can be considered the overt factors, but 
his long and frustrating experience with the civil service examination 
and his stay in Korea probably contributed to the underlying 
motivations. His early difficulties in the examinations and his refusal 
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to knuckle under to them illustrate a certain stubborness and dogged 
perseverance in his makeup which was to be evident again later on, 
notably when he was working to raise funds for Dah Sun Cotton 
Mill. His later disappointments served to open his eyes to the 
supposed desirability of an official career. By the time he finally 
succeeded in the examinations, he was already in his forties and 
had acquired some fame through exploits outside of the traditional 
and prescribed course of scholarly advancement. Under the cir­
cumstances it should not be too surprising that the prospect of a 
slow advancement through the official hierarchy held little attraction 
for him. 
Chang Chien's experience in Korea also left a decided impression 
upon him. The successful outcome of the affair of 1882 convinced 
him that only by pursuing a vigorous policy in Korea would China 
be able to check the Japanese threat there. He wrote three treatises 
on the Korean question, all existing copies of which have been lost. 
From his other writings, however, we can piece together his 
recommended course of action in Korea. He proposed the reiteration 
of existing treaties, clearly proclaiming China's suzerainty over 
Korea, and the stationing of troops at the strategic northern Korean 
city of Pyongyang.15 He further advocated: (1) following the 
precedent of the Han Dynasty in incorporating northern Korea 
within China's boundaries; (2) placing a Chinese resident-general 
and troops in Korea to bolster her external defenses and to supervise 
her internal reforms; or as an alternative (3) encouraging Korea 
to put her own house in order, modernize her armed forces, and 
act in conjunction with Chinese troops in Manchuria.16 Chang Chien 
was not blind to the likelihood of antagonizing Japan with such 
a forward policy. In fact he wished to see China take the initiative 
of forcing Japan either to accept Chinese terms or to commit 
herself as an open aggressor. These bellicose proposals arose from 
his conviction that a determined China might lose Korea temporarily 
but could never be beaten in the long run. He was not alone in his 
opinion, as other officials cherished similar sentiments, notably 
Teng Ch'eng-hsiu and Chang P'ei-lun. These suggestions, however, 
were overruled by the Throne in favor of Li Hung-chang's policy, 
that of peaceful penetration in Korea and the balancing of one 
power by another. Yet although Chang Chien's specific recom­
mendations failed to be adopted, they demonstrate clearly that he 
was vividly aware of the threat represented by Japan. It was the 
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same fear of Japan later on that in part prompted him to forego 
the regular career of an official in favor of doing something concrete 
to modernize his country. 
For Chang Chien the signing of the treaty of Shimonoseki really 
marked the end of his scholarly life. Thereafter he was to devote 
his time and energies to the cause of a whole series of problems 
related to the modernization of China. These included industrial 
growth, constitutional government, modern education, land 
reclamation, salt reform, river conservancy, and civic and philan­
thropic projects. The Chang Chien of the pre-1894 era was virtually 
indistinguishable from the scores of "bright young men" turned out 
by the traditional civil service examinations system, perhaps more 
capable and worldly-wise than most, but certainly no less patriotic 
and no less steeped in Confucian classics. The Chang Chien of the 
post-1894 era retained much of the old moral core, but added to 
this was the man of foresight, action, and achievement, a man who 
was at the forefront of those who showed China the way out of 
the old centuries into the new. This is the Chang Chien on whom 
our attention will be primarily centered. 
CHAPTER THREE





T H E SUCCESS of Chang Chien in the palace examination of 1894 
gave him a great natural advantage over others when he decided 
to devote his life outside the regular official career. In a country 
like China, where education was the sine qua non of social position, 
power, and prestige, his obtaining the rank of chuang-juan—highest 
of the highest—counted for a great deal in any field he chose to 
enter. Added to the fact that no native of Nan-t'ung had ever been 
designated that rank in its recorded history, the magnitude of 
Chang Chien's prestige in Nan-t'ung and in Kiangsu can well be 
imagined. 
Having decided to abandon all thought of pursuing an official 
career so that he would be able to devote himself to some concrete 
means of helping his country, Chang Chien cast about for the best 
way to achieve his goal. He was convinced that, in the long run, 
the introduction of modern education must underlie all reforms, 
but he did not have the necessary funds to introduce educational 
reforms, even on a limited scale. Furthermore, he saw another 
matter which was more pressing for China at the moment: the need 
to do something about the tide of factory-made goods which was 
flowing into China.1 More and more his thoughts settled upon the 
idea of establishing a cotton mill in his native district of Nan-t'ung. 
A number of factors helped channel his thinking. Nan-t'ung 
was located in the sector of Kiangsu long famous for its cotton. 
Cotton was grown together with rice and wheat as one of the 
staple crops of the area. Nan-t'ung cotton was sought after by 
neighboring localities because of the greater length of its fiber and 
its superior texture.2 Thus there was an existing commodity which 
commanded a ready market in Chang Chien's native district. Hitherto 
a great deal of the cotton sold locally was used in hand spinning, 
but with the acceptance of cheap, machine-made yarn from abroad, 
handicraft workers generally concentrated on weaving, so that 
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conditions for the establishment of a cotton mill became favorable.3 
Another factor which impinged on his thinking was the signing 
of the treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, with the stipulation that the 
Japanese should enjoy the right to establish factories in the interior 
of China. Under the most-favored-nation clause of treaties with all 
the powers, this meant that countries like England, Germany, and 
other Western powers would receive the same right. Chang Chien 
was already aware of the deep inroads in China's economy made 
by the increasing import of cotton yarn and cloth from such 
countries as England and India. He hated to think of the prospect 
of seeing foreign-owned factories established in China, on top of 
what was already taking place.4 
Rise of Imports of Cotton Textile Products 
The single most remarkable fact in the picture of China's imports 
in the last third of the nineteenth century was the phenomenal rise 
in the import of cotton goods. This was particularly true of cotton 
yarn. Whereas only 33,507 piculs (2,234 tons, as 15 piculs equal 
a ton) of yarn were imported in 1867, 2,748,644 piculs were imported 
in 1899, an eighty-twofold increase.5 In the decade of 1882-91 
alone, cotton yarn import jumped from 184,940 piculs to 1,212,922 
piculs.6 Much of the jump during this decade was accounted for 
by the great increase in the import of Indian yarn. "The Indian 
cotton goods trade and its growth," stated Commissioner of 
Customs R. E. Bredon of Shanghai in 1891, "are the leading features 
of the last few years' trade in Shanghai. From 1 million taels 
[$1,290,000] worth in 1885 the trade grew to be worth 10 millions 
in 1891, and this, too, without in any way cutting into the trade in 
English and Dutch yarn."7 Following 1891, the import of Japanese 
yarn had an even more spectacular rise than did Indian yarn the 
decade before. Through the port of Shanghai alone, it jumped 
from a nominal worth of 1,760 taels in 1891 to 6,303,346 taels by 
1901. Meanwhile the value of Indian yarn imported through 
Shanghai also rose from 10 to 21 million taels during the same 
period.8 A measure of the increasing importance of cotton among 
the imports of China during the decade of 1882-91 can be seen when 
more than sixfold increase in the amount of cotton yarn imported 
is contrasted with the increase in the value of all imports (from 
79.5 million taels to 136 million).9 From this it is clear that import 
 19 DAH SUN AND NAN-T'UNG INDUSTRIES
of cotton goods, especially cotton yarn, was rapidly assuming the 
dominant position among the commodities imported into China in 
the late nineteenth century, comparable to a position once occupied 
by opium. 
Development of the Cotton Industry in China 
The great increase in the import of cotton yarn during the 
decade of 1882-91 showed that there was a ready market in China 
for machine-spun yarn. At the same time, the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
merely confirmed a trend which could not be long delayed in any 
case—the desire of foreign interests to establish factories in China. 
Chang Chien was not the first person to realize the dangerous 
implications of this trend. Only a handful of cotton mills, however, 
were in existence prior to the establishment of Dah Sun. 
The establishment of a modern cotton industry in China occurred 
over a relatively short period of time. Despite the fact that China 
had long been one of the leading cotton-producing countries of 
the world, the bulk of her raw cotton was consumed by the hand-
looms of the cottage industry, while the rest went for such modest 
uses as padding for winter clothing and quilts. Modern machine 
processing of cotton did not come into being in China until 1890. 
Although the efforts of the progressive officials played a large part 
in the development of the cotton industry, the initial impetus in 
the establishment of the first cotton mill in Shanghai was supplied 
by a private merchant named P'eng Chi-chih.10 In 1878 P'eng 
approached Li Hung-chang and Shen Pao-chen, the commissioners 
of trade for northern and southern China respectively, with a 
scheme to set up a weaving mill. Li Hung-chang was very much 
in favor of the scheme, and recommended Cheng Kuan-ying to P'eng 
as the official representative in the venture. Spring of 1879 saw a 
disagreement among the directors of the enterprise. Thereafter 
P'eng severed all relationship with the enterprise and Cheng Kuan­
ying took an increasingly active role in its affairs.11 
Cheng Kuan-ying came from an educated family, but chose to 
enter a business career, to which he devoted most of his mature life. 
He anticipated much of the later developments of the modernization 
in China in his book, Sheng-shih Wei-yen {Warnings to the Seemingly 
Prosperous Age), written in the 1880s, which, among other things, 
advocated the creation of a cotton industry to check the drain of 
2O DAH SUN AND NAN-T'UNG INDUSTRIES 
wealth through import of cotton goods. After he had assumed the 
direction of the embryonic enterprise, he made strenuous efforts 
to make sure the venture would not fail through the lack of 
thorough preparation. There were then a number of factors which 
had to be taken into consideration, among them the lack of any 
reliable data concerning the applicability of China-grown cotton for 
machine spinning and weaving, the hostility engendered by the 
project among the majority of the merchants and officials, and the 
inconstancy and incapacity among the executives, Cheng himself 
included. During this period of experimentation and delay, Cheng 
obtained from Li Hung-chang the guarantee of a monopoly in 
machine manufacturing of cotton cloth for ten years. Li took an 
active interest in the venture, and largely took over from Cheng 
in getting the weaving mill finally out of the planning stage. The 
Shanghai Weaving Bureau commenced production in 1890, and the 
success of the enterprise became immediately apparent; so much so 
that Li was not daunted by the outbreak of a disastrous fire which 
reduced the enterprise to a complete ruin. Subsequently the 
enterprise was reestablished as Hua Sheng Cotton Mill under the 
direction of Sheng Hsiian-huai and had a history of varied 
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successes. 
The establishment of the Shanghai Weaving Bureau marked the 
beginning of a decade which saw a continuing growth in the 
establishment of cotton mills. Without going into details, we may 
enumerate the ones which preceded Dah Sun. The locality with the 
largest number of mills was Shanghai, and most of the early mills 
were Chinese-owned. Among these were Hua Hsin (1891), Yii 
Yuan (1894), Yii Chin, Ta Shun (both 1895), and Yu T'ung (1898). 
Other Chinese-owned mills were found in Wu-ch'ang (Hupeh 
Weaving Bureau in 1892 and Hupeh Spinning Bureau in 1898), 
Ningpo (Tung Chiu Yuan in 1894), Wusih (Yeh Ch'in in 1897), 
Soochow (Su Lun in 1897), Hangchow (T'ung Yi Kung in 1897), 
and Hsiao-shan in the province of Chekiang (T'ung Hui Kung in 
1899). Beginning with 1897, foreign interests also established a 
number of cotton mills. That year saw the founding of two 
English-owned mills, Laou-Kung-Mow and Ewo, while German 
interests established Soy-Chee and American interests started the 
International Cotton Manufacturing Company (Hung Yiian).13 
Japanese interests were not far behind, but the period of Japanese 
domination did not arrive until after the turn of the century, when 
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many of the early ventures, ruined by undercapitalization or 
mismanagement, fell into Japanese hands. 
The Founding of Dab Sun 
Chang Chien was at home in mourning for his father in 1895 
when Governor-general Chang Chih-tung was assigned to the 
Liang-Kiang post, temporarily replacing Liu K'un-i, in the face of 
possible Japanese threat to the Yangtze delta area. The two Changs 
found each other congenial. Governor-general Chang commissioned 
Chang Chien, along with Shen Yiin-p'ei, to raise and train a corp 
of militiamen to guard the northern approaches to the mouth of 
the Yangtze River.14 The defeat of China by Japan removed the 
necessity of such a step, but Shimonoseki posed the greater threat 
of the specter of foreign mills being established on Chinese soil. 
Governor-general Chang took the initiative in urging local officials 
and gentry members to initiate industrial enterprises.15 In October, 
1895, he requested Chang Chien, Lu Jun-hsiang, and Ting Li-ying, 
all outstanding members of the Kiangsu gentry, to accept the posts 
of directors of commerce bureaus and to start cotton mills in 
Nan-t'ung, Soochow, and Chinkiang respectively.16 On Chang 
Chien's part, he accepted the dual responsibilities for Nan-t'ung 
only after much hesitation.17 
He succeeded in persuading six men to become the promoters 
of the Nan-t'ung cotton mill: P'an Hua-mou, Kuo Hsiin, Fan Fen, 
Liu Kuei-hsin, Shen Hsieh-chiin, and Ch'en Wei-yung. P'an, a 
Cantonese, Kuo, a Fukienese, and Fan, who came from Ningpo, 
were active businessmen from Shanghai, while the other three were 
all natives of Nan-t'ung and Hai-men.18 Assured of adequate 
support from the group, Governor-general Chang Chih-tung made 
public an announcement on January 15, 1896, of his intention to 
encourage the investment of private capital in cotton mills. This 
was followed shortly afterwards by an announcement designating 
the six men, with the help of Chang Chien, as the appointed group 
to undertake the setting up of the Nan-t'ung cotton mill.19 
The promoters went to Nanking and conferred with Governor-
general Chang on tax exemptions, receiving his promise that all 
necessary assistance would be rendered by the incumbent magistrates 
of Nan-t'ung, Wang Shu-t'ang, and of Hai-men, Wang Ping.20 
The governor-general further gave his approval to the detailed 
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arrangements of the newly named Dah Sun Cotton Mill.21 An 
initial capital of 600,000 taels was to be raised, with the Shanghai 
group of promoters, headed by P'an Hua-mou, responsible for 
400,000 taels, and Shen Hsieh-chiin and the rest of the Nan-t'ung 
group responsible for the remaining 200,000 taels.22 P'an and 
Kuo Hsiin were put in charge of the funds to be collected. Chang 
Chien was to serve as the liaison man between the promoters and 
the government.23 The factory was to be located five miles northwest 
of the city of Nan-t'ung at T'ang-chia-cha, where land had already 
been bought for the purpose. Machinery with a total capacity of 
20,000 spindles and the power plant necessary for its operation were 
to be purchased, which would produce an expected 150 piculs 
(20,000 pounds) of yarn per day. Raw materials were to be bought 
locally, and the finished products were primarily to be sold locally 
also. The provincial government kept the taxes on the products 
low to encourage growth of the enterprise, and other official aids 
were stipulated.24 On February 11, 1896, a memorial from Governor-
general Chang to the Court at Peking announced the initiation of 
the venture and paved the way for official approval of the enter­
prise.25 
In the spring of 1896 the Court ordered Chang Chih-tung and 
Liu K'un-i to return to their former posts of Hu-Kwang and 
Liang-Kiang respectively. Governor-general Liu affirmed his 
willingness to abide by the wishes of Governor-general Chang on 
the matter of establishing Dah Sun, except for minor modifications 
in taxes.26 
In August, 1896, two of the original six promoters, Fan Fen 
and Ch'en Wei-yung, backed out.27 Of the remaining promoters, 
P'an Hua-mou was especially wary of taking chances and cautioned 
the others to proceed slowly. Then a new factor entered the picture, 
the possibility of acquiring some cotton-spinning machinery which 
was already in Shanghai. This was the machinery which Governor-
general Chang Chih-tung had bought from England. In his previous 
tour of duty as the governor-general of Hu-Kwang, Chang Chih­
tung had been instrumental in establishing the Hupeh Weaving 
Bureau in Wu-ch'ang. Subsequently he had ordered from England 
machinery with a capacity of 40,700 spindles to enlarge the produc­
tive capacity of the enterprise. When he was shifted to the Liang-
Kiang post in 1894, the machinery was sent to Shanghai, along 
with an English engineer named Thomas, who was responsible for 
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the installation of the machinery. Governor-general Chang entrusted 
it to Huang Tsun-hsien, an official, and to Wu Hsi-ling, a merchant, 
to be used in a mill under joint official-private auspices. Then when 
Governor-general Chang was recalled to his Hu-Kwang post at the 
end of 1895, he felt it inadvisable, with himself about to be absent, 
to continue the arrangement in Shanghai. Accordingly, he requested 
Lu Jun-hsiang, the director of the Soochow Commerce Bureau, to 
make use of the machinery in the cotton mill which the latter was 
planning to set up.28 But Lu, fearing that the machinery would 
prove to be unsuitable, bought new machinery directly from 
England for his Su Lun mill. In February, 1896, Governor-general 
Chang entrusted the machinery to the director of the Kiang-ning 
(Nanking) Commerce Bureau, Kuei Sung-ch'ing, with instruction 
to sell it if possible.29 Director Kuei apparently indicated the 
availability of the machinery to the Dah Sun group, tentatively 
setting the price at 500,000 taels. 
The possibility of acquiring this machinery gave the Dah Sun 
venture new impetus. On September 14, 1896, P'an Hua-mou and 
Kuo Hsiin wrote to Chang Chien, advising that the machinery, 
which had been left on open docks in Shanghai for some time, 
be checked for possible damages sustained. Moreover, they urged 
getting from the government assurances of complete private 
control of the machinery before purchasing it.30 Subsequently the 
machinery was found to be in tolerable condition. Director Kuei 
Sung-ch'ing, no doubt anxious to close the deal, was willing to 
sell the machinery even if the asking price was not paid all at once. 
Through his representative, he further told P'an and Kuo that the 
provincial government would be willing to assist the private 
buyers if necessary.31 Chang Chien now conceived of the idea of 
changing the enterprise to a joint official-private venture, with the 
government contributing the machinery and the private backers 
raising a matching sum of 500,000 taels.32 
On November 2, Kuo Hsiin came to Nan-t'ung to inspect the 
factory site. Chang Chien broached the matter of the new arrange­
ment. Kuo demurred, saying that it still would be difficult to raise 
money from private sources. Chang Chien informed Kuo that he 
had found Chiang Hsi-shen and Kao Ch'ing in Nan-t'ung to 
replace the departed Fan and Chen. Kuo returned to Shanghai.33 
Two days later, P'an and Kuo wrote to Chang Chien, suggesting 
that the project of the mill be postponed for a year.34 They cited 
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the unfavorable business conditions of Shanghai as grounds for 
delay, but their real reason may well have been reluctance to enter 
into the new arrangement. As Chang Chien was to recall later, the 
day he received this letter, he "was beset by doubts and worries and 
paced the floor the entire night through."35 He wrote to P'an and 
Kuo, urging them not to despair.36 Apparently he succeeded for 
the moment. P'an and Kuo agreed to let Liu Kuei-hsin, one of the 
original promoters, join the Shanghai group, with Chiang and Kao, 
the two new promoters, joining Shen Hsieh-chiin to form the 
Nan-t'ung group, each group agreeing to raise 250,000 taels.37 
On December 6, 1896, following Director Kuei's intimation of a 
possible government loan of 60,000 taels, an agreement was signed 
between the government and the six private promoters, pledging 
the government to contribute the necessary machinery with a 
capacity of 40,700 spindles, valued at 500,000 taels, providing that 
the private promoters raised a like amount. The government would 
retain only supervisory power, with all actual control remaining in 
the hands of the private group. All profit and losses were to be 
shared equally between the two parties. Kuei Sung-ch'ing signed 
for the government, while Chang Chien attached his signature to 
those of the six promoters.38 On the occasion of the signing, 
P'an and Kuo again stated that it was virtually impossible to raise 
money in Shanghai. It was then agreed among the promoters that 
P'an and Kuo would each raise 80,000 taels; the remaining 340,000 
taels would be the responsibility of the Nan-t'ung group. Liu Kuei­
hsin now rejoined the latter group.39 
On March 26, 1897, the six promoters and Chang Chien held a 
meeting in Shanghai. The Nan-t'ung group accounted for nearly 
59,000 taels, which they had raised, while P'an and Kuo had raised 
only 20,000 taels.40 At this meeting it was agreed that all would 
work toward the goal of reaching the 200,000 taels figure in the 
following three months.41 But rumors of P'an and Kuo's dissatis­
faction persisted, even reaching the ear of Governor-general Liu 
K'un-i.42 P'an and Kuo now apparently felt that they would be 
at a disadvantage in the enterprise, to which complaint the Nan-t'ung 
group answered that the condition was of P'an and Kuo's own 
making, and that the two men could easily change the situation by 
assuming responsibility for raising a larger share of the funds than 
their self-imposed limit of 160,000 taels.43 
In May, 1897, another business recession set in. The Nan-t'ung 
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group petitioned the Kiang-ning Commerce Bureau for a loan of 
100,000 taels, citing the bureau's loan of 600,000 taels to the Su 
Lun Mill of Soochow as precedent. In the petition they stated the 
cost of construction of Dah Sun to be 240,000 taels, of which only 
half was accounted for by the money already gathered.44 This 
petition was unsuccessful, but it further worsened the relationship 
between the Nan-t'ung and the Shanghai groups. P'an now claimed 
that news of official involvement in the venture had led Shanghai 
investors to withdraw the 20,000 taels previously raised.45 In July 
the Nan-t'ung promoters went to Shanghai and tried to have the 
Shanghai group produce at least 60,000 taels to match the 120,000 
taels collected by the Nan-t'ung promoters, but P'an remained 
adamant.46 Matters reached an impasse at this point. The Nan-t'ung 
promoters then requested Director Kuei to allow them to resign, 
but Kuei instead urged them to persevere in the venture.47 
Chang Chien now looked to other quarters for financial resources. 
He began to approach Sheng Hsiian-huai, the noted official-
entrepreneur who already controlled several cotton mills in 
Shanghai.48 Chang Chien proposed that half of the government-
contributed machinery be assigned to Sheng to establish a new 
mill in Shanghai, in exchange for which Sheng would help raise 
money for Dah Sun. In this effort Chang Chien had the encourage­
ment of Director Kuei.49 On August 16, 1897, an agreement was 
signed between Chang, Sheng, and the government, in which the 
main points were: (1) two mills, one at Nan-t'ung and one at 
Shanghai, to share equally the machinery of 40,700 spindles capacity; 
Chang and Sheng to raise 250,000 taels each from private sources 
to match the government contribution of the machinery; (2)Chang 
Chien in full charge of the Nan-t'ung mill, with Sheng getting a 
free hand at Shanghai; and (3) confirmation of the tax scheme set 
forth in the previous agreements with the government.50 This 
agreement confirmed the main points of a private agreement 
signed by Chang and Sheng five days previously on August 11. 
The private agreement included the additional stipulation that, 
aside from his financial responsibility toward the projected Shanghai 
mill, Sheng would share responsibility in raising the 250,000 taels 
stipulated for the Nan-t'ung mill, plus an additional 150,000 taels. 
For these obligations, Sheng was given the option of appointing 
two of the department heads in Nan-t'ung.51 The signing of these 
two agreements meant that in effect two factories were to be 
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established in place of one, with Sheng assuming complete respon­
sibility for the Shanghai mill and promising to back Chang Chien 
on Dah Sun. Upon hearing this drastic revision of the enterprise, 
P'an and Kuo tendered their resignations to Director Kuei and 
severed all further connections with Dah Sun.52 
Within a month Sheng Hsiian-huai was informing Chang Chien 
of the difficulty of raising funds among Shanghai business circles 
because of the recent example of the joint official-private cotton 
mill at Wu-ch'ang being completely taken over by the govern­
ment.53 Chang Chien received assurances from Governor-general 
Liu K'un-i that private interests would have a complete free hand 
in managing Dah Sun,54 but this apparently did not calm the 
doubts of prospective investors. Chang Chien himself went to 
Shanghai in November to try to raise more funds, but without 
55 success.
In December, 1897, Chang Chien let out the contract for the 
building of the factory for the sum of 90,000 taels, payable in a 
few months' time,56 and the foundation of the main plant was laid 
that month. Construction proceeded steadily through 1898. Not 
only was it necessary to build the main factory buildings and 
warehouses, but considerable work had to be done in building 
roads, bridges, river enbankments, and canal locks. Chang Chien's 
commitment to the contractors increased his financial worries. The 
seemingly advantageous agreement with Sheng Hsiian-huai became 
worthless when the latter failed to live up to his word. Faced 
with bad business conditions and mounting financial crises in his 
other business interests, Sheng never assumed his end of the 
responsibility toward either the projected Shanghai mill or Dah 
Sun.57 Attempts by Chang Chien to secure government loans 
through Director Kuei were equally unavailing, despite the latter's 
earlier intimations.58 
On April 17, 1898, Chang Chien sent an appeal to Governor-
general Liu K'un-i, setting forth the desperate financial situation 
and stating that a minimum of 50,000 taels was needed in a month's 
time to meet commitments.59 There is no evidence of Liu's response 
to this appeal. In the same letter Chang Chien also informed Liu 
of his prospective trip to Peking on other matters and his hopes 
of raising money there.60 Leaving Shen Hsieh-chiin in charge of 
Dah Sun, he went to Peking in June. There he tried to raise 
additional money, but once more met with failure.61 At this time 
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some 180,000 taels had been raised from private sources, but most 
of the money had already been used to pay the contractors.62 By 
November Chang Chien was at his wit's end. He now sought to 
resign from both his position as director of Nan-t'ung Commerce 
Bureau and his responsibility toward Dah Sun, but Governor-
general Liu persuaded him to stay on.63 The governor-general, at 
least, was thoroughly sympathetic toward Chang Chien's efforts. 
He had tried to help in 1897 by urging various local officials to 
lend official funds to the venture, but without success.64 Now in 
1898 he tried again.65 This time his appeals apparently succeeded 
in persuading customs and salt officials to lend Dah Sun 38,500 
taels,66 but still more funds were needed. 
Chang Chien now swallowed his pride and once again approached 
Sheng Hsiian-huai. On December 26, 1898, he wrote to both Sheng 
and Governor-general Chang Chih-tung, informing them of his 
vain efforts to raise funds from other sources after Sheng had 
broken his word. Relying upon Governor-general Chang's support, 
he further proposed to Sheng that, assuming that Sheng had 
legitimate reasons for failing to uphold his end of the agreement, 
he should at least be willing to lend Chang Chien 100,000 taels, to be 
repaid within one year at 8 percent interest per annum.67 Sheng's 
reply five days later contained the counterproposal that Chang 
Chien take over the direction of the four cotton mills Sheng already 
controlled in Shanghai at the time, and merge the financial needs 
of Dah Sun with those of the other mills.68 Chang Chien's answer 
to this was a flat refusal.69 In a letter dated January 11, 1899, he 
unburdened his frustrations to Governor-general Liu: 
I am writing with much shame. Do I not know the difficulties which 
you have encountered ? In the past three years I have lost count of the 
times when I had to endure discouragement and sarcasm. I have had to 
associate with people whom I would not have associated with ordinarily, 
and I have done things I would not have done otherwise. My tongue 
is numb and my writing brush tattered. I have done things in the daytime 
which I regret at night. You probably did not know this. How could 
I have told you everything anyway?70 
By the end of 1898 the factory was 90 percent completed.71 
Most of the machinery had been installed under the supervision 
of the original engineer, Mr. Thomas, but the financial situation 
remained desperate. Temporary aid came in the form of official 
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loans. Responding to Governor-general Liu's appeal, the magistrates 
of Hai-men and Nan-t'ung lent the equivalent of 30,000 taels to 
Dah Sun, while the Likin Bureau lent 10,000 taels.72 By this time 
Chang Chien realized that, to the original estimated sum of 250,000 
taels, which had never been fully raised, another 250,000 taels must 
be added to ensure the possession of sufficient operating capital.73 
For this additional sum, he decided to negotiate a foreign loan. 
He found two Americans in Shanghai who agreed to raise the sum 
for him, payable in ten years at the interest rate of 6 percent per 
annum. They apparently promised more than they could deliver, 
for no further news came from them after their departure from 
China.74 Then for a while it seemed that a private investor from 
Fukien was about to put 200,000 taels into the venture, but this 
prospect also came to nought.75 Having exhausted all these 
possibilities, Chang Chien decided to begin production at Dah 
Sun while taking care of the most pressing debts by reselling a 
part of the 80,000 taels worth of raw cotton already bought.76 
The machinery was tested on May 8, 1899, and the first spool of 
Dah Sun yarn was produced on May 23.177 
The beginning of production did not relieve Chang Chien of his 
financial difficulties. Of the 220,000 taels raised, 210,000 taels had 
already been spent in paying for construction cost and in payment 
for the guaranteed 8 percent dividend of invested sums.78 In June, 
1889, Chang Chien made another futile trip to Shanghai to raise 
funds.79 While there he started negotiations with a group of 
Shanghai merchants to rent out Dah Sun for three years at the 
annual rent of 40,000 taels (equivalent to 8 percent of the assessed 
value of 500,000 taels). The negotiation first broke down over 
disagreements about the net worth of the enterprise, and foundered 
completely when Governor-general Liu refused to sanction such 
an arrangement.80 Liu now tried to come to the aid of Chang Chien 
once again by telegraphing the magistrates of Shanghai, Chinkiang, 
Wu-hu, and Kiukiang to lend Chang Chien official funds. The 
local magistrates' reaction can be gauged by that of Yuan Shuang­
ch'iu, the magistrate of Wu-hu, who, notwithstanding his old 
friendship with Chang Chien, stated that Chang Chien was foolish 
to get involved in the venture in the first place.81 One official, 
however, did lend Dah Sun 200,000 taels.82 
As this was still insufficient, Chang Chien borrowed from 
English and Japanese banks in Shanghai during August and Sep­
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tember to keep going.83 Yarn prices now began to rise sharply on 
the Shanghai market.84 Chang Chien consulted with Shen Hsieh­
chiin, his closest business associate and one of the small band of 
loyal friends who stodd by him throughout his difficult days. 
The two men jointly decided to take the gamble of increasing 
production at the risk of exhausting the limited supply of raw 
cotton even sooner.85 This decision turned out to be fortunate. 
Dah Sun was able to replenish its cotton supply and continue 
production. By October, 1899, Chang Chien sent the first optimistic 
letter to Governor-general Liu since he began the project.86 
Thereafter Dah Sun was firmly established as a going concern. 
Throughout the period of nearly five years during which Chang 
Chien persisted in trying to raise funds for Dah Sun, he had the 
greatest difficulty in convincing private investors that the project 
was financially sound. After Dah Sun became a joint official-private 
enterprise, he found it even harder to raise funds from private 
sources, and the venture was bailed out of difficulties several times 
only by opportune loans from official sources. The reluctance of 
private businessmen to invest in Chinese-owned cotton mills was 
not entirely without good reason. They knew of the fact that 
investors in one of the early mills had not received a cent of dividend 
in return for their money, and that the backers of the Su Lun Mill 
had succeeded in getting some dividends only after reluctant 
company officials were forced to pay them. It was in order to 
overcome such adverse circumstances that Dah Sun agreed to pay 
8 percent guaranteed dividend (kuan-li) on all investments starting 
with 1896, the very first year of the venture, long before actual 
production.87 The rate of 8 percent was also the highest among 
cotton mills, for 6 percent was considered high by Chinese mills 
in Shanghai, where the foreign mills were only paying dividends of 
3 percent.88 In spite of this inducement, it was still difficult to raise 
private funds. The persons closest to the venture had to risk even 
more. While the investors in Dah Sun were guaranteed a high 
return as soon as they contributed funds, Chang Chien and the 
other promoters received not a cent of salary during the three 
years before Dah Sun began production.89 
With the enterprise finally on its way, the Boxer disturbance of 
1900 caused only a minor setback. Thereafter Dah Sun followed a 
general pattern of increasing production and profits.90 The continued 
success of Dah Sun led Chang Chien to think of expanding its 
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operations by the establishment of branch mills. Accordingly, he 
applied in 1904 for official permission to open a branch mill in 
Ch'ung-ming, a large island in the Yangtze estuary south of Hai-
men. In his petition he proposed to set up a mill with machinery 
of 20,000-spindles capacity on a capital of 800,000 taels. He cited 
the former Governor-general Chang Chih-tung as having given 
him the right to establish cotton mills in the general area of Nan-
t'ung and Hai-men, which could be interpreted to include the 
territory of Ch'ung-ming. He further added that, due to the 
abundance of cotton in Ch'ung-ming, opening of one cotton mill 
there would not necessarily preclude the possibility of others 
setting up separate cotton mills.91 
This last statement betrayed the real reason for Chang Chien's 
desire to establish a branch mill in Ch'ung-ming. He had heard 
rumors that certain Shanghai merchants were planning to establish 
their own mill either in Ch'ung-ming or Hai-men. If this took 
place, it would cut into the source of raw cotton available for 
Dah Sun, and it would place a rival mill directly in Dah Sun's 
own back yard. It was to forestall this possibility that Chang Chien 
made plans to push through the opening of a branch mill.92 
His petition was duly approved, and raising 600,000 taels by 
early 1906, he was able to start operations by April, 1907.93 Whereas 
forty-four months were required to start operations at the main 
mill, the branch will took only twenty-seven months from its 
inception to the time all buildings were erected and machinery 
installed.94 In a number of ways the branch mill benefitted from 
the experience gained with the main mill, as for instance, many 
of its workers went through a period of training at Nan-t'ung 
before the opening of the branch mill.95 For the first few years, 
however, the latter operated at a loss.96 Chang Chien in his report 
on the tenth anniversary of the branch mill attributed the difference 
between the main mill's success and the branch mill's early difficulties 
to the fact that the main mill had the advantage of superior location, 
with better transportation facilities, a ready local market, and an 
adequate supply of skilled labor.97 The branch mill's construction 
cost alone amounted to more than 700,000 taels,98 which, together 
with 215,000 taels paid out as guaranteed dividend from 1904 to 
1908, kept the branch mill in the red during that entire four-year 
period.99 
The machinery for the branch mill came from two sources. 
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Machinery with the capacity of 12,000 spindles was obtained from 
the province of Shansi. It was originally ordered from England by 
the Shansi provincial government for a cotton mill, but the project 
was abandoned during the Boxer uprising. An additional 14,000 
spindles were bought directly from the Howard & Bullough 
Company in England,100 adding up to 26,000 spindles in all. 
The establishment of the branch mill was followed shortly by 
the reorganization of the entire Dah Sun enterprise. Certain 
shareholders had launched rumors detrimental to Dah Sun in 
general and to Chang Chien in particular. As a result, Chang Chien 
called a shareholders meeting on August 31, 1907. 101 Some fifty 
shareholders and ten honored guests attended the meeting. At this 
meeting Cheng Hsiao-hsii, one of Chang Chien's earliest associates, 
proposed that Dah Sun be reorganized into a limited liability 
company, in accordance with the newly promulgated commercial 
laws of the country. Cheng's suggestion was accepted by the 
shareholders.102 All essential personnel, however, remained un­
changed. 
Under the reorganization the branch mill was designated as 
Dah Sun Mill No. 2. In subsequent years Chang Chien had 
ambitious plans for further expansion. Eventually four Dah Sun 
mills were established, two in Nan-t'ung and one each in Ch'ung­
ming and Hai-men, although plans for the founding of mills in 
Ju-kao, Tung-t'ai, Yen-ch'eng, and elsewhere in Kiangsu were 
never realized.103 
The Growth of Dah Sun 
The growth of Dah Sun can be traced in a number of ways.104 
Taking the most common yardstick for cotton mills, the number of 
spindles, we find that the original number of 20,350 was increased 
by another 20,3 50 in 1904. This was the other half of the machinery 
which was supposed to be used by Sheng Hsiian-huai in the 
Shanghai mill which he never established. In 1915 the total number 
of spindles at the Nan-t'ung mill stood at 60,700. This was raised 
to 74,700 by 1918. Meanwhile the branch mill had started in 
Ch'ung-ming in 1907 with 26,000 spindles. By 1925 its total stood 
at 35,000 spindles. In 1921 a third mill was established in Hai-men 
with 34,340 spindles. Yet another mill, originally planned as Mill 
No. 8, but later designated Mill No. iB, was started in 1924, with 
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16,724 spindles. Thus by 1925 the combined number of spindles 
of Dah Sun's four mills was 177,488. To this figure should be 
added 1,342 looms in the weaving sections of three of the mills 
(Mill No. iB had no looms). 
Another measure of Dah Sun's phenomenal growth was in its 
total capitalization. Starting with 500,000 taels in 1899, the figure 
rose to 580,000 taels in 1901, 1,130,000 taels in 1903, and 1,802,490 
taels in 1905. This latter amount included the capital for the 
establishment of Mill No. 2 at Ch'ung-ming. Further increases 
pushed capitalization figures to 1,919,390 by 1907 and to 1,995,790 
the following year. In 1915, and again in 1918, further increases 
totaling 1,000,000 taels were authorized to pay for added machin­
ery.105 In the report made in 1925, the figure for Mill No. 1 was 
2,500,000 taels, and for Mill No. 2, 1,194,390 taels (no figures were 
given for Mills No. 3 or iB). Information available in 1929 gave 
the same figure for Mill No. 1, but increased that of Mill No. 2 
to 1,416,390 taels, and added that Mill No. 3 had a capital of 
3,000,000 (again figures for Mill No. iB were not available). Thus 
the total capital for the three largest of the four Dah Sun mills in 
1929 stood just shy of the 7,000,000 taels mark. 
More indicative of Dah Sun's year-to-year growth, however, are 
the figures for the net profit earned. These can best be seen in 
table form, as in Table t, which tabulates number of spindles and 
capitalization as well. 
Suffice it here to point out only a few salient points. Figures 
available to us from 1899 to 1913 show that, starting with the 
figure of 52,369 taels in 1900, the upward trend of earnings received 
no substantial reversal until 1907, when, from the previous year's 
gain of more than 400,000 taels, it fell to less than 5 6,000 taels. In 
1910 a second drop from more than 247,000 taels to about 75,000 
taels occurred. But three years later, the figure had exceeded the 
previous peak of 1905. After 1913, earnings apparently jumped to 
fantastic heights. Although annual records are available only up to 
1913, authoritative sources indicate that Dah Sun annual dividends 
reached the figure of 90 percent during World War I.107 In the report 
to the stockholders issued in 1925, the total profits of Mills No. 1 
and No. 2 since they came into operation were given as nearly 
13,500,000 taels.108 
The growth of Dah Sun from 1899 to the 1920s stands out in 












































































































































































































































(a) Totals of Dah Sun Nos. 1 and 2 hereafter. 
(b) Totals of Dah Sun Nos. 1, 2, and 3 hereafter. 
(c) Totals of Dah Sun Nos. 1, 2, 3, and ib hereafter. 
(d) Figures in Yen,	 Chung-kuo Mien-yeh Chib Fa-chan, 119, corrected by figures 
in primary sources in TCLS (1), 147. 
industry as a whole. Out of a total of sixteen Chinese-owned 
cotton mills established between 1896 and 1913, all except Dah Sun 
either failed or changed ownership by the time of World War I.109 
The unique success of Dah Sun must be attributed to a number of 
factors. First, Dah Sun had the advantage of being located in the 
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best cotton-growing district in China. It could count on an adequate 
supply of the superior Nan-t'ung cotton, which sold at a price io to 
15 percent cheaper locally than in Shanghai, due in part to the 
saving in transportation cost.110 Dah Sun effected further economy 
by buying directly from the field and ginning the cotton itself.111 
Second, there was a ready local market. The bulk of Dah Sun yarn 
was sold in the Nan-t'ung and Hai-men area.112 This area had long 
had a flourishing handicraft weaving industry. The introduction of 
machine-spun yarn fitted in well with the needs of the local hand 
weavers. Third, because of the difference of living standards in 
Nan-t'ung as compared to Shanghai, for instance, Dah Sun wages 
were generally 10 to 20 percent lower than comparable wages in 
Shanghai. For example, Dah Sun paid its workers in the carding 
room a maximum daily wage of twenty fen (equivalent to ap­
proximately U.S. $0.08 in 1916),113 while Soy-Chee and International 
Cotton, both foreignowned mills in Shanghai, paid their cardhands 
maximums of twenty-seven fen (about U.S. $0.1 i)and twenty-five fen 
(about U.S. $0.10) respectively.114 Fourth, compared to the general 
run of Chinese-owned cotton mills of the time, Dah Sun was ef­
ficiently managed and economically operated.115 Almost unique 
among its competitors, Dah Sun sought improvement in technology 
and administration.116 The credit for this state of affairs does not 
belong to Chang Chien alone, but must be shared with several of 
his associates, notably Shen Hsieh-chiin and Chang Ch'a, Chang 
Chien's older brother. Liu Hou-sheng, one of Dah Sun's officers, 
has stated that Chang Ch'a was a better businessman than his better-
known younger brother.117 Chang Ch'a was a successful local 
magistrate in Kiangsi in 1902 when he received an urgent call for 
help from his younger brother back home. After some hesitation, 
he returned to Nan-t'ung and began a lifelong association with 
Dah Sun, lasting some thirty years. Of his four brothers, Chang 
Chien was close only with Ch'a. The two had unbounded trust 
in each other. Chang Ch'a's business acumen admirably com­
plemented his brother's tireless energy and organizing ability.118 
Dah Sun's successes, culminating in the war years and immediately 
following postwar years of 1918-21, was unfortunately followed 
by a steady decline thereafter. This trend was true of Chinese 
industry in general, and Dah Sun was caught in the over-all business 
decline. This fact, however, does not totally exonerate Chang Chien 
from being at least partially responsible for Dah Sun's misfortunes. 
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At the time during World War I when Dah Sun's profit reached 
fantastic heights, Chang Chien was warned by one of his associates 
of the danger of declaring such high dividends in preference to 
plowing some of the profit back into the company, but he did not 
heed this warning.119 Continued high profit inevitably attracted 
speculators from Shanghai and elsewhere to putting money into 
the company, thus accentuating even more unrealistically its apparent 
prosperity.120 Meanwhile, Chang Chien used a part of Dah Sun's 
excess profits to support his numerous other Nan-t'ung projects,121 
without keeping the accounts absolutely clear.122 The day of 
reckoning came soon after the end of the war-induced period of 
prosperity. The years following 1923 saw both Dah Sun No. 1 and 
No. 2 operating in the red, while No. 3 was barely in the black.123 
Now the stockholders of Dah Sun, long the beneficiaries of the 
company's success, turned on Chang Chien for its sudden failure. 
He was accused of permitting Dah Sun to lend 2,500,000 taels to 
various land reclamation companies, most of which were also 
failing in the general business decline.124 Chang Chien was further 
accused of siphoning off 900,000 yuan (about 630,000 taels) from 
Dah Sun for the various Nan-t'ung projects.125 That these charges 
were probably true can be seen in the fact that Chang Chien in 
self-defense merely argued that Dah Sun had a moral obligation 
to help out the Nan-t'ung projects, and he assured his critics that 
he would personally assume any debts incurred by Dah Sun to the 
projects.126 
From 1923 on Dah Sun went further and further into debt. In 
1924 Dah Sun No. 1 was already operating under a loan extended 
by a consortium of banks in Shanghai.127 After Chang Chien's 
death in 1926 Dah Sun declined even faster. By 1935 Mill No. 2, 
owing the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications a total 
of 1,100,000 yuan, became the joint property of these two banks. 
Later it was sold to a Chinese company for less than 500,000 yuan.128 
A year later the Shanghai consortium lent another 4,000,000 yuan 
to Dah Sun No. 1 and 1,000,000 yuan to No. 1B.129 The records 
are not complete beyond 1936, but it appears that the major units 
of Dah Sun had all become heavily indebted by the time of the 
Sino-Japanese conflict. 
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Other Nan-t'ung Industries 
Dah Sun was fundamental to the industrial complex of Nan-t'ung 
because, with minor exceptions, all other enterprises founded by 
Chang Chien were either directly or indirectly connected with Dah 
Sun. Aside from the Tung Hai Land Reclamation Company and 
the Tung Jen T'ai Salt Company,130 the other important Nan-t'ung 
enterprises were Kwan Sun Oil Mill, Dah Sing Flour Mill, Han Mu 
Lin Publishing House, Che Sun Waterways Company, Dah Ta 
Pier Company, Dah Ta Inland Navigation Company, Dah Sun 
Steamship Line, Fu Sun Sericulture Company, and Tze Sun Iron 
Works. Of these, only Han Mo Lin Publishing House, being 
primarily connected with the Nan-t'ung Normal School, was not a 
subsidiary of Dah Sun. 
The first enterprise which grew directly out of Dah Sun was 
Kwan Sun Oil Mill. Strictly speaking, the mill was the result in 
the first instance of the desire of several cotton mills in Shanghai 
to set up a cottonseed-oil mill in the region of Nan-t'ung and 
Hai-men. All except Hua Sheng Cotton Mill soon dropped the 
scheme. Dah Sun and Hua Sheng joined forces in founding Kwan 
Sun. Most of the Kwan Sun machinery was originally ordered by 
Hua Sheng for the use of the Shansi provincial government. After 
the latter failed to .carry through its end of the deal, it was sold 
to the German-owned Soy-Chee Cotton Mill. For the price of 
10,000 taels, shared equally by Dah Sun and Hua Sheng, the 
machinery was bought back from Soy-Chee. It lacked, however, 
the boiler and the engine needed to power the machinery. Con­
sequently it was arranged to locate Kwan Sun immediately adjacent 
to Dah Sun in T'ang-chia-cha so that the machinery could be 
operated by means of Dah Sun's power plant. Of the original 
capital of 50,000 taels, 10,000 came from the two cotton mills while 
the additional 40,000 were raised by Sha Yuan-pin, who became 
the manager of the enterprise.131 
Kwan Sun began operation in 1903. Soon it was profitably 
converting cottonseed, formerly a waste product of Dah Sun, into 
useful by-products. By 1909 its capital had been raised to 213,000 
taels and it had acquired its own power plant. That year the stock­
holders agreed to raise an additional 107,000 taels as a first step 
toward the eventual goal of 400,000 taels as the total capital.132 
Of this 107,000 taels, the original stockholders subscribed to 60,000 
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taels, with the remaining 47,000 taels to be raised on the open 
market in Shanghai.133 
By 1915 further constructions had been added to the original 
two-storied brick structure to give it a capacity of 142 rooms. At 
that time it was earning a net profit of around 30,000 yuan (about 
21,000 taels) in an average year.134 By 1921 it was employing a total 
of over 400 workers under the general supervision of Sha Yuan-pin, 
who had been with the company ever since its inception. Cottonseed 
oil, which had many household and industrial uses, was the com­
pany's main product. It also produced cottonseed cake, cottonseed 
husks, and waste cotton as by-products. The cottonseed cake was 
a valuable fertilizer and found a market throughout the greater part 
of Kiangsu. Cottonseed husks and waste cotton were sold locally, 
the former for fuel and the latter for garment padding. Kwan Sun 
maintained sales outlets throughout Kiangsu and even in Japan, 
Europe, and the United States. The products of Kwan Sun con­
sistently won prizes at various international and national expositions. 
There was no question as to the success of this first subsidiary 
enterprise of Dah Sun.135 
Another enterprise which grew out of the fact that Dah Sun 
originally had more power than it could profitably use was the 
Dah Sing Flour Mill, later renamed Fuh Sing.136 The enterprise 
was originally the brainchild of several officials of Kiangsu and 
Kiangsi, who initiated the venture as an adjunct of Dah Sun in 
February, 1901. It soon turned out that the available machinery 
had too limited a capacity for profitable production. As a result 
the enterprise was established as a separate entity from Dah Sun 
in 1902. Largely through the efforts of Hsu Shih-lin, one of the 
original Kiangsi officials, 40,000 taels were raised as capital and the 
necessary machinery purchased from the United States.137 
The first two years of Dah Sing's existence it maintained a 
working agreement with Dah Sun. Not long after it severed all 
connection with the latter, it was forced to close up because of 
mismanagement. Its backers, in order to save the business from a 
total loss, entrusted it to Chang Chien and Chang Ch'a. Between 
them the Chang brothers managed to raise 100,000 taels, and the 
flour mill was reopened in June, 1909, under the new name of 
Fuh Sing.138 In 1914, 50,000 taels were added to the capital. Finally 
in the spring of 1921 an additional 100,000 yuan (about 71,000 taels) 
were raised, bringing the total capital to 221,000 taels.139 
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Fuh Sing, like Dah Sun and Kwan Sun, was also located at 
T'ang-chia-cha. It occupied a three-storied structure as its main 
factory, with later additions of offices and dormitory space.140 
In 1921 it employed sixty men. The wheat used came mostly from 
Nan-t'ung and the surrounding districts in Kiangsu. The flour 
produced was sold in most of the important coastal ports, as far 
as Tientsin in the north and Foochow in the south, with one grade 
of flour exported even to Japan.141 That Fuh Sing turned out to be 
a highly successful business can be seen from the net profit figure 
of 87,000 yuan (about 62,000 taels) in 1911. A decade later net 
profit jumped to a high of 250,000 yuan (about 179,000 taels) per 
year.142 The business of Fuh Sing continued to expand into the 
1930s.By 1933 it was processing 500,000 piculs (33,333 tons)of wheat 
yearly, a two-and-a-half time increase over the figure of 1920.143 
Close as the connection between Kwan Sun, Fuh Sing, and 
Dah Sun was, the two steamshiplines, the pier, and the waterway 
companies were even more intimately linked with Dah Sun. The 
first of the steamship lines, also called Dah Sun, came about directly 
as a result of the effort to facilitate the shipment of raw materials 
and finished products between Nan-t'ung and Shanghai. For 
several months after Dah Sun Cotton Mill became a going concern 
in late 1899, the mill used the steamshipline operated by a Shanghai 
merchant named Chu Pao-san. As the business of Dah Sun in­
creased, the arrangement became less suitable. Early in 1900 Chang 
Chien undertook to reorganize the steamshipline, renaming the line 
after the cotton mill and arranging with Chu to raise the capital 
to 32,000 yuan (about 23,000 taels), with the cotton mill responsible 
for 12,000 yuan.144 Soon after the reorganization, the steamshipline 
began to carry passengers, which added to its income. By the end 
of 1901 Chang Chien found the partnership with Chu and other 
Shanghai backers still unsatisfactory. He began negotiations, which 
ended in August, 1902, with his buying out the Shanghai group 
for 14,000 yuan (10,000 taels), 70 percent of their share of the 
capital.145 From 1902 until 1909, Dah Sun Steamship Line con­
sistently showed a profit, to the extent that it could add a new ship 
to its fleet in 1906 at a cost of 26,000 taels without having to issue 
new stocks.146 
The success of Dah Sun Steamship Line no doubt prompted 
Chang Chien to lay plans for a second line, plying between Nan-t'ung 
and some of the nearby localities. In 1903 the Chang brothers, 
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together with Sha Yuan-pin, obtained official permission for the 
new line, under the name of Dah Ta Inland Navigation Company. 
With an original capital of 20,000 yuan (about 14,000 taels), the 
company, consisting of a single small steamer, began regular runs 
through the interior waterways between Chin-sha and Lii-ssu, 
located at the two extremeties of Nan-t'ung district. Just as Dah 
Sun Steamship Line came into being to facilitate the transportation 
of Dah Sun Cotton Mill's products to Shanghai, the bulk of Dah 
Ta's business was the transportation of raw cotton from the 
outlying parts of Nan-t'ung to the mill. Increasing demands of the 
cotton mill caused the expansion of Dah Ta.147 In 1906 its capital 
was increased by 10,000 yuan (about 7,000 taels) and two more 
small steamers were added, to ply between Nan-t'ung and the 
neighboring districts of Tung-t'ai, Yen-ch'eng, and Hsing-hua.148 
Because Dah Ta ships traveled the interior waterways which 
crisscrossed the Yangtze north-bank districts, a good deal of 
opposition was aroused by the appearance of these steamers, some 
from official sources. Opposition began even before the establish­
ment of the company. A certain official Li of Nanking wrote to 
Governor-general Wei Kuang-tao his opposition to the granting 
of permission for the company on the following grounds: (1) the 
greater speed of the steamer would cause frequent collisions in the 
narrow waterways; (2) the steamers would eventually cause crews 
of native boats to lose their jobs, thereby either inciting them to 
attack the steamers or turning them into bandits; (3) some bridges 
spanning the waterways were too low; (4) sparks from steamers' 
funnels would endanger native boats loaded with fuel; and (5) 
constant battering by the wake of passing steamers would weaken 
the banks of the waterways.149 That the viewpoint of official Li 
did not prevail is already indicated above by the granting of the 
permission to establish the company. Opposition, however, was 
not confined to one official alone. In 1904 the Liang-Huai salt 
commissioner ruled against the passage of steamers on certain salt 
waterways. Chang Chien protested this decision to Governor-
general Wei in no uncertain terms, pointing out the special danger 
that, if Chinese shipping lines were hampered in their developments, 
they would soon be hard pressed by foreign competition permitted 
under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.150 Apparently his 
protest was effective, as Dah Tah continued to operate on interior 
waterways for many years thereafter. 
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The success of Dah Ta is shown by the fact that by 1919 total 
capital reached the 80,000 yuan (about 57,000 taels) mark. Four 
years later it was doubled.151 The three ships of 1906 were increased 
to thirteen by 1914, and two more ships were added in each of the 
three years of 1917, 1920, and 1921. By then the ships were plying 
on eight routes, connecting Yang-chou, Ju-kao, T'ai-chou, and 
others with the localities already mentioned.152 
The activities of the two steamship lines made it necessary to set 
up two more enterprises. In 1904 Chang Chien applied for and 
received permission to organize the Dah Ta Pier Company in 
Shanghai. With 139,000 taels as capital, Dah Ta carried out the 
building and maintenance of a pier with warehousing facilities for 
the use of Dah Sun Cotton Mill and other Chinese enterprises. In 
his application Chang Chien emphasized the fact that existing piers 
were all foreign-owned and that the establishment of Dah Ta 
would be a great boost to Chinese prestige.153 
In 1906 a pier with warehouses was built at T'ien-sheng Harbor 
in Nan-t'ung district, serving the needs of T'ang-chia-cha. The 
development of T'ien-sheng Harbor as the chief transportation 
center for the products of the various Nan-t'ung industries came 
full circle that same year with the setting up of the Che Sun Water­
ways Company, which took over the task of harbor improvement 
as well as improvement of the interior waterway between T'ien­
sheng Harbor and T'ang-chia-cha.154 By then T'ien-sheng was 
already handling nearly two million taels of business yearly and 
netting the provincial government a handsome revenue of nearly 
12,000 taels in likin, the internal transit tax.155 
With all these enterprises booming, it was inevitable that some 
kind of enterprise would be set up, capable of making the less 
complex machines needed in the various industries, as well as 
providing facilities for repairing them. Such an enterprise was 
established in 1905 by the Chang brothers, who raised 200,000 yuan 
(about 143,000 taels), largely from the reserves of Dah Sun Cotton 
Mill.156 Named the Tze Sun Iron Works, the enterprise grew out 
of the pooling of the repair facilities of Dah Sun Cotton Mill, Kwan 
Sun Oil Mill, and Dah Sing Flour Mill. Its first manager was 
Chang Ching-ju, son of Chang Ch'a, who served capably until his 
early death in 1917. Under his management Tze Sun grew by 1915 
into an industrial concern employing a total of 200 men. Its principal 
product was manually operated cotton gins, but it also made 
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numerous other products, ranging all the way from household pots 
and pans to sizable river steamers. Most of the newer ships of 
Dah Ta Steamship Line were locally built by Tze Sun.157 Unlike 
most of the other Nan-t'ung industries, Tze Sun generally operated 
at a loss, its deficit being made up by Dah Sun.158 
Most of the enterprises described thus far follow the pattern of 
growing out of Dah Sun, and later becoming either important 
businesses in their own right or continuing to serve as subsidiaries 
of Dah Sun. Among the enterprises located in T'ang-chia-cha, 
however, was one company which began largely as a separate 
entity but later entered into the closest ties with Dah Sun. This 
was the Fu Sun Sericulture Company, which later became Fu Sun 
Weaving Mill. The germinating idea which led to the founding 
of Fu Sun antedated even the establishment of Dah Sun, for it was 
Chang Chien's father, Chang P'eng-nien, who first became in­
terested in promoting sericulture in Nan-t'ung in the early 1890s. 
Chang Chien, having been associated with his father in this project, 
conceived at the time of the establishment of Dah Sun a two-prong 
textile program for Nan-t'ung, the development of cotton and silk. 
Until 1904, however, he had no chance to carry out the second 
part of his design. That year he, together with his brother and Kao 
Ch'ing, one of the chief backers of Dah Sun, founded the Fu Sun 
Sericulture Company. At first the activities of the company were 
limited to the raising of silkworms and the promotion of the 
planting of mulberry trees, efforts which could hardly be termed 
industrial. Sometime after the important meeting of stockholders 
of the Nan-t'ung industries in 1907, which linked all industries into 
one organization, Fu Sun was reorganized into a weaving mill, 
based on a capital of 100,000 taels.169 Thereafter growth was steady. 
By 1926 Fu Sun occupied a large complex of buildings in T'ang­
chia-cha and employed close to 400 men and women. It was 
organized into three departments, silk, cotton, and dyed fabrics, 
producing cotton cloth, silk fabrics, and dyed fabrics respectively.160 
Of the enterprises in Nan-t'ung which were only indirectly 
connected with Dah Sun, the Yih Sun Distillery, founded in 1905, 
was originally located on the land of the T'ung Hai Land Reclama­
tion Company and designed to use the wheat and kaoliang grown 
as subsidiary crops on reclaimed lands. After the typhoon of 1905 
had badly affected crop production on the reclaimed land, the 
distillery was moved to Chang Chien's native village of Ch'ang-lo. 
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There it became a profitable enterprise, and its distilled spirits were 
good enough to win prizes at the International Exposition of 
Milan in 1906. By the 1930s it attained a productive capacity of 
1,500 catties (2,000 pounds) yearly.161 
Two other smaller enterprises were the Dah Lung Soap Factory 
and the Mao Sun Construction Company. The former came into 
being to utilize the waste products of Kwan Sun Oil Mill in the 
production of soap and fertilizers. The latter was organized when 
other private merchants, attracted by the facilities offered by T'ang­
chia-cha, came to locate their own enterprises there. This created 
a need for the construction of new factory and office buildings. 
Mao Sun was founded specifically to answer that need.162 
All of the enterprises mentioned above were amalgamated into 
one corporate entity in 1907. As a result of the reorganization of 
Dah Sun into a limited liability company that year, its previous 
arrangement of subsidizing all other Nan-t'ung enterprises, an 
arrangement which had reached a figure in excess of 400,000 taels 
by this time, was found to be incompatible with Dah Sun's new 
corporate structure.163 Again at the suggestion of Cheng Hsiao-hsii, 
the Nan-t'ung Industrial Company was created.164 Its capital of 
600,000 taels came from Dah Sun's extra reserves (kung-chieh 
Chang Chien as an Industrialist 
Although Chang Chien did not come from a business back­
ground, and did not confine his activities solely to the industrial 
world, his involvement in establishing Dah Sun and his later 
industrial efforts inevitably call for us to examine him in the role 
of an industrialist. Just what did he do in regard to the operation 
of his numerous industrial enterprises ? Did he personally run them 
on a day-to-day basis ? Was he aware of the manifold repercussions 
of industrialization upon an agrarian country like China? How 
did he fit his industrial activities into the scheme of his total career ? 
In short, what was his exact role in the industrial development of 
his district and his country, and how much was he conscious of 
the larger implications of his industrial efforts ? 
There are several ways in which we can examine Chang Chien the 
industrialist. The most obvious would be to assess him as the active 
manager of the various enterprises, the man who made the executive 
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decisions. Unfortunately we are handicapped by the scarcity of 
pertinent sources. No such records as business memoranda, orders 
of purchase and sale, directives to department heads, or even 
private letters among the various Dah Sun executives have been 
left for us. Consequently we can get only a general idea of Chang 
Chien's duties and activities within Dah Sun. What little we know, 
however, does shed some light on Chang Chien as a business 
executive. 
The single most important piece of evidence we have on Chang 
Chien's relations vis-a-vis the other executives at Dah Sun is a 
document called the "Factory Agreement," written either by 
Chang Chien or at his direction in December, 1897. It was modeled 
upon agreements of other cotton mills then operating in Shanghai.166 
As contained in T'ung-chou Hsing-pan Shih-jeh Chih Li-shih 
(History of the Establishment of Industries in Nan-t9ung), the "Factory 
Agreement" is a document of some forty pages.167 There is a brief 
preamble in which Chang Chien explains why he went into the 
cotton-spinning business and goes on to justify the need for such 
a document as the agreement. The main body of the agreement, 
composed of fifteen articles, begins with the definition of duties and 
responsibilities of Chang Chien himself, then those of the heads of 
each of the four departments: business, supervisory, general affairs, 
and accounting. The agreement goes on to state conditions of 
employment, salaries, bonuses, hours, and other minor matters, 
even including the type of meals which the junior executives were 
permitted to have while working at the plant.168 These stipulations 
are applicable to only the office staff, and specific though they may 
seem, they are far surpassed in detail by the following section 
giving instructions and regulations applicable to the different stages 
of production. In what amounts to an appendix of some thirty-four 
pages, this section contains stipulations ranging from the one 
requiring all apprentices of the buying and selling departments to 
study English for two hours each day to those setting forth the 
daily production quotas of workers in the different stages of the 
cotton-spinning process. There are also detailed stipulations as to 
the exact duties of plant guards and as to what to do in case of 
fire.169 In other words, all regular working conditions and emergency 
measures which could be foreseen were covered in the "Factory 
Agreement." 
What are the implications of this detailed set of regulations? 
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There seem to be three. In the first place, the need for such a 
detailed set of regulations probably arose in part because the 
operation of Dah Sun was unfamiliar to the cotton workers of 
Nan-t'ung, who made up the labor force of the enterprise, and 
who knew cotton spinning only as a handicraft industry. Secondly, 
the fact that Chang Chien issued such a document demonstrated 
clearly that he was directly responsible in the first instance for 
every policy decision of the company down to the most minute 
matters. Finally, we must assume that not all of these regulations, 
formulated at a time before even a single spool of Dah Sun yarn 
was produced, stood the test of actual operations. Modifications 
must have been made as Dah Sun operations became more regular. 
Nevertheless, the fact that no written revisions of this agreement 
were ever made and that it appeared in print in the same detailed 
fashion ten years after Dah Sun commenced operations seems to 
imply that, broadly speaking, this agreement remained the "bible" 
for Dah Sun operations. 
The impression that Chang Chien took it upon himself to exercise 
broad powers is further buttressed by the specific duties which he 
assigned to himself in the "Factory Agreement": 
It is my responsibility to act between the official and private promoters 
of the enterprise, to regulate profit, to overcome obstacles, to set 
regulations, to appoint and remove officers of the enterprise, to investigate 
into achievements and inefficiencies, to determine credits and faults, and 
to pass out awards and fines.170 
Thus the conclusion that Chang Chien was the policy maker and 
at the same time overseer of actual operations is inescapable, but 
this must be qualified somewhat by the other scattered information 
at our disposal. From Chang Chien's report to the stockholders 
given in 1907, we learn that at the very start in 1896 six departments 
were contemplated for Dah Sun operations, each to be headed by 
one of the six original promoters in the enterprise. Then after the 
two Shanghai promoters P'an and Kuo withdrew, the departments 
were consolidated into four, with Shen Hsieh-chiin heading 
business, and the other three promoters, now designated as directors 
{tung-shih), heading the remaining three departments.171 During 
this early stage Shen Hsieh-chun shared many of the responsibilities 
of Chang Chien, and, as we have seen, the key decision in 1899 
to increase production, which saved Dah Sun, was a joint decision 
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on the part of the two men.172 Soon afterward they were joined by 
Chiang Hsi-shen in actively directing the business. In 1902 Chang 
Chien's elder brother Chang Ch'a heeded the former's call for help 
by giving up his official post and returning to Nan-t'ung. Chang 
Ch'a's presence permitted Chang Chien to devote most of his time 
to the normal school and to his land reclamation projects. Two 
years later, after Chiang died and Shen retired, Chang Ch'a assumed 
sole responsibility for the over-all direction of Dah Sun.173 From 
that time forward Chang Chien in effect occupied what amounted 
to the position of a board chairman in a Western-type corporation 
while Chang Ch'a was the chief executive of the enterprise. 
There is another way in which we can examine Chang Chien 
the industrialist. That is to trace his economic views, particularly 
as they pertain to industrialization and the impact of machine 
manufacturing upon China. A number of Chinese scholars, in 
examining the economic thoughts of late-Ch'ing thinkers, have 
included Chang Chien.174 The picture of Chang Chien the industrial­
ist thus presented to us is a man of definite views, ranging from 
the advocacy of private enterprise, of the corporate structure of 
business enterprises, to championing a larger scheme of "cotton 
and iron policy" {mien-fieh chu-i). There is no question that Chang 
Chien was deeply convinced by the necessity for China to industrial­
ize. Immediately upon the defeat of China at the hands of Japan 
in 1895, Chang Chien, presumably at the request of Governor-
general Chang Chih-tung, drew up a long memorial which 
Governor-general Chang submitted to the Court in his own name. 
Among the many specific suggestions in the memorial, the following 
concerns the promotion of industry: 
People all say that foreign nations maintain themselves through com­
merce. This is a superficial view. They do not know that the basis of 
the foreign nations' riches and strength is industry. First they master 
chemistry and the other natural sciences, and become adapt at machine 
manufacturing, to the extent that the unprocessed become refined, the 
few become many, and the worthless, valuable. And then the merchants 
have the opportunity to make substantial gains through trade. In the 
K'ao-kung Chi of Chou times the crafts are considered as one of the six 
main vocations. Emperor Shun, in appointing nine officials to oversee 
universal affairs, had one in charge of industry. The Analects is one of 
the nine classics. It too mentioned the crafts as the source of wealth. 
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From this it can be seen that the three generations of ancient sages all 
agreed on this point. Later generations emphasized the scholar and the 
official and neglected the crafts and industry. 
The goods sent from abroad into China are all machine-made of fine 
quality, with a value upwards of ten times the original material. Even 
such inexpensive items as coarse fabric, kerosene, dyes, firing clay, after 
they have been processed, become valuable. Take Japan for example. 
She has emphasized industry, organizing industrial promotion organiza­
tions along with commercial exhibitions, and singling out the superior 
products among the everyday objects produced by the people. This can 
be said to be following the examples of the West. Since the Japanese 
government rewards the maker of superior products to encourage ex­
cellence, the various crafts compete eagerly, thereby improving Japanese 
goods constantly and finding greater markets for them. Today Japan's 
natural resources are limited to things like seaweed and coal. Where 
she is able to gain great profit from China and the West is in her ap­
plication of manpower and not in her natural resources. 
China is densely populated. If she were to rely upon agriculture alone, 
she cannot survive. There will be no end of difficulties in the days to 
come. Therefore we must concentrate with single purpose [to promote 
industry]. Otherwise the country cannot provide for the millions of her 
uprooted people and recover the tens of millions [of taels] which she 
loses every year [to foreign nations]. Every province should be required 
to establish industrial bureaus to concentrate on the problem. They 
should search the customs office records for native products with the 
greatest market potential, then improve the quality and increase the 
production of such items in order to promote their sales [abroad]. 
Factories should be set up to produce items of foreign goods which have 
the greatest sale in China, in order to compete with the foreign items 
and check their sale. Such efforts should be in the fields of coal mining, 
iron production, the machine processing of silk, the planting of cotton, 
tea, and sugar cane, the processing of sugar and flour, ceremics, woolens, 
and foreign-style needles, nails, wine, and matches. These efforts would 
achieve the result of both promoting the sale of native products and 
resisting the import of foreign goods. It would be the responsibility of 
governor-generals and governors of every province to establish com­
mercial bureaus, and proceed according to conditions of production and 
sales in each locality. Every province must accomplish some results, and 
the provincial officials from governor-generals down should be held 
accountable for their success and failures. 
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Moreover, officials heading groups of craftsmen should be dispatched 
abroad to learn from various industries. They should learn all they can 
in [improved] agriculture, manufacturing, textiles, [iron] refining, 
shipbuilding, armaments, roadbuilding, mining, and chemicals. After 
returning to China they should be put into industrial efforts, the officials 
responsible for theoretical planning and the craftsmen into actual 
execution. 
China is the most populous country in the world. If we can only 
industrialize, what worries would we have? This is the way to care 
for the people and strengthen the nation. It is not designed merely to 
eliminate insults [from foreign nations], but it would achieve that result 
also.175 
Ten years later, on the occasion of the founding of Tze Sun 
Iron Works, Chang Chien had this to say: 
As stated in the Shih Chiy we Chinese depend on agriculture for our 
food handicraft for our production, and commerce for our inter­
course. Handicraft is indeed the central connection between agriculture 
and commerce. In the West the people found handicraft too 
expensive; consequently they turned to machine manufacturing. At the 
least, what one machine produces is equivalent to that of several tens 
of workers, sometimes to that of several tens of animals, at the most, 
several hundreds or even a thousand heads of animals. The machine's 
efforts are even, consequently its quality is also superior. It can be in 
constant operation, so that its quantity is also large. It is by nature exact 
and economical. As a result its products can reach us and reap great 
profits. Today China is promoting industry without using machinery. 
This is comparable to trying to win a thousand // race while riding on 
a tortoise. And if we use machinery without seeking to make them 
ourselves, this is tantamount to be in perpetual dependence on others, 
taking the third position while delegating the top position to Western 
factories and the second position to the commercial middlemen. The 
products of our industries are only circulated in our own markets, 
thereby expropriating the profit of manual laborers. This is not a 
desirable state or affairs.176 
Thus, in spite of the fact that Chang Chien was not above citing 
precedents in Chinese history to justify his position, there is no 
denying that he saw clearly the basic advantages of machine 
manufacturing over handicraft industry, and the need for industrial­
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ization in China's attempt to save herself. We must still ask, however, 
whether he understood the theories and forms of modern industrial 
and business enterprises. 
In his attempt to promote industrial development Chang Chien's 
career and pronouncements both betray his preference for private 
enterprise, but he did not clearly champion private enterprise as 
such. Rather he advocated gentry participation in business. Relying 
upon his own experience, he argued that the funds needed by the 
gentry for such activities as social welfare projects should legitima­
tely come from business enterprises.177 This was appealing to the 
gentry along practical grounds, but Chang Chien went further. 
Confronting the deep-seated tradition among the gentry that 
business careers were beneath their dignity, Chang Chien asserted 
that, on the contrary, the gaining of wealth through successful 
business ventures was "right and honorable."178 
While Chang Chien steadfastly maintained the distinction between 
gentry and merchants, his championing of gentry involvement in 
business was in effect an argument against direct government 
involvement in business. He, however, did not see the issue clearly 
between government participation on the one hand and private 
initiative on the other. Quite typically, he chose the middle ground 
of advocating gentry participation in business, thus bringing in a 
class which was at once outside the government and yet closely 
related with the ruling circles. His ideas on private enterprise 
involving the gentry obviously grew out of his own gentry status 
and his experience in founding Dah Sun. Neither Dah Sun's original 
"private" nor its later "joint" status was a result of decisions made 
on doctrinal grounds. They evolved through practical necessity. 
Chang Chien always took the pragmatic view. In 1905, for instance, 
he urged the government to establish a precedent by extending 
official protection to Nan-t'ung industries, on the ground that 
government protection was essential to the country's industrial 
development.179 Thus his advocacy of private enterprise was 
something considerably less than total commitment to the ideal in 
theory. 
Similarly, he showed an affinity for the corporate structure in 
business organization, but not on doctrinal grounds. In two pieces 
of his writings, the Reasoned Discussion on Reforms and the "prospec­
tus" for the T'ung Hai Land Reclamation Company,180 he stressed 
the need for the formation of companies {kung-ssu)}*1 These sources 
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have led scholars to assert that he was an advocate of the corporate 
form.182 Both of these sources, however, were written in 1901, the 
year when he began his land reclamation efforts. The context of 
these sources further shows conclusively that he was addressing 
himself specifically to the problem of forming a land reclamation 
company. Nowhere in any of this writings did he demonstrate an 
understanding of the concept of limited liability. As we have seen, 
Dah Sun was not organized initially as a limited liability company, 
and Chang Chien did not change Dah Sun's corporate structure 
until 1907, and then only at the suggestion of his long-time associate 
Cheng Hsiao-hsu, whose motives may have been to still the rising 
chorus of criticism against Chang Chien. Dah Sun's difficulties in 
the 1920s can be directly related to Chang Chien's own cavalier way 
with corporate funds. The conclusion that he never did fully grasp 
the basic difference between a partnership and a limited liability 
company seems inescapable. 
What Chang Chien's various pronouncements on industrial 
activities does show is a strong feeling of paternalism on his part 
toward the workers of his enterprises. He regarded them as under 
his personal care. The detailed regulations of Dah Sun already 
alluded to above give ample evidence of this attitude. The working 
conditions of Dah Sun in the 1920s also reflect Chang Chien's 
concern for the welfare of his workers. Like most other Chinese 
cotton mills of the time, workers operated on twelve-hour shifts, 
but they had rest breaks at 6 A.M. and 6 P.M., and days off on the first, 
eighth, fifteenth, and the twenty-third of every lunar month.183 
Each worker had two weeks annual vacation, and up to two weeks 
off during the hottest part of the summer months.184 These regula­
tions were among the most humane in the entire Chinese cotton-
textile industry at the time. 
Finally, much has been made of Chang Chien's so-called cotton 
and iron policy, which he enunciated in 1913 while serving as the 
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.185 Actually this was merely 
a logical outgrowth of his concern for the raising of cotton to 
include the mining of essential metalic ores. For the latter he was 
willing to have the mining enterprises nationalized.186 His policy 
was really nothing more than a practical program to ensure the 
uninterrupted supply of two types of basic resources: cotton for 
the consumer-goods textile industry and iron and other metals for 
basic heavy industry. 
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Taking Chang Chien's economic views as a whole, two things 
become readily apparent. First, he did not isolate his ideas on 
industrial efforts from his concern with the total economic develop­
ment and growth of the country. He conceived of industry, com­
merce, agriculture, and conservation as interrelated facets of the 
whole economic picture. And to him China's economic development 
was in turn inextricably bound up with her educational and social 
advancement. Second, his economic ideas were nearly all reactions 
to specific needs and exigencies of the times. They were not meant 
to form a consistent and comprehensive program, systematically 
worked out. Typically Chang Chien arrived at his economic ideas 
from the specific to the general, applying working solutions to 
problems rather than advocating a doctrinal program of national 
economic development and then attempting to apply it to concrete 
cases. 
Aside from examining Chang Chien's managerial duties and his 
economic ideas, we must view his role as an industrialist in yet 
another way. That is to conceive of him as a creative entrepreneur. 
The noted economist Joseph Schumpeter has conceptualized this 
kind of an entrepreneur as a type of daring and far-seeing individual 
who is primarily concerned with the establishment of new enter­
prises.187 A further definiation conceives of this kind of an entre­
preneur as "a decision-maker whose creative initiative draws all 
factors of productions together to initiate, maintain, and expand 
business enterprises."188 Chang Chien seems to fit into this con­
ception of an entrepreneur especially well. He served as the catalytic 
agent to bring together the various elements necessary for a produc­
tive enterprise: capital, raw material, technology, and management. 
He partook of the duties of day-to-day operations, but he also 
made decisions affecting the long-term growth and decline of 
enterprises, decisions which were outside routine management. 
Chang Chien's importance as an industrialist is precisely in his 
supplying the necessary vision, energy, and direction to existing 
factors of production to create enterprises where none had existed 
before. 
We have already seen that as an entrepreneur Chang Chien had 
to overcome a number of formidable obstacles, the foremost of 
which was the lack of capital. Not being an official, he could not 
divert official funds to his various undertakings, as Chang Chih-tung 
and Li Hung-chang had done. In his appeal to the private investors, 
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he was thwarted by their interest in investing their capital either 
in land or in ventures which promised a quick return. Traditionally 
land had always been regarded as the safest form of investment. 
Landowning also brought with it considerable social prestige. 
Those investors who dared to put their money into industrial 
enterprises had no institutional and social safeguards for their risk, 
in a kind of investment which, at best, can be expected to give 
a return only after a considerable length of time. Consequently 
Chang Chien was forced to turn to official subsidies of various 
kinds until he could convince private investors of Dah Sun's 
soundness. 
As a creative entrepreneur Chang Chien successfully mobilized 
the advantages of his home district. Drawing upon his great 
personal prestige as a ranking scholar, with its attendant entree into 
the official world, he took Nan-t'ung's superior cotton, skilled crafts 
laborers, and ready market to establish Dah Sun as a going concern. 
What Nan-t'ung itself was not able to provide, its reasonable 
proximity to Shanghai made it possible for Chang Chien to draw 
upon the resources and services of that great commercial center. 
He also had the good fortune to have a group of devoted and able 
associates who helped him to carry through his ideas into reality. 
In summary, Chang Chien's chief claim to distinction as an 
industrialist is in his establishing Dah Sun as one of the first 
predominantly private business ventures launched in China. Such 
enterprises as the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company 
(founded in 188 5)and the K'ailan Mines were government-sponsored 
projects. As a matter of fact, early enterprises could hardly have 
gotten off the ground without official protection and support. Even 
Dah Sun required official aid in the form of the machinery turned 
over to the company as the government's share of investment. It is 
nevertheless true that Chang Chien had to blaze a new trail when he 
attempted to interest the limited number of people who had capital 
to invest to put it in Dah Sun. The difficulties he had during the 
time of the cotton mills' establishment give eloquent testimony to 
the prevailing business sentiments of the time. Ironically the other 
cotton mills which were being founded at about the same time 
hindered rather than aided Chang Chien's efforts by their cavalier 
treatment of their investors. Yet in spite of every obstacle and 
discouragement, in spite of false hopes and broken agreements, 
Chang Chien did not give up but pushed on to the successful 
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founding of Dah Sun. This was his chief contribution as an in­
dustrialist. While Nan-t'ung was thus started on its way to be an 
important inland industrial center, he was able thereby to secure 
the financial backing which enabled him to go on to achievements 
in other fields of endeavor. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Involvement in National Affairs

CHANG CHIEN'S preoccupation with business matters did not 
exclude him altogether from involvement in national affairs. We 
have already seen how, relatively early in his life, his Korean 
experience had committed him deeply to speak out on national 
issues. In the years from 1898 to the early 1920s, he not only made 
known his views on a wide variety of important issues, but he 
became involved with several of the leading figures of the period: 
K'ang Yu-wei in 1898, Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing in 1911-12, 
and most importantly, Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1911-14. To be sure, he 
never occupied positions of real power. He accepted the position 
of cabinet minister twice, and then only for relatively brief dura­
tions. To the end of his life he, in the position of an uncommitted 
senior statesman, continued to dispense advice to one faction or 
another in the confused period of warlord rule in China. For all 
intents and purpose, however, we can consider his public career 
ended with the resignation of his last official post in 1915. 
The Reform of1898 
In June, 1898, while still deeply involved with Dah Sun, he went 
north to Peking. Not since his triumph in the palace examination 
four years previously had he been back in the capital, and part of 
the reason for his going there at this time was to take the san-kuan 
examination required of Hanlin members.1 In this examination, he 
failed to distinguish himself, passing with a very ordinary mark.2 
His presence in Peking, however, placed him in close touch with 
the events immediately preceding the "hundred days of reform." 
One of the first things Chang Chien did upon reaching Peking 
was to call on his old benefactor, Weng T'ung-ho. Thereafter the 
two men met frequently, and held long, earnest conversations.3 
Chang Chien would call on Weng in the afternoon and stay until 
sundown, during which time there would be "nothing on which 
they did not talk," as Weng stated in his diary.4 It seems fairly 
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certain, therefore, that the name of K'ang Yu-wei figured promi­
nently in the conversations. 
By this time botK Chang Chien and K'ang Yu-wei were considered 
to be among the more outstanding younger scholars of the day. 
The two men had first met in 1889, when both were in the capital 
for the metropolitan examination. Their relationship then had been 
quite cordial.5 In 1888 K'ang had first made his advocacy of political 
reform known in a memorial, which failed to reach the Emperor 
because responsible officials disapproved of its radical tone. At this 
time K'ang had not yet become widely known. The event 
which catapulted him into prominence was the joint memorial of 
1895, signed by some 1,300 candidates for the metropolitan 
examination in Peking. The memorial, a product of K'ang's 
efforts, called for the continuation of resistance against Japan in 
the Sino-Japanese War and the introduction of political reforms.6 
The government did not follow these suggestions, but through 
their presentation K'ang came to be recognized as the leading 
reformer of the time. 
Six years previously, in 1889, the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi had 
relinquished the nominal power of the throne to the Kuang-hsii 
Emperor. The Empress Dowager continued to keep herself fully 
informed of all that went on, but the task of carrying on the day-
to-day business of ruling the country fell on the shoulders of the 
Emperor. In 1895 this well-intentioned but inexperienced monarch 
was deeply perturbed by the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War. 
He was anxious to find some way to lead China out of the unfortu­
nate position in which the country found herself. Most of the high 
officials at the Imperial Court, however, seemed totally devoid of 
effective ideas to cope with the situation. 
A few officials at this time recognized K'ang to be a man of 
much promise. One of these officials was Weng T'ung-ho. As early 
as 1888, K'ang Yu-wei had sought to approach Weng, but without 
success.7 It was not until the time of the submission of the joint 
petition, followed shortly after by the conclusion of the unfavorable 
peace treaty at Shimonoseki, that Weng came to regard K'ang with 
more favor. He forthwith sought out K'ang and absorbed much 
of the latter's ideas.8 As a former imperial tutor, Weng had direct 
access to the Emperor. He became instrumental in drawing the 
Emperor's attention to some of K'ang's ideas.9 For the time being, 
however, K'ang's talents were not put to use. 
INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS 5 5 
In March, 1898, Germany succeeded in gaining a ninety-nine 
year lease on Kiaochow Bay from China. In rapid succession Russia, 
France, and England extracted similar territorial concessions. China 
seemed on the verge of being partitioned by the powers. At this 
precise moment K'ang Yu-wei chose to send in another memorial, 
in which he tempted imperial anger by boldly stating that the end 
of the dynasty was inevitable unless reforms were undertaken 
immediately.10 This time he found the Emperor sympathetic to his 
ideas. First a decree for responsible officials to meet with K'ang 
was issued. Then on June 16, the Emperor held a personal audience 
with K'ang. This signal honor granted to a relatively low-ranking 
official marked the beginning of several critical months, during 
which time the Emperor placed an extraordinary amount of con­
fidence in K'ang. 
This turn of events did not come as a total surprise to Chang 
Chien. He, of course, had been aware of K'ang's reputation as a 
reformer for several years previously. In 1895 Liang Ting-feng, a 
fellow provincial of K'ang's, had sent a telegram to Chang Chien 
inviting him to join the Ch'iang-hsiieh Hui, the Association for the 
Study of National Strengthening, organized by K'ang and headed 
by Chang Chih-tung. In spite of Chang Chien's favorable response 
to this bid, he did not become intimate with K'ang.11 In fact Chang 
Chien developed a personal aversion to K'ang, disliking his vanity 
in particular. Soon after K'ang's sudden rise to a position of power, 
Chang Chien had occasion to call on K'ang. He found the reformer's 
residence thronged by a host of followers and servants, giving the 
place "an air comparable to that of an old and powerful official."12 
He ventured to advise K'ang against his proposed course of action. 
K'ang turned a deaf ear to this. 
While K'ang's star was rising, his erstwhile patron Weng 
T'ung-ho found himself increasingly estranged from the Emperor.13 
On June 15, Weng was cashiered. Chang Chien urged Weng to 
leave the capital at once.14 Weng left for his native town of Ch'ang­
shu, Kiangsu, on July 1. Chang Chien left Tientsin for Nan-t'ung 
on July 25.15 Thus both men left the scene at the height of the reform 
and were not involved with the failure of the movement brought 
about by the Empress Dowager's return to power.16 
We have dwelt on these few months of Chang Chien's life in 
some detail because his reputation as a progressive and his presence 
in Peking coincident with the beginning of the reforms seem to 
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suggest that he might have had some connection with the reforms.17 
That he was actually suspected of complicity at the time can be seen 
from what he wrote later: 
I was the last-named among the so-called "six followers of Weng 
T'ung-ho." Although I was not in the capital at the time of the reform, 
I was accused of being secretly in league with K'ang Yu-wei and Liang 
Ch'i-ch'ao. From the capital to Hupeh and Kiangsu, the rumors flew 
thick and fast.18 
A more serious complication arises over the fact that Chang 
Chien's aversion toward K'ang Yu-wei seems to be strangely 
inconsistent with Weng T'ung-ho's alleged sponsorship of K'ang. 
In view of the intimate relationship between Chang Chien and 
Weng T'ung-ho, it would seem highly unlikely that the two could 
have held divergent views toward K'ang during the critical summer 
of 1898. To be sure, Weng later asserted that by 1898 he had had 
a change of heart concerning K'ang, and that he opposed rather than 
encouraged the Kuang-hsii Emperor's desire to use K'ang. Until 
recently scholars have generally dismissed this account as an un­
worthy attempt by Weng to avoid being implicated in the failure 
of the reform of 1898. In the last decade, however, new interpreta­
tions of the evidence have lent greater credence to Weng's own 
words.19 It seems not altogether unreasonable to conclude that 
K'ang Yu-wei's failure in 1898 was to a considerable degree because 
of his failure to gain and retain the support of the "moderate" 
faction of reformers represented by Weng T'ung-ho and Chang 
Chien.20 
The Boxer Uprising 
The triumph of the reactionaries in 1898 led directly to the 
Boxer outbreak two years later. In view of fuller accounts elsewhere 
we need not go into the details of the uprising itself. It is worth 
noting, however, that the Imperial Court displayed a marked degree 
of vacillation throughout this entire affair. Decrees suppressing the 
Boxers were followed by counterdecrees protecting them. The 
attack on the legation quarters in Peking was never pushed home. 
Diplomatic channels were left open purposely to facilitate negotia­
tions while Chinese troops were actively engaging the foreign 
troops in combat. To the outside world at the time the evidences 
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seemed clear-cut that China was acting in bad faith. The truth of 
the matter was that the confusion of action was but a reflection 
of the clash within the Imperial Court among several factions 
holding divergent views.21 
One faction which played a key role throughout the disturbance 
was composed of the southern officials, including Chang Chih-tung, 
Liu K'un-i, Yuan Shih-k'ai, Sheng Hsiian-huai, and Li Hung­
chang.22 This group opposed giving support to the Boxers. When 
the decree of June 20, declaring war on the foreign powers, reached 
the south, Governor-general Liu called on some of his trusted 
advisers for suggestions. Included in this group were T'ang Shou­
ch'ien, Ho Ssu-k'un, Ch'en San-li, Shen Tseng-chih, and Chang 
Chien. These men, all scholars of repute and with considerable 
official experience among them, were unanimous in advocating the 
preservation of peace in the southern and central provinces at all 
cost.23 Liu, after some hesitation, was won over to this point of view. 
He approached Chang Chih-tung and found the latter in substantial 
agreement on this subject. Meanwhile Sheng Hsiian-huai had been 
approached by Chao Feng-ch'ang, a close friend of Chang Chien 
and T'ang Shou-ch'ien. Sheng and Chao had reached the same 
decision independently.24 The result was the two sets of agreements 
negotiated between the southern officials on the one hand and the 
foreign consuls in Shanghai on the other, in which the two groups 
agreed to maintain order in the Yangtze region and around Shanghai 
respectively without infringing upon each other's authority.25 This 
effectively localized the disturbance to Chihli and Shansi, as 
provinces outside the direct jurisdiction of the southern officials, 
such as Szechwan, also steered clear of involvement in the dis­
turbance.26 
In subsequent actions the southern officials acted in general 
accord. They did not limit their efforts to preserving the peace 
in the central and southern provinces, but attempted to rescue the 
Imperial Court from what they regarded as a disastrous course of 
action. This took the form of sending memorials to the Court-
urging the abandonment of its pro-Boxer policy, continuation of 
the foreign debt payment, and advising the Chinese ministers 
abroad to maintain friendly relations with the powers at all costs.27 
In all these efforts the two governors-general Chang Chih-tung and 
Liu K'un-i played a leading part. Liu relied heavily on his group 
of advisors. Chang Chien was often called upon for advice. He was 
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in Nan-t'ung when Li Hung-chang was still delaying in obeying 
the order for him to go north, and while the Imperial Court was 
deliberating the advisability of evacuating from Peking. He wrote 
Governor-general Liu to urge Li to hasten to the capital, adding 
that Liu should send a personal representative with Li. He also 
opposed the abandoning of Peking contemplated by the Court, on 
the ground that it would have a bad effect on national morale.28 
Li Hung-chang subsequently reached Tientsin in the latter part of 
September and went on to play a key role in reaching a settlement 
with the foreign powers. Before Li's arrival in Tientsin, the Imperial 
Court had fled from Peking on August 15, eventually reaching Sian 
in late October.29 By this action the Court rejected the southern 
officials' suggestion to seek refuge in the Yangtze region. 
A secondary factor which intensified the threat of disturbance in 
the Yangtze region was the existence of large roving bands of 
bandits. One of the largest was led by a certain Hsu Pao-shan. 
Chang Chien advised Governor-general Liu to grant Hsu a full 
pardon. He believed that removing Hsu's leadership from his 
band was the most effective method of neutralizing that particular 
danger. Liu also carried out this suggestion.30 
Prior to the departure of the Imperial Court from Peking, 
Russia had moved troops into Manchuria in order to "pacify the 
rioters." After quickly overpowering some ineffectual resistance by 
the Chinese, Russian forces were in control of most of Manchuria 
by the beginning of September. This placed Russia in a strong 
bargaining position, by means of which she intended to extract 
heavy concessions from China. For this purpose, Russia, in the 
person of Count Witte, opened negotiations with the Chinese 
plenipotentiary Yang Ju in St. Petersburg in January, 1901. Basing 
his demands on a temporary agreement reached in November, 
1900, by the opposing commanders, Witte presented a list of 
concessions in Manchuria to be agreed to by China. It called for 
the appointment of Russian advisers to key positions, Russian con­
currence on all official appointments, and vital economic concession 
in railway and mining rights. In effect this would have guaranteed 
Russian domination of Manchuria. Neither the Imperial Court nor 
Yang Ju were willing to incur the onus of accepting these demands, 
and negotiations dragged on for several months.31 
When details of the Russian demands reached China, opinions 
among the responsible officials were generally against their ac­
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ceptance. The two Yangtze governors-general in particular were 
strongly against yielding to the Russians. Liu K'un-i once more 
called on the help of his advisers.32 Among them Chang Chien 
again played a prominent role. He drafted two telegrams for Liu, 
one addressed to the responsible officials in Peking, and the other 
to the foreign powers directly. In the former he warned of the 
danger of alienating the other powers by submitting to Russia and 
urged the government to disclose details of the demand to the other 
powers. In the telegram to the foreign powers he pointed out the 
inadvisability of having the St. Petersburg negotiation taking 
precedence over the general negotiation at Peking. He further 
stressed the danger to all the powers concerned if China should 
disappear as a political entity.33 These two telegrams were jointly 
dispatched by governors-general Liu and Chang. Their stand in this 
matter reinforced the strong pressures brought to bear on China by 
the other powers against giving in to Russia. The Imperial Court, 
after several months of vacillation, failed to give Yang Ju a clear-cut 
directive to sign the agreement. As a result of China's unexpected 
resistance and the unfavorable reaction of the other powers, Russia 
withdrew her demands. Russian troops, however, remained in 
Manchuria until her defeat at the hand of Japan in 1905.34 
Efforts on Behalf of Constitutional Government 
In March, 1901, while negotiations leading to a settlement of 
the Boxer uprising were still going on, Chang Chien published a 
small work entitled Reasoned Discussion on Reforms. This came as a 
result of the decree of January 29, in which the Empress Dowager, 
speaking in the name of the Emperor, called for detailed suggestions 
for reforms from officials throughout the country.35 The comprehen­
siveness of the reform plan embodied in this work, however, 
suggests that most of the reforms had long been in the back of 
Chang Chien's mind. Altogether forty-two specific reforms were 
proposed: ten to be carried out by the Board of Civil Office, twelve 
by the Board of Revenue, eight by the Board of Rites, and four 
each by the boards of War, Punishment, and Public Works respe?-. 
tively. Not all of the suggested reforms were of equal weight, but" 
among the more important ones were changes in the training and 
appointment of officials, establishment of a public education system, 
encouragement of private efforts in land reclamation, modernization 
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of the armed forces, revision of the penal code, tax reforms, and 
establishment of deliberative assemblies to publicize reform 
measures.36 The last were to be set up on both the national and 
local level. A national assembly or parliament was to be made up 
of members appointed by four or five ministers, themselves to be 
members of the assembly. Its function would be the planning of 
various stages of reforms to be carried out. At the same time local 
assemblies on the prefectural and the hsien level were to be estab­
lished, with members elected from among the gentry. It would be 
the task of the local assemblies to educate the people to accept the 
various reform measures.37 
Chang Chien's reform program probably influenced the thinking 
of governors-general Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung, who 
jointly presented to the Throne three successive memorials in 
July of 1901, calling for a series of reforms, some of which paralleled 
Chang Chien's ideas.38 The two officials, however, carefully couched 
their suggestions in such language so as to leave no doubt of 
their loyalty to the existing political structure of the Ch'ing dynasty. 
At that time Chang Chien himself did not recognize the need to 
change the basic political structure of the country. The reforms 
embodied in the Reasoned Discussion on Reforms would only graft 
some new branches of specific improvements onto the old tree of 
the existing governmental structure. Even his suggested national 
and local assemblies had only the most limited function of imple­
menting the proposed reforms. He still clung to the view that 
successful reform needed only "men of ability" and the necessary 
funds.39 
The idea that a constitution was a desirable thing in itself first 
came to him on his trip to Japan in 1903. Invited to attend the 
fifth Japanese industrial exhibition in Osaka, he took advantage of 
this" opportunity to spend ten weeks in Japan, visiting thirty 
agricultural and industrial enterprises and thirty-five educational 
institutions.40 He was much impressed by Japanese accomplish­
ments. He reasoned that, if Japan, endowed with less natural 
advantages than China, could be so advanced in education and 
industry, she had to possess something which China did not. 
The obvious thing was her constitution.41 Upon his return he 
took every opportunity to discuss constitutionalism with his friends. 
He carried on a, correspondence with Shen Tseng-chih on this 
topic. In May of 1904 he was asked by governors-general Chang 
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Chih-tung and Wei Kuang-tao to draft a memorial requesting the 
adoption of a constitution by the Imperial Court. He fulfilled the 
task after consulting a number of his friends and revising the draft 
no less than seven times.42 The submission of this memorial by 
governors-general Chang and Wei followed closely on the heels of 
similar moves made by governors Ting Cheng-to of Yunnan and 
Liu Shao-nien of Kweichow. Two months later Chang Chien 
completed the printing of The Constitution of Japan. His friend 
Chao Feng-ch'ang sent twelve copies of the book to Peking, 
some of which eventually got into the hands of the Empress 
Dowager herself.43 Chang Chien followed this by sending copies of 
another book on the Japanese constitution to T'ieh-liang, the 
influential Manchu general then in charge of the Board of War, 
who was known to harbor some progressive ideas.44 Chang Chien's 
single most outspoken act was the sending of a letter to Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, the governor-general of Chihli and one of the most 
powerful officials of the time. In this letter Chang Chien openly 
called on Yuan to take the initiative in constitutional reform: 
It is obvious that the dangers of 1894 and 1900 cannot be compared 
to those of today. Without fundamental changes in the body politic no 
amount of small improvements would prove beneficial. At this time 
when Japan and Russia have not reached a settlement in the Russo-
Japanese War, it would be futile to attempt an appeasement policy. 
Victory in the war will be the triumph of constitutionalism over autocracy. 
What nation today is completely autocratic? Can one autocratic state 
survive among all the constitutional nations ? In Japan, Ito, Itagaki 
and others have gained lasting fame by the introduction of constitutional 
government. Your talents are certainly not beneath those of the Japanese 
constitutionalists.45 
The circumstances which permitted Chang Chien openly to 
advocate constitutionalism grew out of the disastrous consequences 
of the Boxer uprising. Saddled with an immense indemnity of 
450 million taels, faced with the revolts of Sun Yat-sen and his 
followers, the Imperial Court sought at last for means to strengthen 
itself and to appease popular discontent. The reform movement, 
however, was not promoted by the Ch'ing government alone. The 
exiled remnants of the reform group of 1898, under the leadership 
of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and members of the local 
gentry on the provincial level, were also active in the movement. 
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K'ang and Liang were still men with prices on their heads who 
had managed to find refuge in Japan. They therefore carried on 
their agitations entirely apart from the other two groups. Also, 
there was no degree of close cooperation between the Ch'ing 
government and the local gentry. About the only thing that the 
three had in common was their opposition to the revolutionaries. 
The reformists under K'ang and Liang came into direct contact 
with the revolutionaries because they were both operating in 
Japan. When K'ang Yu-wei first arrived in Japan in late 1898, 
there was an attempt on the part of interested Japanese to promote 
an alliance between K'ang and Sun Yat-sen. The effort failed as 
much through disagreements between the two groups on basic 
issues as through the rise of personal antipathy between the two 
leaders.46 Thereafter the reformists and the revolutionaries in Japan 
fought each other continuously for the allegiance of the overseas 
Chinese. This group was essential to the reformists and the revolu­
tionaries alike because its members were the chief source of financial 
support for both. Consequently competition between the two groups 
was intense. Sometimes this took the form of roughhouse tactics, 
but primarily the two factions fought each other by means of 
Chinese-language newspapers. The central organ of the revolu­
tionaries was the Peoples Tribune {Min Pao), published in Tokyo under 
the joint editorship of Chang Ping-lin, Hu Han-min, Wang Ching­
wei, and Chu Chih-hsin. Opposed to it was the reformists' New 
People Miscellany {Hsin-min Ts'ung-pao) of Yokahama, edited by 
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Outside of Japan there were opposing newspapers 
in Hong Kong, Hawaii, San Francisco, Singapore, and Vancouver.47 
The contents of those newspapers reveal quite clearly the stands 
taken by the two camps. Opposed to the revolutionaries' call for 
the immediate overthrow of the dynasty and the establishment of a 
republic, the reformists advocated the establishment of a constitu­
tional monarch under the Kuang-hsii Emperor. 
The essays of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, written in classical style but with 
fresh vitality, had a great influence on the minds of the literate 
Chinese, particularly the younger group. His arguments received a 
hearing because the ideas embodied in them were fresh and seemed 
to have a particular pertinence for the contemporary situation. 
The Ch'ing government officials were not altogether blind to this. 
In Peking high officials like T'ieh-liang, Tuan-fang, and Hsu 
Shih-ch'ang were in favor of adopting a constitution.48 Outside 
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the country Sun Pao-ch'i, the ambassador to France, argued for 
such a step. These men persuaded the Empress Dowager to appoint 
a special mission in the summer of 1905. It was the mission's task 
to travel abroad for a study of various political systems. 
The mission was originally composed of Duke Tsai-tse, Tuan­
fang, Tai Hung-tz'u, Hsu Shih-ch'ang, and Shao-ying. As they 
were boarding the train leaving Peking on September 24, 1905, a 
young revolutionary named Wu Yueh attempted to kill them with 
a bomb. The bomb exploded prematurely, killing Wu Yueh and 
slightly wounding Tsai-tse and Shao-ying. As a result the departure 
was put off until December, at which time Hsu Shih-ch'ang and 
Shao-ying were replaced by Shang Ch'i-heng and Li Sheng-to.49 
The mission split into two groups, Tsai-tse, Li, and Shang 
covered Japan, England, France, and Belgium, while Tai and 
Tuan-fang spent most of their time in the United States and the 
German Empire, with brief stopovers in Japan and eleven other 
European countries. The two groups were abroad from December 
of 1905 to August of 1906. Upon their return they were immediately 
received individually in a series of audiences. In addition, the 
members of the mission submitted a number of memorials separately 
and jointly. The joint memorial expressed the consensus of the 
members, requesting the reorganization of the government offices 
under a constitution.50 
What kind of constitutional government did the members of the 
mission recommend ? Basically it was to be modeled after those of 
Japan, Austria, and the German states of Prussia, Bavaria, and 
Saxony. The power of the emperor was to be strengthened rather 
than restricted. He would appoint a "responsible cabinet," whose 
duties were to recommend policies to the emperor in ruling the 
country and to absorb the blame of administrative failures. There 
would be a parliament which would reflect "the people's interests" 
with the power to approve budgets and impeach the cabinet. 
The members of the mission, however, were deliberately vague on 
the franchise upon which the parliament was to be based. Certainly 
they had no thought of making the parliament a truly representative 
body. In fact, they conceived of the constitutional system mainly 
in terms of increasing the administrative efficiency of the govern­
ment. The participation of the people was to be allowed only in 
order to awaken their interests in the nation's needs, thereby leading 
to greater development of resources and a corresponding rise in 
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tax revenue. Should the cabinet or the parliament exceed its 
prerogatives, the emperor could have it dismissed instantly. In 
short, the emperor would be ruling with the aid of the constitution, 
rather than under the constitution. None of the imperial prerogatives 
was to be curtailed in any way.51 
The report of the constitutional mission caused no immediate 
action on the part of the government. In August, 1907, however, 
a decree came out changing the Political Investigation Bureau 
(K'ao-ch'a Cheng-chih Kuan) to the Bureau for Constitutional 
Planning (Hsien-cheng Pien-ch'a Kuan). The following month 
three officials were sent to Japan, England, and Germany respec­
tively for follow-up studies of the constitutional system of these 
countries. At the same time the provinces were ordered to prepare 
for the opening of provincial assemblies, the rules and regulations 
of which were issued in July, 1908.52 
Aside from the exiled reformists in Japan and the Ch'ing govern­
ment itself, there was another group which was active in the promo­
tion of constitutionalism. This group was composed of members 
of the local gentry in the provinces.53 The most influential segment 
of this group was active in Kiangsu under the leadership of Chang 
Chien, Cheng Hsiao-hsii, and T'ang Shou-ch'ien. The three men 
were all ranking scholars. T'ang was a native of Chekiang, and 
held the Chin-shih degree.54 Cheng, a Fukienese, was a Cbii-jen of 
1882 who had served as an official in Anhwei and Kwangtung 
prior to his retirement to Shanghai in 1906.55 T'ang, Cheng, and 
Chang Chien were the chief organizers of the Association to 
Prepare for the Establishment of Constitutional Government 
(Yii-pei Li-hsien Kung-hui) in 1906. This association was active in 
the three adjoining provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien and 
included many outstanding dignitaries among its membership.56 
Organizations similar in nature to the Association to Prepare for 
the Establishment of Constitutional Government sprang up in 
Hunan, Hupeh, and Kwangtung. 
From the very start of the association Chang Chien took a 
moderate, practical stand. While his colleagues were arguing over 
the relative speed with which the constitutional movement should 
be pushed, he was willing to let the ultimate initiative come from 
the government. For private individuals, he believed, industry, 
education, and local self-government should be the primary 
concern.57 This view, however, did not prevent him from exerting 
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his influence whenever he deemed it would do the most good, as 
his letter to T'ieh-liang in 1906, supporting the latter's pro-constitu­
tion sympathies, amply demonstrated.58 
Meanwhile the various steps undertaken by the government 
toward the eventual promulgation of a constitution had attracted 
a certain degree of popular response. In 1907 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and 
several of his colleagues founded in Tokyo the Political Information 
Qub (Cheng-wen She) for the express purpose of advocating the 
establishment of a constitution. Members of this organization who 
were students in Japan were active in promoting this cause after 
their return to China. Liang, however, was still persona non grata 
with the Ch'ing government, which in December, 1907, issued an 
order prohibiting students from participating in political activities. 
When members of the Political Information Club persisted in 
their efforts, a few key leaders were arrested in July, 1908, and 
the organization in China ordered dissolved.59 
The government was more circumspect in dealing with the 
provincial gentry. Many of them were, after all, men of considerable 
prestige. They were no less outspoken, however, about their 
advocacy of constitutionalism. The same month that the Political 
Information Club was ordered suppressed, Cheng Hsiao-hsii was 
the leading spirit in sending in a joint petition asking for the 
establishment of a national assembly. Acting in the name of the 
Association to Prepare for the Establishment of Constitutional 
Government, Cheng and his colleagues contacted the Constitutional 
Government Association (Hsien-cheng Kung-hui) in Hunan, the 
Constitutional Government Preparation Association (Hsien-cheng 
Ch'ou-pei Hui) in Hupeh, and the Self-governing Association 
(Tzu-chih Hui) in Kwangtung, as well as outstanding constitu­
tionalists in Hunan, Chihli, Shantung, Szechwan, and Kweichow. 
Delegates representing these associations were sent to Peking in 
August, 1908. They submitted a petition calling for the institution 
of a national assembly within the shortest possible time. This move 
met with some unexpected support from among the officials. 
Faced with this manifestation of popular will, the government made 
public on August 27, 1908, a draft outline which had been drawn 
up by the Bureau for Constitutional Planning. This outline, 
modeled after the Japanese constitution, reflected the ideas of the 
constitutional mission of 1905-06. It was far short of the expectation 
of the petitioners. This gesture by the government was further 
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vitiated by the announcement that a preparatory period of nine years 
was to pass before the establishment of the constitution.60 
The death of the Kuang-hsu Emperor and the Empress Dowager 
Tz'u-hsi within a day of each other on November 14 and November 
15, 1908, seemed at the time the end of an era. The enthronement 
of the infant Hsiian-t'ung Emperor and the appointment of his 
father, Prince Ch'un, as regent were generally regarded hopefully 
by the adherents of constitutionalism. Their expectation seemed to 
be justified with the actual establishment of provincial assemblies 
in October of 1909. 
In the establishment of the Kiangsu Provincial Assembly Chang 
Chien played a leading role.61 Because a representative meeting of 
any kind was totally unprecedented, much preparatory work had 
to be done. One immediate problem was the fact that there was 
no suitable place for holding such a meeting in Nanking, the 
provincial capital. One had to be constructed. In March, 1909, Chang 
Chien went to Nanking and chose an elevated spot northeast of the 
famous Drum Tower for the location of the assembly building. 
Meanwhile he dispatched a person to Japan to obtain plans of the 
National Diet Building in Tokyo. Actual construction of the 
provincial assembly building began in May.62 While work was 
going on some 230 delegates gathered in Nanking for a preliminary 
conference. Chang Chien was elected chairman by a vote of 196. 
Under his guidance the financial aspect of the coming assembly 
was thrashed out.63 He tended to his duties despite a lessening of 
his usual vigor. From May on he suffered from loss of sleep due 
to organic difficulties. He was finally cured in July through the 
treatment of a Chinese physician.64 
The Kiangsu Provincial Assembly began its first session on 
September 16, 1909. Ninety-five delegates met in the impressive 
new Assembly Building. Chang Chien was elected chairman, 
getting fifty-one of the ninety-five votes cast.65 The subsequent 
actions of the Kiangsu Provincial Assembly and assemblies of 
other provinces showed that, if the Ch'ing government had expected 
the various provincial assemblies to confine their activities only to 
local affairs, it could not have been more mistaken. 
Upon his election as chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial As­
sembly, Chang Chien telegraphed the provincial assemblies of 
fifteen other provinces, requesting that they join Kiangsu in asking 
the government for the establishment of a parliament without 
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delay.66 To back up his appeal he sent three men to circulate among 
the provinces and to elicit positive reactions from them. Their 
efforts were successful, as representatives from all sixteen provinces 
met at the Association to Prepare for the Establishment of Constitu­
tional Government headquarters in Shanghai in December, 1909, 
to form a new organization, the Association of Comrades to Petition 
for a Parliament (Kuo-hui Ch'in-yuan T'ung-chih Hui). Members 
of this organization vowed to remain together until the day the 
Parliament began its first session. Until then, the decision was made 
to adjourn in Shanghai and meet in Peking two months later.67 
Without Chang Chien, who remained in Shanghai, the ACPP 
reconvened in February, 1910. Two immediate steps were under­
taken. One was the submission of a joint petition; the other was 
the effort to raise support among the various high officials for the 
project. These efforts had to be abandoned temporarily when the 
government issued a restraining order forbidding the continuation 
of such activities.68 Three months later, however, the Delegation 
to Petition for a Parliament (Kuo-hui Ch'in-yuan Tai-piao T'uan) 
was set up under Sun Hung-i to remain in Peking while others 
returned to their own provinces to agitate for further action. The 
result was the submission of a number of separate petitions. The 
government once again refused to consider the requests.69 
Matters remained in this impasse until October, 1910, when the 
National Assembly, the establishment of which had been promised 
by the government at the time when it released the constitutional 
outline the previous year, was convened. Thereupon the Delegation 
to Petition for a Parliament sent its petition to this body, which, 
however, was really an advisory council with little actual power. 
At the same time various governors-general and governors also 
found it advisable to urge some kind of action. Thus the government 
received recommendations for the immediate establishment of 
Parliament and a responsible cabinet from both the National 
Assembly and the provincial officials. In early November the 
government announced the shortening of the preparatory period 
from nine tofive years, setting the date for the opening of Parliament 
in 1913, and promising that a cabinet would be formed prior to 
the opening of Parliament. The decree also ordered all further 
activities to petition the government to cease at once.70 
The issuance of the November decree split the constitutionalists 
into two camps. The one that represented the Association to 
68 INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS 
Prepare for the Establishment of Constitutional Government 
believed that its limited objective had been reached and that no 
reasonable purpose could be served by further agitation. This view 
was sharply disputed by representatives of other provinces. Men 
like T'ang Hua-lung of Hupeh and Tan Yen-k'ai of Hunan 
persisted in agitating for the immediate opening of Parliament. In 
December, 1910, the government cracked down hard on the 
dissatisfied constitutionalists. Some were ordered to return to 
their home provinces, and one man, Wen Shih-ling of Tientsin, 
was sent in exile to Sinkiang. These measures broke the back of 
the constitutionalists' movement for the immediate opening of 
Parliament.71 
True to its promise, the government set up a cabinet in April, 
1911. If, however, the constitutionalists had hoped to see a truly 
representative cabinet, they were greatly disappointed. Of the 
thirteen posts on the cabinet, nine were held by Manchus, revealing 
the basic distrust held by the Throne toward the Chinese officials. 
Five of the Manchus were members of the imperial house, thus 
providing the basis for the cabinet being nicknamed the "royal 
cabinet." This move by the government pleased few. The con­
stitutionalists began to doubt the government's sincerity, while the 
revolutionaries received fresh support for their argument that the 
Ch'ing government was incapable of genuine reform. 
For Chang Chien the makeup of the cabinet came as a distinct 
disappointment. Some two months after the organization of the 
cabinet he submitted a petition to that body. In it he urged the 
cabinet to take three actions: (1) to formulate and announce an 
over-all policy; (2) to establish direct coordination between the 
cabinet and the various government agencies; and (3) to open its 
sessions to the public and to call in experts for consultation. He 
laid particular stress on the last point as an indispensable step toward 
securing public support for the cabinet.72 There appeared to be no 
response to this petition. 
The Year 1911 
The year 1911 turned out to be a fateful one for Chang Chien. 
Both by accident and by design he was thrown into the midst of 
events; and although the key events revolved around such men as 
Li Yuan-hung, Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing, and Yuan Shih-k'ai, 
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Chang Chien was never far from the scene of action. He was in 
Peking when the decision to nationalize the railroad in Szechwan 
was made. He was in Wu-ch'ang the night when the outbreak 
occurred. And he was in the Lower Yangtze region during the 
uncertain days of the brief period when that section of the country 
was the scene of the establishment of the first provisional govern­
ment of the infant republic. Throughout this time Chang Chien 
represented that large segment of the people which were neither 
involved directly in the revolutionary activities nor had a vested 
interest in the continued survival of the Ch'ing dynasty. He had 
been a leading advocate of constitutionalism up to 1911. When he 
supported the revolutionary cause after the initial outbreak, he was 
acting the part of a typical member of the local gentry of the country, 
who switched from constitutionalism to republicanism as a means 
of saving China. 
In May of 1911 Chang Chien was selected by the chambers of 
commerce of Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton, and Hankow to go to 
Peking in order to obtain government permission for the founding 
of a joint Chinese-American bank, and a joint shipping line. This 
scheme came as a result of the visit of an American delegation to 
the Southern Industrial Exposition (Nan-yang Ch'uan-yeh Hui) of 
1910 in Nanking,73 in which delegation the American financier 
Robert Dollar was a prominent member. Through Dollar, Chang 
Chien had met with the group of American businessmen and 
worked out the details for a joint Chinese-American bank with a 
total capital of five million yuan (about 3.5 million taels), to be 
established with the American half of the capital. At the same time 
a steamship line was also to be set up on a share-and-share-alike 
basis, starting with a new 18,000-ton ship ordered by Dollar.74 
Chang Chien made ready to travel to Peking by way of Hankow. 
On his way from Hankow to Peking he paused on June 7 at Chang ­
teh, where Yuan Shih-k'ai had been living in retirement ever since 
his dismissal in 1908. The two men had not seen each other for 
twenty-eight years. On this occasion Chang Chien talked about one 
of his pet projects, the Huai River Conservancy Scheme.75 The next 
day he reached Peking, arriving a day earlier than the original 
schedule in order to avoid the elaborate welcome which various 
organizations had planned for him.76 He chose to stay at the office 
building of the Mongolian Industrial Company, which had been 
the residence of Weng T'ung-ho a dozen or so years back. 
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On June n he received word through Prince Ch'ing that the 
Regent, Prince Ch'un, the father of the infant Hsiian-t'ung Emperor, 
wished to see him. Chang Chien accordingly first paid a visit to 
Duke Tsai-tse, the Minister of Finance, on which occasion he 
requested that it be made clear that he was not seeking an official 
appointment.77 The actual audience with the Regent took place on 
the evening of the thirteenth. After granting him the privilege of 
being seated, the Regent opened the interview by saying, "You have 
not been to the capital for over a decade, during which time the 
peril to the nation has certainly increased." To this Chang Chien 
replied, "It has been fourteen years since I left the capital. As for 
the state of affairs confronting the nation today, the Former 
Emperor began political reforms in 1898. Then came 1900 and the 
imperial trip to the west. Those were all days when the Former 
Emperor encountered grave danger. Today the world knows China 
has adopted a constitution; the world respects our people. This is 
all due to the efforts of the Former Emperor.78 The Regent was 
gratified by this reply. Chang Chien went on to indicate his efforts 
in the field of industry, education, and local government, and 
requested permission to offer a few suggestions concerning national 
affairs. The Regent told him to speak freely. Thereupon Chang 
Chien outlined three critical periods of external relations and three 
vital domestic issues. In China's international position he saw 
danger in that very year (1911) and in 1913 and 1915. The agreement 
with Russia concerning the Hi Valley in Sinkiang was due to expire 
before the year was out. He feared that Russia might seek this 
occasion to press for further advantages. Two years hence the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was due to expire. He urged that China should 
exert all efforts in preventing the renewal of this partnership. 
Finally in 1915 the Panama Canal was scheduled to be completed. 
He warned of the danger of Japan trying to seek some decisive 
advantage in China before the power of the United States in the 
Pacific was increased thereby. Within the country itself Chang 
Chien urged, in the first place, the speedy establishment of the 
constitutional system of government, in order to be able to relieve 
the ravages of floods and other natural disasters without reliance 
on foreign nations. Secondly he pressed for active government 
support in the industrial growth of the country, as the sole means 
of redressing the highly unfavorable balance of trade. Lastly he 
referred to his own mission to Peking this time and said that, 
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although friendly relationship with the United States was desirable, 
China must rely on herself in the long run by introducing responsible 
ministry and a modern system of government. These points were 
well taken by the Regent, who asked him to discuss them in detail 
with Duke Tsai-tse. Chang Chien then went on to talk about 
precautionary steps to be taken in the nationalization of the railroad 
in Szechwan, and other topics. The audience lasted an hour and a 
half.79 
Immediately afterward Chang Chien paid a visit to Prince Ch'ing, 
on which occasion he discussed the importance of Manchuria and 
urged the Prince to give strong support to a request for twenty 
million taels by Governor-general Chao Er-sun toward the develop­
ment of Manchuria. He went on to talk about the country as a 
whole: the sufferings of the people, the danger of the revolutionary 
movement, etc., and ended with the hope that Prince Ch'ing would 
live up to the duties of his exalted position. Prince Ch'ing was so 
moved by the plight of the country that he burst into tears. In his 
personal record Chang Chien commented that this showed the 
Prince to be "not unduly confused and stupid," as he was reputed 
to be.80 
Within a few days Chang Chien had fulfilled his original mission, 
obtaining the necessary approval from Duke Tsai-tse for the 
establishment of the joint bank and joint steamship line. The 
revolution which broke out later in the year cut short the scheme, 
and it never materialized. 
While he was in the capital the Minister of Education, T'ang 
Ching-Ch'ung, appointed him to the chairmanship of the forthcoming 
National Education Conference to be held at the end of July. As 
this would keep him in the capital longer than he had intended 
to stay, he tried to decline the appointment, but without success. 
He thereupon proposed to wait for the opening of the conference 
by putting the intervening time to the best possible use, by making 
a tour of Manchuria.81 
Prior to his departure for Manchuria an interesting episode 
occurred which was to have some bearing on the revolution that 
broke out four months later. Duke Tsai-tse summoned both Chang 
Chien and Sheng Hsiian-huai to discuss the proposed nationalization 
of the railroad in Szechwan. Sheng had discovered that certain 
members of the Szechwan gentry had managed to obtain over three 
million taels from people of the province on the pretext that it 
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would be used to finance the planned railroad.82 The question of 
the moment was, in view of the fact that the government planned 
to take over the railroad, how much should the investors be com­
pensated. Sheng wanted to pay off only a fraction of the sum. 
Chang Chien argued for full reimbursement.83 As events turned out, 
Sheng Hsiian-huai had his way. The unrest in Szechwan caused by 
the government's decision to take over the railroad contributed to 
the successful outcome of the outbreak at Wu-ch'ang on October 10. 
On June 29, Chang Chien, accompanied by Chiang Tao-ming, 
Meng Seng, and several other close associates, arrived at Mukden, 
where he visited the Manchu palace museum to view the rare objects 
on display. On July 2 he consulted with Governor-general Chao 
Er-sun on the twenty million taels requested by Chao. The following 
day he visited the local agricultural station. On the fourth he 
traveled by way of the South Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern 
railways from Ch'ang-ch'un to Harbin. He noted the obvious 
Japanization of Ch'ang-ch'un and the equally apparent Russification 
of Harbin, and that in neither of the two places was the Chinese 
section on a par with the foreign zones as far as neatness and 
cleanliness were concerned. On the eighth he arrived at Chichihar 
and stayed at the residence of Governor Chou Shu-mo of Heilung­
kiang. The following day he had a chance to visit a Russian-operated 
lower primary school in nearby K'un-k'un-ch'i, before returning to 
Harbin. On the way he noticed immense stretches of uncultivated 
land along the right of way. On July 11 he left for Ch'ang-ch'un, 
continuing on to Mukden the next day. South of Mukden, because 
the Liao River had flooded the railroad tracks, his party had to 
detour by way of Ying-k'ou. By inquiring into the source of the 
Liao River, Chang Chien first conceived of the possibility of 
connecting the Liao with the Sungari River. He arrived in Peking on 
the fourteenth. The Education Conference opened three days later.84 
This trip to Manchuria was more than just an excursion for 
Chang Chien. Although he had traveled extensively in China he 
had never been in Manchuria before. Out of this trip he received a 
deeper impression of the penetration of Japanese and Russian 
influence into that part of China. More concretely, the germs of 
the reclamation scheme and the Liao-Sungari Canal project were 
planted in his mind. Later he was to attempt the implementation 
of these schemes during his term of office as the Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce.85 
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Less than two months after he had returned to Nan-t'ung from 
the north, Chang Chien went to Wu-ch'ang to help draw up the 
operating regulations of the Ta Wei Cotton Mill.86 He arrived on 
October 4. On the evening of the ninth two revolutionaries were 
arrested by the authorities. The city gates were closed immediately 
while the authorities sought to round up other revolutionaries. At 
ten o'clock on the morning of the tenth the gates were finally 
opened. Chang Chien promptly went across the river to Hankow. 
That evening he boarded ship for his return trip to Nan-t'ung.87 
When he boarded the ship at eight o'clock, he could see across 
the river the burning of an engineering corps camp just outside 
Wu-ch'ang. The river was too wide at this point for him to hear 
any distinct sounds, but seven miles downstream he could still see 
the horizon bright with the reflected glow of the conflagration.88 
On the evening of the eleventh the boat arrived at Anking, the 
capital of Anhwei Province. Next morning Chang Chien went 
ashore to call on Governor Chu Chia-pao to discuss the Huai 
River Conservancy Scheme. It was then that he learned that 
Wu-ch'ang had fallen to the revolutionaries on the previous 
evening.89 Anking was then in a most precarious position, as there 
was a shortage of ready funds for emergencies, and the new-style 
troops stationed there were rife with revolutionary sentiment and 
could not be relied upon. Under the circumstances Chang Chien 
gave up any hope of pursuing the subject of controlling the Huai 
and left Anking that very evening. The following night his boat 
tied up together with a later arrival, from the passengers of which 
Chang Chien got the details of the events of the ninth and tenth 
in Wu-ch'ang.90 
He reached Nanking on October 14 and went directly to T'ieh­
liang, who was the commanding general of the region at the time. 
He urged the Manchu general to send troops at once to Hupeh 
and to memorialize the government for the immediate establishment 
of a constitutional government.91 T'ieh-liang evaded the issue by 
asking Chang Chien to refer the matter to Chang Jen-chiin, the 
governor-general of Liang-Kiang. This Chang Chien did on the 
following day. Governor-general Chang, however, not only treated 
the proposal to urge the establishment of constitutional government 
with great contempt, but refused even to entertain the notion of 
sending troops to the aid of the authorities in Hupeh. He turned 
a deaf ear to Chang Chien's argument that, should the revolutionary 
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forces come downstream to Anking, that city was as good as lost 
and Nanking would be in grave peril.92 
Chang Jen-chiin's action did not deter Chang Chien from making 
all efforts to press for the establishment of constitutional govern­
ment. He went on the sixteenth to Soochow, where Ch'en Te­
ch'iian, the governor of Kiangsu, backed his proposal and asked 
him to draft a memorial to be sent to the Imperial Court. That 
evening he and two of his fellow constitutionalists, Lei Feng and 
Yang T'ing-tung, worked jointly until midnight before the memo­
rial was done.93 It was sent to Peking in the name of Governor 
Ch'en and Governor Sun Pao-ch'i of Shantung. In this memorial 
Chang Chien argued that the latest disturbance in Hupeh was but 
a symptom of unrest and that even its successful suppression would 
not be a permanent solution to the ills of the country. He urged 
that the "royal cabinet" be dissolved and a genuinely responsible 
ministry of the most able officials be substituted at once. The 
ultimate step, he went on to say, must be the promulgation of the 
constitution.94 He backed this up five days later by sending a 
telegram to the cabinet in the name of the Kiangsu Provincial 
Assembly, asking for the beginnings of a constitutional government 
by the establishment of Parliament.95 
Meanwhile in Nanking, Governor-general Chang continued in his 
obstinate ways. People arriving in Nanking from the Wu-han 
cities were full of praise for the orderliness of the revolutionary 
troops. Consequently rumors flew thick and fast. Governor-general 
Chang, in attempting to forestall any disaffection on the part of 
the new-styled army stationed in Nanking, ordered the troops to 
withdraw outside the city walls. He further aggravated the situation 
by issuing only five rounds of ammunition per man to the troops.96 
When Chang Chien heard this, he went at once to his friend Fan 
Tseng-hsiang, who was serving under Governor-general Chang at 
the time. Because of Fan's intercession, the governor-general 
ordered another ten rounds to be doled out to each soldier.97 
This episode revealed how the usefulness of the new-styled army 
as a fighting force was effectively destroyed by the inept administra­
tion of Chang Jen-chun. 
Staying in Nan-t'ung during the latter part of October and the 
first days of November, Chang Chien noted the spread of revolu­
tionary fervor throughout the country. On November 4 revolu­
tionists in Shanghai, Soochow, and Hangchow declared the in­
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dependence of Kiangsu and Chekiang. Governor Ch'en Te-ch'iian 
was pressured into becoming the new military governor of Kiangsu, 
while T'ang Shou-ch'ien was made the military governor of 
Chekiang.98 As for the unfortunate Chang Jen-chun, faced with 
the critical test, he could only plead incapacity and laid down the 
power of his office without a murmur." 
Up to this moment Chang Chien had not gone beyond the point 
of urging the government to adopt the constitution at once. Events 
in early November, however, apparently convinced him of the 
hopelessness of efforts to shore up the tottering Manchu regime. 
He forthwith abandoned the constitutionalists' cause, which he had 
championed for nearly a decade, and threw his support behind the 
revolutionary movement. 
Upon hearing of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Nanking, 
he immediately dispatched a letter to T'ieh-liang in an attempt to 
head off any bloodshed which might arise between the revolutionary 
forces and the loyal troops under the Manchu general. In the letter 
he appealed to T'ieh-liang's reform sentiments by tracing the chief 
cause of popular discontent to the failure of the government to 
give real meaning to its decision for the establishment of a constitu­
tional government. He urged the Manchu general to take the 
long-range view by cooperating with the new forces in order to 
preserve Chinese-Manchu harmony.100 
He next turned to the problem of what the Mongols in Inner 
and Outer Mongolia would do if their traditional relationship 
with the Manchu government was broken. To forestall any 
separatist tendencies on the part of the Mongols he and T'ang 
Shou-ch'ien, Hsiung Hsi-ling, and Chao Feng-ch'ang sent jointly 
a telegram to Kalgan, urging the Mongols of Inner and Outer 
Mongolia to support the republican forces in China. Their effort 
bore fruit when the Mongols declared their willingness, for the 
moment, to be on the side of the republicans.101 
The desperate Ch'ing government at this time turned to the only 
man who could cope with the situation, Yuan Shih-k'ai. After 
shrewdly delaying and maneuvering until he wrung from the 
Regent virtually unlimited power, Yuan consented to come back 
into power and organized an interim cabinet on November 16.102 
Chang Chien was appointed the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, 
and Commerce in this cabinet and concurrently the Pacification 
Commissioner for the Southeast. These posts Chang Chien firmly 
jG INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS 
declined to accept.103 This was Yuan Shih-k'ai's first attempt to 
enlist Chang Chien's support, but by no means the last. 
On his side Chang Chien sent a series of telegrams and letters 
to Yuan. He was concerned with Yiian's true sympathies, and 
wished to win him over to the republican point of view. He now 
indicated his definite break with the constitutionalists. Citing Japan 
as an example of a small, homogeneous nation to which the con­
stitutional monarchical form of government was best suited, he 
stated that a republican form of government was preferable for 
China because of her vast size and diverse peoples. To achieve 
this end he suggested the voluntary abdication of the emperor.104 
He was concerned lest revolutionary fervor turn into excesses 
against the ruling house and thereby touch off racial strife between 
the Manchus and the Chinese. 
At this time Hu Han-min, a leading revolutionary, sought out 
Chang Chien to draft an abdication decree. Chang Chien turned the 
draft over to Hu, who, after obtaining T'ang Shao-i's approval in 
the matter, sent it to Yuan Shih-k'ai. Subsequently this draft was 
published as the cabinet's decree, signifying the willingness of the 
Throne to abdicate.105 
Throughout these few eventful months the military governors 
of both Kiangsu and Chekiang, Ch'en Te-ch'iian and T'ang Shou­
ch'ien, called on Chang Chien frequently for advice. The three 
having been close associates for some time previous to the events 
of 1911, Ch'en and T'ang freely wrote of their difficulties to Chang 
Chien.106 
On December 15 Ch'en, T'ang, and Ch'en Ch'i-mei, another 
leading revolutionary, arrived in Nanking to organize a provisional 
national government. There they were faced with an immediate 
problem. Nanking was in a state of unrest at the time, caused by 
the presence of revolutionary troops from outside Kiangsu. These 
troops would not leave the city until they were paid. The republicans 
could count on only one ready source of revenue: the salt tax of 
Liang-Huai region. Chang Chien was thereby appointed the salt 
commissioner of Liang-Huai. In this position he borrowed 200,000 
yuan (about 140,000 taels) from the various local chambers of 
commerce, pledging the salt revenue of Liang-Huai as securities. 
With this fund he succeeded in paying off the troops, facilitating 
their departure from Nanking.107 
The year 1912 was the first year of the republic. Sun Yat-sen 
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had returned from abroad in the last days of December and im­
mediately became the rallying point of the revolutionary cause. He 
was nearly unanimously elected as the president of the provisional 
government. The cabinet he organized on January 3 included 
Huang Hsing as Minister of War, Ch'en Te-ch'iian as Minister of 
Interior, and T'ang Shou-ch'ien as Minister of Communications.108 
Chang Chien was tapped for the post of Minister of Industries, 
which he held until the provisional government was dissolved 
three months later. During this brief period he came into close 
contact with Huang Hsing, Ch'en Ch'i-mei, and two other leading 
revolutionaries, Chang Ping-lin and Wang Ching-wei. He, of 
course, kept up his contact with Ch'en Te-ch'iian and T'ang 
Shou-ch'ien. 
When the cabinet was first formed, Chang Chien was originally 
slated for the post of Minister of Finance, but he declined, advising 
the government that even with the revenue from Huai salt and 
the custom receipts from Shanghai, the government would run into 
an annual deficit of eighty million taels. He proposed that Sun 
Yat-sen negotiate a foreign loan of fifty to a hundred million 
taels until the various provinces could supply the government's 
financial needs.109 Chang Chien's subsequent appointment to be 
the Minister of Industries, however, did not allow him to steer 
clear of the problem of government finance altogether. For the 
immediate operating expenses, there were those in the government 
who wanted to go to the local chambers of commerce again to 
borrow another 500,000 yuan (about 350,000 taels). Chang Chien 
opposed this move, arguing that the government should not be 
placed in a position of excessive indebtedness to these associations. 
Instead he pledged himself to raise the 500,000 yuan and made 
good on the pledge.110 Of the amount, 300,000 yuan was obtained 
on a loan without security from the Mitsui Bank in Shanghai, 
solely on the past good relations between the bank and the Dah 
Sun Mills.111 On February 7 Chang Chien was in Shanghai and 
heard that the sum he managed to raise was not sufficient and that 
Sun and Huang had decided to raise further funds by reorganizing 
the Han-yeh-p'ing Iron and Coal Company into a joint Sino-
Japanese corporation. He jumped to the conclusion that Sheng 
Hsiian-huai must have been behind the scheme, and wrote at once 
to Sun and Huang opposing the move. The letter setting forth 
his reasons clearly showed his distrust of both Sheng and Japan. 
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Recently, I received a letter from Hupeh, asking about rumors that 
Han-yeh-p'ing is to be jointly operated with the Japanese. I myself 
have heard that Sheng Hsiian-Huai proposes to use that company to 
secure loans, and further lending sums thereby to the government. We 
know that the Kiangsu railroad affair was defeated but recently. Yet 
now the news is abroad that 30 million yuan is to be raised, half Chinese 
and half Japanese, with 5 million to be lent to the government. You 
two gentlemen must know the details of this matter. That's why I am 
sending this post haste, intending to offer my humble opinion. 
I happen to know the history of Han-yeh-p'ing especially well. In a 
word, of all the commercial enterprises, iron mills in particular should 
not be made joint ventures with foreigners. Even if this is done, it 
should not be done with the Japanese. They have patiently and earnestly 
plotted our ruin for many years, but have not succeeded. The reason 
is that within their three islands there is not one iron mine, a source of 
eternal regret to the Japanese. In contrast China's riches in coal and 
iron exceeds that of any other country. I have said on occasions that the 
day our iron industry is fully developed will mark the day when Japan 
will be bested by China. This is no exaggeration. In recent years, the 
Japanese have exhausted every means to gain control of T'ung-kuan-shan, 
Ta-yeh, and Peng-ch'ih-hu, without success. Now Sheng Hsiian-huai, 
because the industries ot China's interior have been taken over by the 
republican army, and knowing that the army is in financial straits, is 
up to his usual unscrupulous tricks. If our government does not take 
due notice of this and falls for his wiles, it is bound to suffer great harm 
in its national defense and diplomacy. The republican government has 
recently been established. It must look after the people with the best policy 
at its command. How could it forfeit the boundless riches of the future 
for mere millions of borrowed funds, and thereby become the laughing 
stock of the world. The foreign-language newspapers of Shanghai are 
already frequently critical toward the government. I hope you will hold 
the long-range view and not be led astray by the counsel of rascals, 
concentrating on some small immediate advantage. Sheng Hsiian-huai 
has his limited abilities, but he has no grasp of the over-all situation and 
has no thought for the good of the nation whatsoever. Even in the case 
of the nationalization of railroads, an intrinsically sound move, he 
chose to use arbitrary methods, leading to nation-wide opposition, and 
thereby causing the downfall of the Manchus. In a word, Sheng has 
brought Han-yeh-p'ing to its present stage of growth through the 
efforts of some ten years. The republican government should aid in 
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its growth, and not because Sheng has been its manager, allow him to 
ruin it now. Even if it were Sheng's private estate, the government should 
still protect it for the general good. As for joint operation with the 
Japanese, this must not be done.112 
As an indication of his sincerity he begged to be relieved of 
his post. Both Sun and Hu Han-min tried to dissuade him from 
the step. His mind, however, was made up, and he would not 
change his decision. The inauguration of Yuan Shih-k'ai on March 
10, 1912, effectively solved this problem, as the Nanking provisional 
cabinet was thereby ended. 
Interest in Politics 
In late December, 1911, Chang Ping-lin, Ch'en Te-ch'uan, Chao 
Feng-ch'ang, and Chang Chien met to discuss the possibility of 
organizing a new political party as a counterpoise to Sun Yat-sen's 
T'ung-meng Hui. Ch'en and Chao, of course, were long-time 
associates of Chang Chien's in his Association to Prepare for the 
Establishment of Constitutional Government. Chang Ping-lin had 
been an independent revolutionary who had suffered imprisonment 
for his activities in Shanghai. After his release he went to Japan 
and cast his lot with the T'ung-meng Hui. At that time all revolu­
tionary factions buried their differences and worked for the common 
cause of overthrowing the Ch'ing government. Now that the 
primary goal had been achieved, the original differences began to 
reappear. Chang Ping-lin headed what was called the Kuang-fu 
Hui faction, which opposed the T'ung-meng Hui radicals by 
advocating a moderate course of action.113 
On January 3, Chang Ping-lin reorganized his Kuang-fu Hui 
into the Chinese Republic Association (Chung-hua Min-kuo 
Lien-ho Hui), whose membership reputedly grew to over 2o,ooo.114 
Shortly afterward the Chinese Republic Association was combined 
with the adherents of the Association to Prepare for the Establish­
ment of Constitutional Government to form the Union Party 
(T'ung-i Tang). Its platform called for establishment of a responsible 
cabinet, sound fiscal practice, development of industry, concern for 
people's livelihood, and advocacy of international peace. Chang 
Chien, Chang Ping-lin, Ch'en Te-ch'uan, Hsiung Hsi-ling, T'ang 
Shou-ch'ien, T'ang Shao-i, T'ang Hua-lung, and Chao Feng-ch'ang 
were among its more prominent members.115 
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Because of the Union Party's anti-T'ung-meng Hui nature, it 
naturally gravitated toward Yuan Shih-k'ai. Thus in the matter of 
opening of the Parliament and the choice of a capital between 
banking and Peking, the Union Party supported Yiian's pref­
erences.116 A heavy representation of former officials, such as 
Ch'en Te-ch'iian, Hsiung Hsi-ling, and T'ang Shao-i, within 
its membership also guaranteed its generally conservative out­
look. 
Aside from the T'ung-meng Hui and the Union Party, there was 
the United Republican Party (T'ung-i Kung-ho Tang). In addition 
there were a host of lesser parties: the People's Society (Min She), 
centering around Li Yuan-hung, the hero of Wu-ch'ang; the 
Nationalist Union Association (Kuo-min Hsieh-chin Hui); the 
Republican Reconstruction Discussion Association (Kung-ho 
Chien-she T'ao-lun Hui), supporting Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. There were 
also such splinter parties as the Nationalist Party (Kuo-min Tang, 
not to be confused with the Kuomintang of later vintage); the-
Republican Public Association (Min-kuo Kung-hui); the United 
Progressive Association (Kung-chin Hui); the Republican Union 
Party (Kung-ho T'ung-i Tang); and the Socialist Party. These 
parties were organized around competing personalities and did not 
maintain their identity for long or pursue any consistent policy. 
Most of them soon went out of existence or merged with one 
another to form more party labels.117 
After the shifting of the political center from Nanking to Peking, 
the polarization between government and opposition parties became 
more definite. Upon Yuan Shih-k'ai's urgings the Union Party and 
the People's Society took the lead to join with the Nationalist 
Party, the Nationalist Union Association, and the Republican 
Public Association to form the Republican Party (Kung-ho Tang). 
It was formally launched on May 9, 1912. It stood for national unity, 
national progress, and international peace. Li Yuan-hung was 
chosen as the Director General. Chang Chien, Chang Ping-lin, 
Ch'en Te-ch'iian, and T'ang Hua-lung were among the leading 
members. Soon afterward Chang Ping-lin broke away to revive the 
Union Party once more.118 
The consolidation of the opposition came about in August, 1912, 
with the transformation of the T'ung-meng Hui into the Kuomin­
tang. Into this new party went the United Republican Party, the 
United Progressive Association, and several other lesser parties.119 
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Nearly all the remaining parties consolidated to form the Democratic 
Party (Min-chu Tang), under the nominal leadership of Liang 
Ch'i-ch'ao. This political organization proposed to act as the swing 
group between the two bigger parties.120 
Chang Chien never looked with favor upon interparty struggle 
as a necessary adjunct of a republican government. In a letter to 
T'ang Hua-lung after the establishment of the Republican Party of 
1912, he indicated his willingness to leave Kiangsu to go to Peking 
if his presence would help bring about harmony among the parties. 
He promised to contact the leaders of the other parties and urged 
members of his own party to desist from attacking the govern­
ment.121 Largely due to the advice of Chao Feng-ch'ang, Chang 
Chien did not venture northward until September, when he heeded 
Yuan Shih-k'ai's call to discuss the salt problem.122 He stayed 
barely a month in Peking. 
On March 20, 1913, Sung Chiao-jen, one of the leading figures 
in the Kuomintang, was assassinated at the railroad station in 
Shanghai. Suspicion at the time, and a later investigation conducted 
by Ch'en Te-ch'iian, implicated Yuan Shih-k'ai.123 This event 
brought to a head the latent hostility harbored by most of the 
Kuomintang leaders toward Yuan, and caused the open break 
between the northern and southern factions, which Chang Chien 
had hoped to avoid. In vain he pleaded with Chao Feng-ch'ang, 
Huang Hsing, and Wang Ching-wei to put the interests of the 
nation above those of the party. In vain he counseled moderation.124 
He had to stand helplessly by as his native province Kiangsu 
declared independence from Yuan and suffered the inevitable 
consequences at the hands of Chang Hsiin and others of Yiian's 
better-organized forces during the summer of 1913. 
The last significant political shift of that year found the three 
anti-Kuomintang parties, the Republican Party, the Union Party, 
and the Democratic Party, combine into the Progressive Party 
(Chin-pu Tang) on May 29. This again was done at the bidding 
of Yuan Shih-k'ai.125 For the third time Chang Chien's name was 
among the leaders of a political party. As it turned out, the new 
party enjoyed only a brief period of power, coinciding with the 
premiership of Hsiung Hsi-ling. Not long afterward the political 
picture became further blurred, as the more radical elements of the 
Kuomintang were driven from Peking upon their support of the 
abortive revolt in the south. The Kuomintang moderates came over 
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to join the Progressive Party. Yiian Shih-k'ai soon grew powerful 
enough to dispense with the support of a government party.126 
Precisely how active was Chang Chien as a politician? All 
evidences point to the fact that, although his name appeared 
prominently among the leaders of the pro-Yuan Shih-k'ai and 
anti-T'ung-meng Hui parties, he took very little active part in the 
successive transformation of the parties. At the time of the formation 
of the Union Party, Chang Ping-lin sought him out because he 
had been a key figure in the constitutionalist's camp in the pre-
republic days. His active support of the Union Party helped ensure 
a strong element of the constitutionalist sentiment on the side of the 
Union Party and its successors. When the Union Party joined with 
the others to form the Republican Party in Peking, Chang Chien 
was not present at its inauguration. He, However, clearly regarded 
himself as a member of this new political group and maintained 
contact with other prominent members. Still his absence from 
Peking during 1912, and his interest in salt affairs and Huai'river 
projects,127 disengaged him from the developing political situation. 
As a result, by 1913, he had grown out of touch with political 
maneuvers. He had so little to do with the formation of the Progres­
sive Party that he did not even deign to note the event in his 
personal record. His subsequent official career came more as a 
result of his association with Yiian Shih-k'ai than of his political 
activities. 
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce 
Since the time of Yiian Shih-k'ai's restoration to a position of 
power in late 1911, Chang Chien had been in frequent communica­
tion with Yiian. His refusal to serve on the final prerepublican 
cabinet did not end Yiian's attempt to have Chang Chien on his side. 
Soon after Yiian became the provisional president in early 1912, he 
telegraphed Chang Chien to request him to go north and assume 
some public office. Again Chang Chien begged off, citing as the 
reason his recent resignation as Minister of Industries in the Nanking 
government. He did not close the door to all appointments, how­
ever, as he intimated in a letter, personally delivered by his friend 
Liu Hou-sheng to Yiian, that he would be willing to serve in some 
capacity which would give him power to introduce salt reforms, 
carry out the Huai River project, or encourage the growth of 
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cotton.128 For the time being Yuan did not choose to follow up 
these hints. This did not prevent Chang Chien from offering advice 
to Yuan on the latter's choices for cabinet posts. For the cabinet 
of T'ang Shao-i, organized in March, 1912, Chang Chien expressly 
recommended Tuan Ch'i-jui for the post of Minister of War, 
Hsiung Hsi-ling for Minister of Finance, and Chou Hsiieh-hsi for 
Minister of Industries. Yuan followed his advice on Tuan and 
Hsiung. The appointment of Tuan was to be expected, since he had 
long been a loyal subordinate of Yiian's. Hsiung's appointment 
however, was more in the nature of a political concession on Yiian's 
part. That Hsiung and not some other prominent member of the 
opposition parties was picked for the post must be attributed in 
part to Chang Chien's recommendation.129 
In July, 1913, Chang Chien did Hsiung a greater service. Yuan 
was then dissatisfied with the cabinet of Chao Pin-chiin, who had 
followed T'ang Shao-i and Lu Cheng-hsiang to the premiership. 
Yuan would have preferred Hsu Shih-ch'ang, one of his closest 
associates, as the new premier. Knowing that the selection of Hsu 
would encounter difficulties in receiving the approval of the 
Parliament, he offered Chang Chien the premiership. Once more 
Chang Chien declined the offer, and strongly suggested that Hsiung 
Hsi-ling be considered instead.130 Yuan submitted the name of 
Hsiung to the Parliament primarily as a political manuever. To his 
surprise the moderate faction in the Kuomintang combined with 
solid Progressive Party support to get Hsiung approved.131 
The cabinet organized by Hsiung Hsi-ling included, among 
others, Tuan Ch'i-jui as Minister of War, Sun Pao-ch'i as Foreign 
Minister, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao as Minister of Justice. Because 
Hsiung had expressed the desire to organize a cabinet composed 
of "first-rate men with first-rate experiences" his cabinet soon 
acquired the name of the "first-rate Cabinet."132 
Yuan now pressed Chang Chien to accept the post of Minister 
of Agriculture and Commerce. Hsiung also urged Chang Chien to 
join his cabinet. Having refused Yiian's offer a number of times, 
Chang Chien found it difficult to decline once again. It was at this 
time also that General Chang Hsiin's troops were committing a 
series of outrages in Nanking, which they had occupied when the 
revolting Kuomintang forces were driven out. Chang Chien 
protested this incident to Yuan in the strongest terms. Yuan 
promised to dispatch Chang Hsiin's troops elsewhere. Thus having 
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been placed under Yiian's obligation for a number of reasons, 
Chang Chien consented to take up the portfolio of agriculture and 
commerce.133 When his appointment was eventually submitted in 
September, 1913, to the Parliament for ratification along with the 
rest of the slate, he had the honor of receiving the largest number 
of ratifying votes in the brief history of the Chinese Republic, 
598 out of 619 cast altogether.134 
Chang Chien's term of office as the Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce from October 21, 1913, to December, 1915, was 
characterized by a number of useful projects. That many of them 
did not become permanent must be evaluated against the conditions 
of the time. A newly established republic, led by a president 
singularly bent on building up his own personal power, with a 
parliament torn by petty political bickerings, can hardly offer the 
stable political background necessary for long-term projects. In any 
case, it is certain that Chang Chien stepped into the cabinet post 
with the resolve to achieve certain definite objects. He indicated 
this in the first published statement upon his appointment, in which 
he enumerated the four basic steps which needed to be taken by 
the government: (1) to set up the necessary legal framework by 
providing forestry regulations, corporation laws, bankruptcy laws, 
etc.; (2) to stabilize the fiscal system of the country; (3) to put the 
tax system into order; and (4) to offer encouragement to private 
enterprise in all fields.135 
Before he set his sights to achieve any of these aims, however, 
he first reorganized the ministry under him. Technically he was 
the concurrent head of both the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry and the Ministry of Labor and Commerce. These two 
ministries had been set up in place of the single Ministry of 
Industries by Yuan Shih-k'ai as a temporary political expedient. 
Chang Chien received Yiian's support in recombining the two into 
the single Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. By this move he 
reduced the personnel by half and eliminated much unnecessary 
duplication in administration.136 
Starting in December, 1913, when he initiated, and the Parliament 
approved, the promulgation of the Labor and Commercial Profit 
Law, he had a hand in the passage of seven basic commercial laws 
within a period of three months, from August to October, 1914. 
The more important among them were the Regulations for the 
Registration of Commercial Enterprise and Corporations, the 
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Corporations Establishment Law, the Chamber of Commerce Act, 
and the Hunting Law, all except the last having to do with in­
dustrial or commercial enterprises.137 These laws provided the 
framework under the republic for the growth of private business, 
although it must be said that mere promulgation of these laws did 
not signify that they went into actual effect throughout the country. 
Chang Chien next turned to the encouragement of agricultural 
and livestock production. He announced the awarding of prize 
money to farmers and herders for outstanding achievements in crop 
cultivation and animal husbandry. He followed this by establishing 
experimental stations for the improvement of cotton, sugar cane, 
forest products, and domestic animals. Other projects which he 
sponsored included the legalization of land reclamation efforts by 
private enterprise and the Manchurian reclamation projects. 
One of Chang Chien's most cherished projects was the stand­
ardization of all weights and measures in the country. He was 
certainly not the first in the country who felt that the multiple 
system of weights and measures then existing was a hindrance to 
the nation's growth in production and trade. His effort was not 
without precedent. The former Ministry of Agriculture, Labor, and 
Commerce in the Ch'ing dynasty had originally initiated the effprt 
to set up a standard system of measurement for length, capacity, 
and weight. Now in 1914 Chang Chien proposed to revive the 
project and carry it out to a successful conclusion. He went about 
it in two ways. On the one hand he dispatched men abroad to 
study the measures used in the other countries; on the other he 
established a standard measurements bureau, which made official 
measuring devices for use throughout the country. This project, 
laudable though it was, suffered the same fate that befell so many 
of Chang Chien's other efforts, namely, his personal interest was not 
enough alone to cause a permanent change, and when he left his 
position, the project died.138 
When Hsiung Hsi-ling resigned his premiership under political 
pressure in February of 1914, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and another minister 
resigned with him. Chang Chien was approached on this matter. 
He replied that he took up his post as a political free agent, intent 
only upon the achieving of certain aims. He therefore felt no 
obligation to follow Hsiung's lead.139 He stayed on in the same 
position in the cabinet of Sun Pao-ch'i. His responsibilities as the 
concurrent Director General of Water Conservancy, however, 
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kept him away from the ministry through a good part of 1914. 
Indeed, he personally was more concerned with water conservancy 
work than with his ministerial responsibilities.140 Early in 1915 he 
attempted to resign his ministership so that he might concentrate 
on water conservancy projects. His resignation was not allowed. 
At this time Yuan Shih-k'ai first betrayed unmistakable signs of 
his intention to revive the monarchy, with himself as the new em­
peror. For months his critics had accused him of harboring such 
designs, but he had denied it categorically. In July, 1915, the 
formation of the Ch'ou-an Hui by Yen Fu and five others, all known 
for their monarchical pro-Yuan sentiments, finally brought the 
matter into the open.141 Chang Chien at once attempted to dissuade 
Yuan from his course of action. Once more, as was the case in the 
summer of 1898 when he tried to dissuade K'ang Yu-wei from the 
latter's course of action, his words fell on deaf ears.142 
In late September Chang Chien submitted his resignation for 
both the ministry and the water conservancy directorship. This was 
again not allowed by Yuan. By this time Chang Chien had already 
left the capital and had returned to Nan-t'ung. He therefore sat 
tight and waited until December, when he again submitted his 
resignation. This was accepted on December 28, 1915.143 
In the last analysis we are forced to conclude that, in spite of 
all his involvement in national affairs, he was of surprisingly little 
influence on the key events of his time. Compared to such men as 
Yuan Shih-k'ai and Sun Yat-sen, or even to such as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 
and Li Yuan-hung, he had far less to do with the outcome of what 
was one of the crucial periods in the history of modern China. 
His role was a subsidiary one at best. 
The reform of 1898 was centered around K'ang Yu-wei. Chang 
Chien disassociated himself from K'ang because he disliked K'ang 
as a person and disagreed with his program. In the Boxer uprising 
Chang Chien was only one of several advisers of Governor-general 
Liu K'un-i, who in turn was only cooperating with the efforts of 
Sheng Hsiian-huai and Governor-general Chang Chih-tung. Chang 
Chien's advocacy of constitutionalism was certainly more important 
than his part in either of the two events of 1898 and 1900, yet 
his outspoken criticisms and proposals, along with the efforts of 
other constitutionalists, only prompted the Court to go through the 
motions of setting up a constitutional government. As events were 
to prove, the entire movement for a constitutional government • 
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became so much wasted effort when the revolution broke out in 
1911. 
It might be argued that the role of Chang Chien in setting up 
the Kiangsu Provincial Assembly contributed to the success of the 
revolution. This would be true if the provincial assemblies were 
active agencies in the overthrow of the Ch'ing regime. No evidence, 
however, exists to support such a contention. The members of the 
provincial assemblies were almost all leading gentry members. 
They had little real sympathy for the revolutionaries and made no 
systematic effort to pursue a common cause with them. That most 
of the provincial assemblies declared their provinces independent 
of the Court after October 10, 1911, must be regarded as a sign 
of the weakness of Ch'ing central power in a time of crisis rather 
than as evidence that the provincial assemblies were centers of 
revolutionary activities. 
Finally, although Chang Chien occupied cabinet posts in both 
the provisional government and under Yuan Shih-k'ai, he did not 
at any time possess real political power. His term of office as the 
Minister of Industries in 1912 lasted only the three months' duration 
of the short-lived provisional government in Nanking. His appoint­
ment came primarily as a result of his great prestige in Kiangsu. 
His later term of office as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce 
in Peking also bore very little actual results. The post itself was 
a minor one in the cabinet and Chang Chien made it plain that he 
had no intentions of using it as a springboard to greater political 
prominence. It must not be overlooked also that he was then already 
over sixty years of age. 
Inasmuch as Chang Chien seemed perpetually to be just off the 
stage where the key events were being enacted, it is apparent that 
he was seldom directly in touch with national political events, and 
then only for short periods of time. In this sense he may be said to 
have suffered from a degree of provincialism. Yet this is precisely 
where he had the advantage over the other leading persons of his 
time. By shunning a straight political career he avoided the plight 
of such men as Yuan Shih-k'ai and Li Yuan-hung. Chang Chien 
was to go on to achieve far more concrete results in the fields of 
industry, education, and conservation by confining his activities 







CHANG CHIEN'S career as an educator has attracted less attention 
than has his career as an industrialist. Yet he himself always em­
phasized the fact that education stood foremost in his mind. Writing 
in 1912 on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Nan-t'ung 
Normal School, he set forth clearly the factors which led him to 
the field of education. 
From the time of China's utter defeat in 1894 and the lowering of 
her national prestige at the signing of the treaty of Shimonoseki in 
1895, the Chinese intelligentsia have come to realize the necessity of 
universal education. Yet universal education must rely on the training 
of teachers, therefore I began to see the necessity for establishing normal 
schools. The establishment of a normal school requires not an inconsider­
able sum of money. The normal schools of other countries are rightfully 
supported on the national or local levels. In China at the time the examina­
tion system had yet to be abolished; the people remained unenlightened. 
On the one hand, the nation merely announced its intentions without 
making concrete plans, on the other, each locality preserved its original 
public funds with no thought of contributing them to a normal school 
system. Thinking through to the root of the problem, I had no recourse 
except to enter the business world. However, I had been a poor scholar 
all my life. Where would I find the necessary capital? Fortunately 
Nan-t'ung had long been famous internationally as a region where fine 
cotton is grown. When the opportunity presented itself for someone to 
establish a spinning factory in Nan-t'ung, I accepted the task. By arduous 
labor and rigid standards I managed to build up public confidence in 
the venture. In forty-four months the enterprise had its start, two years 
passed by without it foundering, and two more years later it began 
to show a profit. From the day of its inception, I had accumulated my 
share of the salary, which, with accrued interest, amounted to some 
20,000 taels. With the encouragement of two or three of my comrades, 
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this sum was used to establish a normal school. Then came the division 
of the school into practice courses, preparatory courses, and regular 
courses. The graduates of the practice and preparatory courses became 
teachers for the lower primary schools which came into being, while the 
regular courses provided teachers for the higher primary schools. 
Thereafter technical courses, courses on surveying, and the agricultural 
school were added one by one.1 
Thus Chang Chien stated that it was patriotism which turned him 
to the career he followed, and that for him business served as 
means to attain the end of education. His business turned out so 
well that in later years he devoted less and less of his time and 
energies to it, delegating much of its control to his brother Chang 
Ch'a and several other associates. Education, however, remained 
one of his chief concerns to the end of his life. 
Before we examine Chang Chien's career as an educator in 
detail, it may be well to trace the development of modern education 
in China, so that his achievements can be seen in perspective. 
Early Developments in Modern Education 
For close to two thousand years China had a gradually de­
veloping system of education based on the Confucian classics and 
formalized by the civil service examination system. This educational 
system became the foundation of Chinese society and culture, and 
was widely copied by neighboring peoples like the Koreans and 
the Japanese. When European scholars first learned about it from 
the reports of the Jesuit missionaries in the seventeenth century, 
it seemed to some of them to be the perfect system, leading to a 
government of philosophers. The basic validity of this Confucian-
based educational system was not seriously challenged by the 
Chinese educated class until the nineteenth century, when repeated 
political and military disasters led some to attribute China's weakness 
to the formal structure of her educational system. Even then few 
questioned the basic tenet that ethical teaching must be the founda­
tion of all education. This was to be expected, since such out­
standing Chinese leaders in the nineteenth century as Lin Tse-hsii, 
Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Chang Chih-tung, men 
generally regarded as representing the more progressive element 
among Chinese officialdom, were themselves products of the 
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traditional education system. Little by little some Chinese came to 
recognize that the system itself was inadequate to cope with China's 
problems. And it was through their efforts that reforms were 
eventually initiated in education. Necessarily, each step had to be 
painfully slow, since it must be made in the face of centuries-old 
inertia and the conservatism of the bulk of the Chinese educated 
class. It was not until a new generation had come along in the 
twentieth century, free from the influence of single-minded con­
centration on Confucian classics and the decade-long preparation 
for advancement through the examination system, that the change 
could be thought of as permanent. 
Into the coming of modern education went several separate 
strands, namely, the revision in the thinking of the Chinese about 
the need to introduce an alien institution, the creation of a modern 
educational administration, the establishment of new-model schools, 
the sending of students abroad, and the contributions made by the 
foreign missionaries. As might be surmised, these steps, which 
seem so logically to grow out of one another, were taken more or 
less haphazardly. This was due not so much to the lack of over-all 
plans, several of which received more than passing attention, but 
rather to the existence of the conservative opposition already 
alluded to, which made it impossible for the more enlightened 
minority among the Chinese to carry out the reforms logically. 
It must also be remembered that educational reform was but one 
among many types of reforms proposed at the time. It had to move 
slowly by necessity. 
After China's second defeat at the hands of the "foreign 
barbarians," an institution called the T'ung-wen Kuan was created 
in 1862.2 Prince Kung and Wen-hsiang, who were chiefly responsible 
for its establishment, conceived of it as a foreign-language school 
for the training of competent clerks to staff the newly created 
agency for the handling of "barbarian affairs," the Tsungli Yamen. 
From the humble beginning of this institution, however, can be 
traced the development of a number of new-type schools alien to 
the traditional scheme of Chinese education. The T'ung-wen Kuan 
was joined in the two succeeding years by the founding of the 
Kuang-fang-yen Kuan in Shanghai and the T'ung-wen Kuan of 
Canton, both for the express purpose of foreign-language training. 
Later the Kiangnan Arsenal and the Foochow Shipyard both had 
attached schools for translators. In 1863 the T'ung-wen Kuan added 
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courses in French and Russian to the original English course. 
In 1866 it further broadened its scope by adding instruction in 
mathematics, chemistry, science, international law, and astronomy. 
This trend, however, proceeded no further until the Reform of 
1898, when the T'ung-wen Kuan became the model for an institution 
of higher education, the Ching-shih Ta-hsueh-t'ang (generally 
referred to by foreigners as the Imperial University). The T'ung-wen 
Kuan continued to exist side by side with this new institution 
until 1902, when it was merged with it.3 
While these institutions were being established, there arose a 
separate movement for the training of Chinese students abroad. 
Its prime mover was Yung Wing, the first Chinese graduate of an 
American university. He succeeded in persuading Tseng Kuo-fan 
and Li Hung-chang to endorse his scheme for sending thirty 
students to the United States each year under the supervision of a 
Chinese scholar. The first group of youths went abroad in 1872.4 
Although the scheme collapsed after only four groups of students 
had been sent, other students, notably the graduates of the school 
attached to the Foochow Shipyard, were sent abroad from time to 
time from 1879 on-5 After Shimonoseki the government again 
allowed students to go abroad. The largest contingent of students 
went to Japan, but European nations as well as the United States 
also received substantial numbers of students. The influence of 
these "returned students" eventually far exceeded their actual 
number. They were responsible for the continued growth of modern 
education, as well as other political and social reforms. 
The establishment of modern schools and the sending of students 
abroad, however, represented no direct threat to the basic system 
of traditional education itself. At the time when the T'ung-wen 
Kuan was set up and when the first group of Chinese students went 
abroad, most Chinese officials regarded these as steps designed 
solely for the acquisition of foreign tongues and foreign skills. 
When these steps seemed likely to have wider implications, they 
were reluctant to lend their continued support. The battle between 
traditional and modern education at first ran strongly in favor of 
the former. Even Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, who were 
chiefly responsible for establishing new schools and sending students 
abroad, were highly antagonistic to the idea of tampering with the 
institutions of classical learning and civil service examinations.6 As 
late as 1898, Chang Chih-tung enjoyed a good deal of support for 
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his proposal to give central emphasis to Chinese learning, as 
embodied in his famous Ch'iian-hsiieh P'ien. But events in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, starting with the defeat by Japan 
and culminating with the Boxer uprising, made drastic changes 
inevitable. In 1903 a three-men commission composed of Chang 
Po-hsi, Jung-ch'ing, and Chang Chih-tung recommended the 
establishment of a national system of modern schools and the 
gradual abolition of the examination system. Two years later 
Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-k'ai were responsible for the 
outright abolition of the examination system, a step which removed 
a major obstacle to the successful erection of a modern educational 
system.7 
There remained the task of creating a national educational 
administration. For, following the example set by Japan, the 
Chinese Government wanted to centralize the development of 
modern education. The decade following the Sino-Japanese War 
had seen the appearance of a number of schools which were largely 
the result of individual efforts. This, however, was regarded as 
undesirable. Instead, a complete system of schools and educational 
policies was mapped out. It included an educational administration 
which would be headed on the national level by a minister holding 
"cabinet" rank. Directly under him would be officials in charge of 
the educational affairs of the capital (Peking). This central body 
would also have supervision over regional educational administra­
tions to be organized on substantially the same line as the national 
administration. For the school system, the proponents of the scheme 
envisaged a ten-year primary school, a three-year middle school, a 
three-year preparatory school, and topped by a three-year college.8 
These details were changed several times even before the system 
left the blueprint stage, but the concept of a centralized, standardized 
scheme of education remained essentially unchanged. Time sched­
ules were drawn up giving a year-by-year plan of how the establish­
ment of each part of this administration and school system was to 
be carried out.9 
An account of the gradual development of modern education in 
China must necessarily mention the efforts of foreign missionaries 
in establishing a number of schools. As early as 1839 a school 
dedicated to the memory of Robert Morrison, the first Protestant 
missionary to come to China, was opened in Macao. It was this 
school that Yung Wing attended. A decade or1 so later, both 
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Catholic and Protestant schools were operating in Shanghai. 
Until 1877, however, the openings of these schools were only 
isolated individual efforts. That year the formation of a school and 
textbook committee at the General Conference of Protestant 
Missionaries in China heralded the beginning of a period of organ­
ized efforts.10 
The contribution of Protestant missionary education to the 
development of modern education in China was twofold. Mis­
sionaries were in the vanguard of those who early agitated for a 
national educational system, and missionary institutions served as 
models of new-style schools. Beginning in 1899 the missionary-
backed Educational Association of China took on the task of 
drawing up a national education scheme and attempted to influence 
the Ch'ing government to recognize the need for such a scheme. 
The missionaries were confident that they would be called on to 
play key roles once the scheme was approved. At the same time 
missionary schools taught English and science while serving as a 
breeding ground for a new crop of Chinese teachers trained in 
modern methods of teaching.11 
The fond hopes of leaders in education among the Protestant 
missionaries were not destined to be realized at first. When the 
government decided on educational reforms in 1903 it turned to 
Japan instead for its model of a national system of education. A 
distinction between government and missionary school was drawn, 
so that in effect students in the missionary schools were discriminated 
against as products of schools without official approval.12 Not until 
after the Revolution of 1911 did missionary education become a 
part of the mainstream of Chinese education.13 
Thus we can see that at the time when Chang Chien assumed the 
role of an educator in 1902, some changes in the Chinese education 
system had been made, but the process had hardly begun. The 
abolition of the examination system and the creation of an education 
administration were substantial advances, and they materially aided 
Chang Chien's efforts. His achievements, however, were on a 
totally different level, and it is to these we now turn. 
The Establishment of a School System 
The disastrous consequences of the Boxer uprising of 1900 
finally forced the Empress Dowager and her conservative advisers 
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to institute reforms. Officials both at the Court and in the provinces 
were ordered to submit memorials on the ways and means of 
bringing about reform. Among the officials, the two governors-
general, Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i, came to the forefront 
with their famous joint memorials of 1901, stipulating a number of 
specific reforms.14 That same year, as a step toward the introduction 
of modern education into his own provinces, Governor-general 
Liu asked Chang Chien to draw up the curriculum for primary and 
secondary schools. Chang Chien took this opportunity to urge upon 
Liu the necessity of opening normal schools in order to provide 
the trained teachers needed for the various primary and secondary 
schools envisaged. Liu was at first agreeable to this suggestion, 
but was later dissuaded by some of his subordinates, who, like 
many other officials of the time, argued that the traditional education 
system of China was far superior to those of other nations.15 
Thwarted in his bid to see a public-supported normal school 
established, Chang Chien fell back on his own resources and 
proceeded to work for the establishment of a normal school in 
Nan-t'ung. This school was initially financed by his unused salary 
from Dah Sun, accumulated over the years to the amount of 
20,000 taels, together with 10,000 taels contributed by his close 
friend Shen Hsieh-chiin and others.16 His petition to Governor-
general Liu for such a school was duly approved in 1902, and in 
June of that year a local temple, the Ch'ien-fo Ssu, was taken over 
for the purpose of converting it into a schoolhouse. The temple 
had outlived its usefulness for some time. Its single resident monk 
was relocated in another temple with little difficulty.17 The grounds 
were enlarged to the extent of six acres, and additional rooms 
were constructed so that up to three hundred students could be 
accommodated in the temple. First classes began in May, 1903.18 
The Nan-t'ung Normal School was the first independent institu­
tion of its kind in China. Prior to its establishment there existed 
only a department for teachers' training at the Nan-yang School 
established by Sheng Hsiian-huai in 1897.19 Nan-t'ung Normal 
School later became integrated into the provincial normal school 
system of Kiangsu when the province took over half of the financial 
burdens of the school.20 
Chang Chien's wife proved to be the motivating force behind 
the founding of a normal school for girls. She and the wife of 
Chang Ch'a, Chang Chien's brother, convinced their husbands that 
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such a school was needed.21 Plans were first laid in 1905. The follow­
ing year a private residence was purchased to be converted into 
school quarters. Delays, however, prevented the holding of the first 
class until 1909. Additional land and buildings were provided in 
1910 and again in 1920, and an attached primary school was opened.22 
The founding of this school for the training of women teachers 
was another first in China, and many of the students came 
from parts of Kiangsu other than Nan-t'ung and its immediate 
environs. 
The establishment of these normal schools provided trained 
teachers, without which no system of primary schools could exist. 
The next step was the primary school system itself. As was his 
custom Chang Chien worked out the scheme in detail. His first 
comprehensive plan in 1906 called for a network of 400 lower 
primary schools for Nan-t'ung, which had an estimated area of 
10,000 square li (about 1,000 square miles).23 This would provide 
one school for every twenty-five square li. One rainy day in 1910 
Chang Chien was traveling, and the condition of the roads and 
the difficulty of making progress caused him to reflect how nearly 
impossible it would be for a child of less than ten years of age 
to have to travel up to ten li a day just to go to and from school. 
The plan was thereupon revised, raising the number of schools from 
400 to 600, so that each school would serve an area of only 
sixteen square li. Five hundred of the primary schools would be 
three-year schools with eighty students each, while the remaining 
one hundred would each have four grades and 120 students. 
This would produce an estimated number of 16,500 lower 
primary graduates a year, of which some 10 percent were expected 
to continue on into higher primary school. To provide for this 
number adequately, eighteen schools on the higher primary level 
were thought to be necessary, ten regular and eight vocational, the 
latter further specified as five agricultural, two industrial, and one 
commercial schools. Each of these would be a four-year school 
with ninety students.24 
To finance this system of schools, Chang Chien proposed a kind 
of local school tax levied on the landowners. The total cost of 
constructing the 600 lower primary and eighteen higher primary 
schools was estimated at 290,000 yuan (about 207,000 taels). This 
was to be covered by a levy of six fen (about U.S. $0.03 at the time) 
on each of the estimated five million mow (about 757,000 acres) of 
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cultivated land in Nan-t'ung. In 1910, when this plan was drawn up 
by Chang Chien, seventy lower primary schools had already been 
established by various gentry members of Nan-t'ung under Chang 
Chien's leadership. The remaining 530 schools were to be in exist­
ence by the end of 1914.25 Unfortunately this carefully worked-out 
scheme of financing the schools was never put into effect. Instead, 
the schools continued to be supported by individual contributions. 
Chang Chien's plan is significant nevertheless because it provided 
a blueprint for a locally supported school system. 
With support for the school system coming only from private 
sources, Chang Chien's goal of universal education for Nan-t'ung 
never reached the level he envisaged. Still, the number of lower 
primary schools grew impressively during his lifetime. From 
seventy such schools in 1910, the figure rose to 357 by 1926.26 
One of the chief reasons Nan-t'ung came to be known as a model 
district was its extensive school system, which provided a concrete 
illustration of what conceivably could have become the pattern of 
universal education for all of China. 
It should not be assumed, however, that all of Chang Chien's 
projects in the field of education followed a set plan and schedule. 
While he was busy establishing the normal school and planning 
for the primary schools, he founded an apprentice school for the 
children of his workmen, and a sericulture and silk-weaving 
training school for the women of his district. These and other 
projects, including the aforementioned normal schools and several 
of the earliest primary schools, were all financed out of Chang 
Chien's own share of the profits of the Dah Sun Cotton Mill. These 
exhausted his available funds, so that when the need for a middle 
school arose in 1906, Chang Chien was unable to finance it privately. 
Consequently he appealed to the provincial government to permit 
the establishment of a consolidated middle school at Nan-t'ung to 
serve the needs of the four adjoining communities of Nan-t'ung, 
Hai-men, Ju-kao, and T'ai-hsing. These communities were to pay 
for the construction of the school in the following proportions: 
five tenths from Nan-t'ung, two tenths each from Ju-kao and 
T'ai-hsing, and one tenth from Hai-men. He further proposed that 
the provincial authorities allocate annually one tenth of the amount 
in excess of 40,000 taels collected on a certain local cloth tax to be 
the operating fund of the school.27 This Nan-t'ung Five-district 
Middle School opened its doors in June, 1908.28 After 1911 the 
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provincial government assumed complete control of the school, 




Before the consolidated middle school had gotten past the 
planning stage, the first step toward what eventually was to become 
Nan-t'ung University was laid in 1906. In that year courses on 
improved methods of farming were added to the curriculum of the 
normal school. Three years later courses in sericulture were added. 
In 1910 these courses received independent existence as the Combin­
ed Agricultural School. After the republic came into being, it was 
reorganized into the Combined Class-A and Class-B Agricultural 
School. In 1912 Chang Chien founded a textile school and a medical 
school. The textile school was another pioneering venture, as there 
were only two schools of its kind in the country at the time.30 
Located near Dah Sun in T'ang-chia-cha, the school provided its 
students with the benefit of actual experience in one of the most 
successful cotton mills in the country. Many graduates of the 
school were later prominent in China's cotton-textile industry. 
The medical school had separate departments for Chinese and 
Western medicine. In 1915 the textile school acquired the status of 
a college. A year later the agricultural school gained similar status, 
followed by the medical school in 1918.31 The logical next step 
would be to combine the three colleges into a university, and in 
1920 the three did indeed join to form Nan-t'ung University.32 
As endowment for the university Chang Chien bought for 500,000 
yuan (about 350,000 taels) a substantial tract of land from the 
Hua Ch'eng Land Reclamation Company, one of many such 
enterprises founded along the coast of northern Kiangsu as a result 
of Chang Chien's influence.33 He became the first head of Nan-t'ung 
University, to be followed after his death in 1926 by his son, Chang 
Hsiao-jo.34 
In the field of adult vocational education, mention has already 
been made of the Sericulture Training School. In 1919 Chang 
Chien opened a school for Chinese musicians as a part of his project 
to support in Nan-t'ung two repertory theaters giving regular 
performances of Chinese opera. Though periodically closed when­
ever the theaters were forced to suspend operations, the school 
lasted until 1925.35 Continued efforts on his part to better the 
means of livelihood of the girls in his area prompted him to add 
courses in embroidery and hairnet-making to the sericulture course 
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already in being.36 The embroidery classes began as a part of the 
girls' normal school curriculum in 1914. The famous embroiderer, 
Yii Shen Shou, was persuaded by Chang Chien to come to Nan-t'ung 
to take charge of the course. Two years later the course was 
detached from the normal school and made into a separate training 
school. It flourished until Mrs. Yii's death in 1921. Chang Chien 
devoted a great deal of personal interest to the Embroidery School, 
and it was generally regarded as one of his pet projects.37 
Even taking into account the fact that not all of the primary 
schools were directly financed by Chang Chien, the school system 
of Nan-t'ung must still be considered one of the largest privately 
controlled systems in the country. Except for the middle school, 
Chang Chien had complete control of all Nan-t'ung schools until 
1926. The higher educational authorities in the province generally 
deferred to him out of regard for his great prestige and his influence 
as head of the Provincial Education Association. His position in 
Nan-t'ung can be seen in his handling of the local manifestations 
of the students' unrest prevalent throughout much of China during 
the years of 1919 through 1925. 
In 1919 the two local schools most affected by the wave of 
student agitation were the textile school and the Provincial Middle 
School, with the normal school affected to some extent. Chang 
Chien promptly suspended the textile school, but since the middle 
school was beyond his control, he wrote to the Provincial Education 
Bureau urging it to act promptly.38 The bureau first agreed to 
replace the principal of the middle school with another man, then 
reversed its decision. Meanwhile the principal yielded to student 
pressure and promised to grant salary increases to the teachers and 
greater freedom to the students. These concessions came as students 
clashed with the local police, causing minor damages. Chang Chien 
immediately wired the bureau, strongly berating it for its indecisive 
action and almost insisting that the bureau go through with the 
removal of the principal. The bureau apparently complied, and 
things quieted down temporarily.39 During the following year a 
group of students bicycled into an athletic field reserved for the 
use of girl students. When they were ordered off the field, the group, 
now increased to several hundred strong, invaded the premise of 
the primary school attached to the girls' normal school. Although 
no damages were incurred, Chang Chien ordered the prompt 
dismissal of the ring leaders.40 
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Student agitation, however, was by no means over. In his New 
Year's Day Speech to the assembled students of Nan-t'ung in 1923, 
Chang Chien found it necessary to appeal to their sense of fair play 
and patriotism and to remind them that quiet and solitude were 
essential to study and that they should be prepared to undergo 
hardships.41 These well-meaning words apparently were not 
altogether effective, for two years later he announced the policy of 
expelling all students engaged in political agitation and of length­
ening class hours and course preparations.42 These episodes show 
us how thoroughly the schools of Nan-t'ung were under Chang 
Chien's control. His lack of complete success in keeping the students 
in line merely points up the latent strength among the new genera­
tion of politically aroused students. 
Chang Chien's desire to foster the growth of Nan-t'ung's schools 
remained unabated throughout his life. He was past seventy years 
of age and in semiretirement in 1924 when news reached him of the 
decision of the United States to return the remainder of the Boxer 
Indemnity Fund to China for educational purposes. To Chang 
Chien this represented a chance to put Nan-t'ung University on a 
sound financial basis. He applied to the American Government for 
20 to 30 percent of the fund, amounting to about five million yuan 
(about 3.6 million taels), to be used to purchase half a million mow 
of land (about 76,000 acres), which would serve as the endowed 
land of Nan-t'ung University. After development this land would 
provide enough income to make enlargements and improvements 
of the various schools in the university possible. He cited the 
following reasons why Nan-t'ung should be favored over other 
localities: (1) freedom from government and official interference; 
(2) record of prior achievements; (3) the practicality of the project; 
(4) Nan-t'ung's superior location in regard to transportation and 
communication; and (5) the special contributions which could be 
made by the agriculture school and the textile school.43 Even 
though Chang Chien was unsuccessful in this venture, it amply 
demonstrated his lifelong concern for education in his own district. 
Descriptions of Nan-fung Schools 
What were the Nan-t'ung schools like? How did they compare 
with similar schools elsewhere in Kiangsu and in China? Details 
of Nan-t'ung schools are not readily available, but by piecing 
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together information contained in Chang Chien's own writings and 
those in accounts of visitors to Nan-t'ung, some idea of the schools 
can be gained. The following are details on three of the schools 
as they were up to 1917. 
Nan-t'ung Normal School.44 Situated south of Nan-t'ung city, 
this school was originally modeled after Japanese normal schools 
in administration and procedure. It had an administrative and 
teaching staff of thirty, while its enrollment after the first few years 
fluctuated between 200 and 285. The students ranged from sixteen 
to thirty years of age. The school was divided into six grades: 
four regular grades, one preparatory grade, and one practicing 
grade. All the students, some of whom came from as far as Kansu, 
Yunnan, and Kweichou, lived in the dormitories. Tuition and 
room were free, while the students originally paid for the meals 
supplied by the school. This rule was later changed and students 
were given facilities to prepare their own meals. The physical 
plant consisted of several buildings with a total of 400 rooms, 
including dormitory and classrooms, and three athletic fields. The 
annual expenditure, including the expenditure of the attached 
primary school, exceeded 30,000 yuan (about 21,000 taels), one 
third of which was provided by Kiangsu Province.45 From its 
inception in 1903 to 1917, the school graduated 556 students, 
averaging just under fifty per year. For the first two years of the 
school's existence the graduates were granted a unique subsidy of 
ten to thirty yuan monthly, in order to attract worthy students 
away from the traditional studies in preparation for the examination 
system. This practice was stopped when the examination system 
was abolished.46 
Girls' Normal School.47 Located in Nan-t'ung city, this was a 
smaller counterpart of the normal school for men. An administration 
and teaching staff of twenty members served the needs of seventy 
students, divided into four grades. The students ranged in age 
from sixteen to twenty-four, with about half of them boarding in 
the school. Tuition was free. The school had 200 rooms and two 
athletic fields. The annual expenditure was around 6,000 yuan 
(about 4,300 taels), with Nan-t'ung providing two thirds of this 
amount. 
Primary schools.48 As there were more than 300 primary 
schools in Nan-t'ung by 1917, a great deal of variation existed 
among them as to the number of students, the physical facilities, 
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etc. The oldest and best primary school was the one attached to 
the normal school. It had a staff of eleven teachers and had 233 
students, divided into six classes. The students varied in ages from 
seven to twenty, and were almost equally divided between boarding 
and day students. The school had sixty-six classrooms, but its 
dormitory facilities for many years consisted of converted houses 
and temples. Its expenditure was included in that of the normal 
school. 
These descriptions do not indicate how the educational facilities 
in Nan-t'ung compared with those of other cities in Kiangsu 
and with those of the rest of the country. How far had modern 
education advanced in China by the time the Ch'ing dynasty was 
replaced by the republic? Both quantitatively and qualitatively 
speaking, where did the Nan-t'ung schools stand in relation to the 
over-all picture ? 
Without dwelling over the oft-repeated statement that statistics 
in China are most uneven in coverage and not always reliable, es­
pecially for the years prior to the 1930s, we need only to note that, 
fortunately for the quarter century under our consideration (1902­
26), some records do exist. Especially detailed are the statistics on 
the over-all state of Chinese education compiled by the Ministry 
of Education in Peking from 1912 to 1917. As this period covers 
the crucial years immediately after the overthrow of the monarchy 
and falls nearly in the middle of the quarter century we are interested 
in, it will serve as a basis for answers to the questions we have 
raised. 
Table 2 shows the number of schools from mid-1912 to mid-1917. 
Taking these five years as a whole, some indication of the nature 
and trend of educational progress in China can be seen. First of all, 
it is apparent that the schools were largely public-supported, with 
the privately supported schools amounting to considerably less than 
one third of the total number of any of the six classifications of 
schools listed. Secondly, these five years followed a generally rising 
trend in the number of schools, as might be expected, but there 
was a noticeable decline after 1914, with the normal schools 
reaching their peak earlier in 1913-14. This over-all drop might 
reasonably be attributed to the increase of domestic political 
instability after 1914. Thirdly, the figures show that the differences 
in the number of schools among the various levels were quite 
great, the low number of agricultural and industrial schools being 
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Table 2 
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN CHINA AND KIANGSU49 
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1913-14 1914-15 1915-16 1916-17 
29,425 33,84O 35,156 33,7oi 
98,782 111,143 118,952 111,908 
801 820 843 883 
4,968 5,378 5,845 6,169 
1,904 2,232 1,897 1,614 
7,363 8,623 7,862 6,442 
128 J47 126 I 3 I 
433 446 458 455 
46 64 59 5 1 
406 452 444 350 
6 9 11 11 
l9 *9 23 24 
44 21 *3 9 
3*4 231 211 J95 
3 2 2 2 
25 21 J9 18 
5 4 2 2 
42 4i 42 41 
2 1 1 1 
7 6 6 6 
3 3 6 2 
20 22 30 21 
1 
3 2 2 2 
aThc school years from August of the first year to July of the following year. 
"The total figures include three classifications of schools: government 
(nationally supported), official (locally supported), and private. 
especially noticeable. As for a comparison of the figures of China 
as a whole to those of Kiangsu Province, their ratio shows a fairly 
close correlation. The one exception is found in the growth of 
lower primary schools, where Kiangsu continued in 1915-16, 
while the rest of the country declined. These points aside, the most 
important fact which these figures reveal is that quantitatively 
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China as a whole had made noticeable progress in the growth of 
modern education by 1912 and generally continued to do so through 
1917. The progress of Nan-t'ung must be taken in conjunction with 
that of the rest of China for it to be properly judged. 
For a comparison of Nan-t'ung with other localities in Kiangsu, 
the following nine localities have been chosen: Nanking, Shanghai, 
Soochow, Wusih, K'un-shan, Hai-men, Ju-kao, Ch'ung-ming, and 
T'ai-hsing. Nanking, Shanghai, Soochow, and Wusih were and are 
leading centers south of the Yangtze River. They are contrasted 
with Nan-t'ung and the four localities around Nan-t'ung: Hai-men, 
Ju-kao, Ch'ung-ming, and T'ai-hsing. K'un-shan, located between 
Shanghai and Soochow, is included as contrast to T'ai-hsing, 
smallest of the five localities north of the Yangtze River. 
Table 3 gives the figures of schools for the ten Kiangsu 
localities. 
This breakdown does not deviate markedly from the national 
picture in the year-to-year growth and decline or in the marked 
drop in number of schools as we go from the lowest schools to 
the higher ones. The figures do suggest two points. First, the five 
localities on .ne north bank of Yangtze (including Ch'ung-ming) 
had a generally more noticeable rate of increase than that of those 
localities south of the Yangtze, especially in the lower primary 
schools. Secondly, even as Nan-t'ung came to rank about on a par 
with Wusih and Shanghai by 1917, both Hai-men and Ch'ung-ming 
had progressed to a point not far behind Soochow's position. The 
significance of this lies in the fact that both in population and 
natural resources none of the north-bank localities can be compared 
with Soochow and Shanghai. 
Qualitative differences between Nan-t'ung schools and those 
of other cities in Kiangsu and elsewhere are even more difficult 
to establish conclusively. In the absence of complete information 
we can only mention a few things as suggestive. In the matter of 
staff members, number of classes, number of classrooms, hours of 
study, teaching method, and yearly expenditure, Nan-t'ung Normal 
School was comparable with other normal schools established prior 
to 1908 in Kiangsu, Chekiang, Hunan, and Fukien. The one 
outstanding feature of the school in Nan-t'ung was its library of 
2,200 Chinese and Western-language books, with which other 
normal schools, having collections ranging from 1,420 books down 
to a low of 50 books, could not begin to compare. As the first 
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Table 3 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN SELECTED KIANGSU LOCALITIES50 
Lower Primary Higher Primary 
T nrnlitipc 
1913-14 1914-15 1915-16 1916-17 1913-14 1914-15 1915-16 1916-17 
Nanking 82 83 99 98 7 11 9 9 
Shanghai0 193 195 181 2 0 6 36 53 45 44 
Soochow 203 2 9 9 b 2 1 7 213 21 23 2 2 2 0 
Wusih 225 2 2 6 238 266 2 2 21 19 18 
K'un-shan 85 93 1 0 0 108 4 5 5 5 
NAN-T'UNG 195 239 263 271 10 13 1 4 13 
Hai-men H3 164 172 1 8 0 6 8 7 8 
Ju-kao 118 129 147 164 1 4 12 11 11 
Ch'ung-ming 146 156 156 1 8 0 10 14 15 1 4 
T'ai-hsing 62 9 0 105 108 5 7 7 6 
Middle Normal 
Localities 
1913-14 1914-15 1915-16 1916-17 1913-14 1914-15 1915-16 1916-17 
Nanking . . . . . . . . . 1 1 . . . . . . . . . 
Shanghai" 5 5 5 6 1 . . . 1 1 
Soochow . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Wusih  2 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 
K'un-shan . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . 
NAN-T'UNG 2 ic 1 1 
Hai-men . . . 1 1 1 1 
Ju-kao 1 . . . . . . . . . 3 2 2 1 
Ch'ung-ming . . . . . . 1 1 3 
T'ai-hsing . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
°It is not clear whether these figures include schools in the foreign concessions or not. 
The latter possibility seems more likely. 
"This may have been a typographical error, as the number seems excessive, compared 
to those of the previous and the succeeding years. 
cThere seems to be a discrepancy here. Records show clearly that both normal schools 
in Nan-t'ung were in existence by 1914, and continued to operate thereafter. 
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normal school in China, it had graduated 556 students by 1917. 
This figure was topped only by Hunan Provincial Normal School 
No. 1, which graduated 741, and Fukien Provincial Normal School 
No. 1 with 660. Likewise, Nan-t'ung Girls' Normal School com­
pared favorably with the girls'normal schools of Kiangsu, Chekiang, 
and Hunan in staff members, classes, classrooms, and teaching 
methods, but its total number of graduates by 1917 was only 
seventeen, far below Kiangsu Girls' Normal School No. 1 with 
fifty-two. Its annual expenditure of 5,940 yuan (about 4,240 taels) 
was dwarfed by the 33,000 yuan and 29,000 yuan spent by Kiangsu 
Girls' Normal School No. 1 and Chekiang Provincial Girls' Normal 
School respectively. Comparing the primary school attached to the 
Nan-t'ung Normal School with similar primary schools attached to 
normal schools in other provinces, figures on staff members, 
number of graduates, number of classrooms, and teaching methods 
were nearly the same. To Nan-t'ung's credit was its library of 
1,900 books, but it had only seven classes to the others' ten to 
thirteen. All of its students put in a minimum of twenty-nine 
hours of classwork, as compared to the twenty-three hours minimum 
required from the youngest classes of the primary schools attached 
to the Chekiang Normal School No. 1 and Kwangtung Normal 
School No. 2.51 
It seems clear that by the time of the republican era Nan-t'ung's 
schools no longer stood out as noticeably different, either quanti­
tatively or qualitatively, from those of the rest of the country. 
Nan-t'ung's high reputation was based on the fact that its normal 
schools, agriculture schools, textile school, and its system of 
primary schools, had all broken new ground when they were first 
established. The first three types of schools remained prime 
examples in their own fields. Another striking fact was that the 
whole system remained under the over-all control of one individual. 
Compared to the province of Kiangsu as a whole, Chang Chien's 
achievements can best be appreciated when we are reminded that it 
was quite an achievement for the relatively backward areas north 
of the Yangtze River just to keep pace with the more prosperous 
centers such as Shanghai, Soochow, and Wusih. 
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Educational Activities Outside Nan-fung 
Chang Chien showed himself no less concerned with educational 
matters outside his own district. In general, however, he enjoyed 
much less success outside Nan-t'ung. Among his efforts was the 
plan of a complete school system, which he drew up for Yang-chou, 
Kiangsu, in 1906.52 This plan provided for the establishment of 
primary, middle, and normal schools. That same year he organized 
the Merchant Marine School of Woosung.53 In 1907, together with 
two colleagues, he completed the establishment of another school 
at Woosung. This was the Chung-kuo Kung-hsiieh, created for the 
express purpose of providing continued instruction for a score of 
students forced by circumstances to return from Japan.54 Then in 
1909, while he was in Nanking for the opening session of the 
Kiangsu Provincial Assembly, he accepted the position of the 
director of the Kiang-ning Combined Commercial School.55 In 1914 
he converted the then unused Provincial Assembly Hall in Nanking 
into the temporary quarters of the School of Hydraulic Engineering, 
which he had established. This school remained one of his close 
concerns until it was merged with the National Southeastern 
University and others to form the National Central University in 
1927.56 
These concrete achievements in Kiangsu contrasted sharply with 
the barrenness of his role as an educator on the national level, 
where he had no official status and could only rely on his prestige 
as an individual scholar and educator. His first attempt to advise 
the government in educational affairs actually preceded his active 
educational career on the local level. In the lengthy document 
entitled Reasoned Discussion on Reforms, which he submitted in 1901, 
he made the following suggestions on education: 
1. Establishment of a public education system, starting with primary 
education and then proceeding upwards. 
2. Changing the examination system to conform to the new education 
system. 
3. Introduction of the teaching of drawing and cartography in primary 
schools. 
4.	 Establishment of provincial translation bureaus. 
5. Creation of a national ministry of education. 
6. Rewarding	 graduates of the new system by granting them the 
traditional titles along with their prestige and privileges.57 
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These suggestions probably had some influence upon the 
thinking of Liu K'un-i, who, together with Yuan Shih-k'ai, was 
instrumental in the eventual abolition of the civil service examination 
system in 1905. The connection between Chang Chien's petition 
of 1913 advocating the creation of a national library and a national 
museum, with the later founding of national libraries and museums 
in China, is more difficult to establish.58 
Within Kiangsu his influence was more substantial. His advice 
was sought and his ideas were listened to. Certain measures which 
he proposed to Governor-general Chou Fu in» 1906, including the 
creation of a provincial educational association and the conversion 
of the space occupied by the examination stalls in Nanking into a 
market place, were carried out.59 In 1907, at the request of Tuan­
fang, the new governor-general of Liang-Kiang, he drew up in 
detail a plan for the establishment of a university to be called 
Nan-yang Ta-hsiieh (University of the South).60 This institution 
failed to materialize, but the fact that he was asked to provide a 
plan for it indicated his high reputation among the educators of 
Kiangsu. The most important role that he assumed in the educational 
affairs of Kiangsu, however, was his position in the Provincial 
Educational Association. 
The growth of provincial societies for the promotion of modern 
education was a by-product of the abolition of the examination 
system and the reorganization of the educational administration, 
both of which took place in 1905. The Kiangsu Educational 
Society (Chiang-su Hsiieh-hui) was founded on Chang Chien's 
advice in 1906 and the members chose him as its first president. 
The following year the province was divided into two educational 
districts, each of which had its own commissioner of education, 
one in Nanking and one in Soochow. The educational society 
similarly divided into two branches, with Chang Chien staying on 
as the head of the Nanking branch. In 1909 this arbitrary division 
of the society was abolished, with the resultant change of its 
location to Shanghai and its name to the Central Educational 
Association of Kiangsu (Chiang-su Chiao-yu Tsung-hui). Once 
again Chang Chien was chosen to be the president. He resigned 
in 1911, stating his belief that a two-year term was enough for an 
officer and suggesting that someone in the Soochow educational 
district should be chosen for the position.61 In 1913 the organiza­
tion, now known as the Kiangsu Provincial Educational Association 
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(Chiang-su-sheng Chiao-yii-hui), once more elected him president. 
Thereafter he was reelected regularly for a number of years. While 
the association was located in Nanking and Shanghai prior to 1911, 
he played an active role in it, even though he was not able to 
attend all its meetings. Important matters were referred to him for 
decisions, while an executive officer carried on the daily duties of 
the association.62 From 1913 on, however, his presidency became 
purely honorary, and there is no record of his ever having been 
present at any of the meetings. The actual leadership in the associa­
tion passed into the hands of Huang Yen-p'ei and Shen En-fu, 
two educators who began their active careers under him. 
Other honors which were bestowed upon Chang Chien in 
tribute to his achievements in education included his election in 
1905 to the board of trustees of Aurora College (Chen-tan, a 
French Catholic school which became a university in 1917), his 
holding of a similar position with Futan University (an outgrowth 
of Aurora University), his election to the chairmanship of the 
board of trustees of the National Southeastern University, and the 
honorary presidency of the First Far Eastern Athletic Meet, held 
in Manila in 1921.63 Generally speaking, he played a limited role 
in the affairs of these institutions. 
Ideas on Education 
In the course of tracing Chang Chien's career as an educator, 
we have already touched upon some of his ideas. Among these are 
his belief in the primacy of teacher training, his belief in the im­
portance of primary education over other forms of education, and 
his advocacy of vocational training. It now remains for us to 
examine further these and some of his other ideas on education. 
Chang Chien was an advocate of universal education. We have 
seen his concern for setting up his primary school system in such 
a way that all the school-age children within a given area would 
have an opportunity to attend school. He preferred the system to 
be a voluntary one, but recognized that there would be areas 
where a voluntary system would not be workable. In such cases, 
he was not opposed to a compulsory system.64 In line with his 
belief that education was the fundamental prerequisite to a new and 
revitalized China, he regarded universal education as the basis for 
both local self-government and a constitutional system of govern­
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ment on the national level.65 He attributed the rapid advancement 
of the West and of Japan to their systems of universal education.66 
Chang Chien emphasized utility in education and advocated the 
teaching of science and technology. He cautioned his students on 
numerous occasions against retreating into ivory towers. He 
emphasized the utilitarian aspect of modern education, saying that 
knowledge was to be applied rather than pursued for its own sake. 
Students should keep abreast of the latest developments at home 
and abroad so that they could take stock of the larger situation 
and preserve a proper balance between learning and living.67 He 
had no doubt that the pursuit of science and mastery of technology 
would lead to enormous benefits.68 He believed that the traditional 
Chinese tendency to shun exactitude had to be overcome and be 
replaced by a proper regard for scientific precision.69 
Against these evidences of a progressive outlook should be 
balanced certain of his more traditional beliefs. On a number of 
occasions he spoke up in favor of Chinese classical writing as an 
indispensable component of the school curriculum. At the outset 
of his efforts to establish Nan-t'ung Normal School he defended 
classical writing against those who wanted it de-emphasized, 
extolling its clarity and exactness.70 In 1907 he added a special 
section to the curriculum of the middle school for the mastery of 
classical Chinese, especially as a tool of communication.71 Ten 
years later he was to reiterate his belief, saying at an interview, 
"Chinese must be the basis of any curriculum. A school which does 
not emphasize the study of Chinese has no hope of achieving a 
balanced curriculum, even if its science courses are adequate."72 On 
this point he never wavered. 
Even more fundamental than his belief in the importance of 
classical Chinese, however, was his firm conviction that the essence 
of Confucian teachings must be the moving spirit of all Chinese 
education. One of his earliest writings on education was an essay 
entitled "On the Propriety of Having School Regulations Follow 
Confucian Precepts," in which he ingeniously traced the origin of 
the modern school system to one section of the U Chi. 
Chinese school regulations should follow the Chou classics. In the 
U Chi, "Weng Wang Shih Tzu" and "Wang Chih" both discuss in 
detail national education and the art of teaching. The conclusions 
of "Hsiieh Chi" are suitable for the training of teachers in normal 
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schools. As for universal education and the ages at which different subjects 
can be taught, we should be familiar with that part of "Hsiieh Chi" 
which states: "At six, teach them numbers, directions, and names. At 
seven, boys and girls should not sit and eat at the same table. At eight, 
begin to teach them to defer to elders when entering and leaving a 
house or when approaching a table at mealtime. At nine, teach them 
arithmetics. At ten, send them out to live away from home and learn 
bookkeeping and proper etiquette. At thirteen, let them study 
poetry and music. At twenty, when they become adults, let them 
begin the study of Li Chi," 
The "Hsiieh Chi" says "a shu [village school] is found among families." 
The shu of twenty-five families was therefore equivalent to the elementary 
school of a lu [village of twenty-five families]. Children between the 
ages of six to nine generally attented a shu. The text of "Hsiieh Chi" 
further states that ten-year-old girls did not attend school, by which 
we know that up to nine years of age they still did so. If a shu is a school 
which taught the children of twenty-five families, was it not comparable 
to the modern lower primary school? 
It ["Hsiieh Chi"] says "a hsiang [a higher school] is found in a tang 
[village of five hundred families]." The students of a hsiang were from 
ten to thirteen years of age, including those boys who advanced from 
a lit elementary school. The hsiang would be equivalent to the modern 
higher primary school. 
It says "a hsii [a still higher school] is found in a chou [territory of 
2,500 families]." Those attending a hsii were from thirteen to nineteen 
years of age, including the graduates of a hsiang. Thus a hsii would be 
equivalent to the modern middle and higher schools. 
It says further that "a hsiieh [the most advanced school] is found in 
a country." This would be the kind of school attended by students of 
twenty years of age and older. Its emphasis on serving the offspring of 
princes, nobles, and officials, as well as the best products of the hsu\ 
makes it comparable to the Ching-shih Ta-hsueh [Imperial University] of 
today."73 
Chang Chien went on in the same essay to argue that such 
essential components of the modern curriculum as mathematics, 
geography, and biology were no more than elaborations of what 
Confucius called numbers (shu), directions (fang), and names (ming). 
He concluded by exclaiming, "How can the talents of the youths 
of today be considered superior to those of the seventy-two [of 
CHANG CHIEN AND EDUCATIONAL REFORMS I I  I 
Confucius' top disciples], and the teaching method of a primary 
school teacher superior to that of Confucius himself?"74 This was 
written in 1903. Fifteen years later he was to promote a 
society called the Association for Honoring Confucius, which 
advocated restoring the? teaching of Confucian classics in primary 
schools.75 
As a direct result of his Confucian training, he strenuously 
opposed coeducation above the primary schools. Although he was 
the first Chinese to open a girls' normal school and to establish 
various vocational training schools for girls, he thought it " 'incon­
venient' that boys and girls should be educated together after the 
age of ten years."76 The benefits of coeducation seemed to him 
illusory. He argued that the segregation of sexes should not be 
regarded as relegating woman to a lower status.77 Later as chairman 
of the board of trustees of the National Southeastern University, 
he could not be dissuaded from his opposition to the efforts of 
P. W. Kuo, the president of the university, to introduce coeducation 
into that institution. The scheme was eventually carried out over 
his opposition.78 
Finally, we should note his belief in the importance of main­
taining rigid discipline in the teacher-student relationship. In this 
respect he was fond of the practice of backing up his classical 
quotations by mentioning the stand taken by Western thinkers 
such as Pythagoras, Carlyle, Burke, and William James against lax 
discipline.79 Another of his favorite devices was to compare a 
school with an army. 
An army cannot relax responsibility. A school cannot relax respon­
sibility. This is the custom of all the republics in the world today. If an 
army relaxes responsibility, then it cannot be led by a general. If a school 
relaxes responsibility, then it cannot be taught by a teacher. An army 
unled would meet certain defeat. A school without teaching is bound 
to collapse. The ills of a nation start nowhere else. The "Hsiieh Chi" 
states: "Among the ways of conducting a school, the most difficult is in 
achieving strict discipline." Strict discipline leads to the proper method 
[of dealing with other problems], and this in turn causes people to respect 
education. Nowadays in the schools of Europe and America, aside from 
teaching and administration, training and obedience are still stressed. 
The educators of the world have admitted the impossibility of following 
a policy of "no-control" in education. That school discipline must be 
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strict is recognized both here and abroad. Without it there can be no 
teaching, no education.80 
The conviction that discipline is all-important in education was 
a central theme of Chang Chien's ideas. He had on more than one 
occasion expressed this view. On May 4, 1919, students in Peking 
demonstrated against China's signing of the Versailles Treaty 
because of the provision turning former German concessions in 
Shantung over to Japan. The government made a half-hearted 
attempt to suppress the movement, whereupon it spread to other 
classes and became nationwide. This turn of events prompted 
Chang Chien to write an open letter entitled "Warning to the 
Students of the Entire Nation" in 1919, in which he reiterated the 
necessity for discipline in schools and called upon the students to 
divert their energies to more useful channels than political 
agitation.81 
Taking Chang Chien's ideas as a whole, it must be admitted 
that most of them cannot properly be called educational ideas. 
They are rather his ideas and beliefs as they applied to education. 
Chang Chien as an Educator 
Because of his own regard for the importance of education, and 
his repeated assertions that China was to be saved mainly by 
reforming her educational system, we have dwelt at some length 
on the career and the ideas of Chang Chien as an educator. Now 
we must pose the question: What kind of educator was he, and 
how did his educational efforts affect China as a whole? 
Chang Chien's qualification as an educator lay chiefly in his 
thorough classical training. In addition he was at one time or 
another in charge of three old-style academies: the Hsuan-ch'ing 
Academy of Kan-yii, Kiangsu, in 1888; the Yin-chou Academy of 
Ch'ung-ming in 1893; and the Wen-cheng Academy of Nanking 
in 1895. Until 1901 he remained in charge of the Wen-cheng 
Academy, where English and mathematics were taught along with 
Chinese classics. In this academy he took an active role in administra­
tion and teaching. Several of his students later became his associates 
and were instrumental in helping him to carry out some of his 
numerous projects.82 However, he had almost no contact with 
modern education of the Western type, the sole exception being 
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his 1903 trip to Japan, where he visited primary schools, middle 
schools, normal and vocational schools, as well as many factories 
and workshops. He was especially impressed with Japanese school 
administration. We have already noted how he modeled the 
Nan-t'ung Normal School closely after normal schools in Japan.83 
As an educator Chang Chien differed from men like Chang 
Po-hsi, who set up a complete system of school administration 
with the government centralizing all controls, and Sheng Hsiian­
huai, who was responsible for the founding of schools on the 
college level. These men worked from the top down, while Chang 
Chien, always following the practical course, established a normal 
school in order to supply teachers for the primary schools, and 
set up vocational schools to teach new trades. His plan for a 
network of primary schools was the prototype of a system toward 
the establishment of universal education and compulsory education. 
Although Chang Chien's accomplishments were largely confined 
to the area centering on Nan-t'ung, they were of more than local 
significance. He, as one of the leading scholars in Kiangsu, was 
highly respected as an educator, and his ideas on education never 
failed to receive a hearing. His work with vocational schools, for 
example, served as a model for the entire country. In the vocational 
education movement throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Huang 
Yen-p'ei, one of Chang Chien's associates in provincial educational 
affairs, played a leading role. 
Chang Chien's interest in education extended throughout the 
period of 1902 to 1926. The Revolution of 1911 marked no notice­
able break in his career as an educator. In the meantime an entire 
new generation of educators, men like Ts'ai Yiian-p'ei, Hu Shih, 
Chang Po-ling, and others, came upon the scene. These men were 
Western-trained, schooled in the philosophies and methodologies 
of Europe and America, and full of new ideas which they were 
eager to put into practice. These men eventually took over the 
burden of completing the task of weaning Chinese education away 
from its traditional mold. Chang Chien, however, deserves a place 
among the ranks of the handful of men who marked the way for 
the growth of modern education in China. In his own time he was 







IN CHANG CHIEN'S mind land reclamation and salt reform originated 
as interrelated projects. Salt reform started out as no more than 
his efforts to cope with a specific problem which confronted the 
salters (yen-hu), those inhabitants of the salt-producing coastal 
areas who for uncounted generations had been restricted by nature 
and law to the production of salt as their livelihood. At the same 
time the conversion of these same salt-producing areas into 
cultivated land would support many more people than they were 
capable of as salt fields. Although he initiated land reclamation 
before salt reform, he was fully aware of the close yet divergent 
relationship between the two. 
The incompatability of land reclamation and salt production is com­
parable to the opposition of ice and hot coal. Salt production requires 
salinity in the soil; land reclamation requires the lack of salinity. Salt 
production calls for the growth of reeds to be used for fuel; land 
reclamation means replacing reeds with crops. Salt production must have 
the constant inflow of tides, precisely what land reclamation can not 
abide. Since this is so, why have salt production and land reclamation 
always gone hand in hand up to the very present? It is because land 
reclamation is a gradual process, while salt production cannot be 
eliminated all at once. 
Land bordering the sea where tides do not penetrate will have salt-free 
soil. Land bordering the sea where tides occasionally penetrate will have 
abundant growth of reeds. However, those places where tides penetrate 
repeatedly will need the protection of dykes and the planting of grass 
to dispel salinity. Only on salt-free and grass-covered land can land 
reclamation be undertaken. That is why land reclamation is a gradual 
process. 
As for salt production, we must consider the livelihood of the salters, 
as well as the investment of the merchants. On land belonging to the 
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commercial salt producers, the removal of stoves and kettles must take 
their set values into account and abide by legal procedures. And if land 
reclamation should fail, we must still rely on salt production. That is 
why salt production can not be eliminated all at once.1 
Here Chang Chien was referring to the situation in Huai-nan, 
that section of the Kiangsu seacoast south of the former outlet of 
the Huai River, which includes part of Nan-t'ung district. For 
centuries the stretch of uncultivated land along the seacoast had 
been given over to the production of salt. Due to natural factors, 
however, salt production by the traditional method had become 
increasingly unprofitable in Huai-nan. As a result the salters were 
in dire straits. One solution to their dilemma would be the introduc­
tion of improved methods of producing salt, which would require 
new techniques and large sums of money for capitalization, both 
beyond the capabilities of individual salters. The conversion of salt 
fields into cultivated land, on the other hand, would be a partial 
solution to the problem. As a matter of fact, some salters had 
turned to cultivation of a portion of the land as a secondary source 
of income. This was, however, an illegal activity. Decrees issued 
in the time of the T'ung-chih Emperor, designed to protect the 
source of salt, strictly forbade the conversion of salt fields into 
cultivated land. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, 
human necessities were again proving to be more powerful than 
legal restrictions. 
To Chang Chien land reclamation did not merely represent a 
partial solution to the salters' problem. He foresaw the unlimited 
potentialities which lay in the eventual conversion of the whole 
vast region of Huai-nan into arable land. A whole new area would 
then be opened to provide livelihood for many more people than 
the comparatively small number of salters then found in the area. 
The expected influx of farmers from nearby districts in Kiangsu 
would relieve directly the overcrowded conditions in Nan-t'ung, 
Hai-men, Ju-kao, and districts to the north. The new land would 
also increase substantially Kiangsu's total agricultural production, 
especially cotton.2 
Chang Chien had been aware of the abundant possibilities of 
land reclamation, especially as it applied to Nan-t'ung, as early as 
1895. At that time the Sino-Japanese War was going badly for 
China. To guard against the possibility of Japanese efforts to extend 
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the area of conflict to the Yangtze region, Governor-general 
Chang Chih-tung asked him to raise and train a local defense corps 
for Nan-t'ung. The war ended not long after this project had 
begun and it was terminated forthwith. During the short duration 
of the project, however, the local defense corp had held a number 
of drill sessions in the open coastal areas straddling the boundary 
line between Nan-t'ung and Hai-men. It was then that the realization 
of just how much land was uncultivated first struck Chang Chien. 
For although he had lived nearly all his life in Nan-t'ung, he had 
had little opportunity to become acquainted with the comparatively 
sparsely populated coastal areas, lying some three days' distance on 
foot from the city of Nan-t'ung.3 
For the time being, however, he was not in a position to do 
anything about this discovery. Until late in 1899 he was totally 
occupied with the task of establishing the Dah Sun Cotton Mill. 
By 1900 he had succeeded in putting Dah Sun on a relatively stable 
basis. He turned his attention at once to the land reclamation 
problem. 
The seacoast of Nan-t'ung was typical of the Huai-nan region. 
The land there was geologically new, created in the most recent 
millenium from the accumulation of alluvial soil deposited by the 
Yangtze and the Yellow rivers. During this time a gradual recession 
of the level of the sea had contributed to the process by converting 
a wide strip of the shallow off-shore floor of the sea into dry land. 
This land, however, was still very much under the influence of 
tidal fluctuations. Numerous shallow streams bisected the coastal 
area, allowing the sea water to flow in and out with the changes 
of the tide. The soil had a porous structure, particularly suited to 
the growth of cotton. Its high degree of salinity, however, permitted 
only the growth of reeds, which were used by the salters as fuel 
in the boiling of brine.4 Years later Chang Chien was to recall the 
scene presented by the Kiangsu coast prior to the introduction of 
land reclamation in these words: 
I stood on an isolated dyke and looked toward the southeast. It was 
a time when the strong northeast wind was at its height, and the tide 
was striking against the base of the dyke. There was water wherever 
I looked. The spray of the waves came up against the dyke here and 
there, causing an uneven erosion of the soil. In the worst places the 
farmers had tried to check it with logs. 
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The land inside the dyke was only partially cultivated, with cabbages 
interspersed with reeds. I toured the seashore in a cart at a time when 
the tide was low and the wind had died down. I saw flocks of wild 
geeseflying by and crying overhead. Deers and rabbits darted out sudden­
ly in front of my cart. Throughout the entire day I did not meet a single 
soul. Yet on summer nights the lights of people out catching land crabs 
were as numerous as stars in the sky.5 
This area traditionally had been the salters' domain. Without 
removing the high salinity of the soil the land was not in a condition 
to be cultivated. What Chang Chien proposed to do was to form a 
company, so that steps to turn the land into productive fields could 
be undertaken. He envisioned the construction of a series of dykes 
and sluice gates, which would keep the seawater out and provide 
proper drainage for the acrerage. The fields were to be planted 
first with reeds and salt-resistant grass similar to the type growing 
wild in the area. Then in the course of a few years, the exclusion 
of seawater and the growth of reeds and grasses would reduce 
salinity in the soil to the point that cotton and wheat could be 
6grown.
Establishment of T'ung Hat 
From the outset Chang Chien had the staunch support of 
Governor-general Liu K'un-i. Under Governor-general Liu's 
guidance he drafted a memorial to the Court in 1900, requesting 
permission to develop the land along the seacoast of Nan-t'ung 
and Hai-men. This was submitted in the name of Governor-
general Liu and received imperial approval.7 Then Chang Chien 
persuaded the governor-general to assign three young graduates 
of the provincial military academy at Nanking to the task of 
surveying the coastal areas of Nan-t'ung and Hai-men to determine 
their exact extent. The survey was completed by January, 1901.8 
The data obtained provided Chang Chien with the needed informa­
tion to draw up a set of company regulations. He worked pain­
stakingly on this document, revising the original draft seven times 
before he was satisfied.9 The name of the company was to be 
T'ung Hai K'en-mu Kung-ssu, the Nan-t'ung Hai-men Reclamation 
Company. It was to cover an area of 120,000 mow (approximately 
18,000 acres), divided into seven sections, laid out in an irregular 
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shallow arc along the coastal area of Nan-t'ung and Hai-men. It 
was the aim of the company to foster crop cultivation by individual 
tenant farmers on reclaimed land. The initial capital was set at 
220,000 taels, all to be solicited from private investors.10 For fund 
raising Chang Chien had the able help of two of his close friends, 
Tang Shou-ch'ien and Cheng Hsiao-hsu, among others. With their 
help and contributions he managed to raise 140,000 taels by August 
of 1901.11 The comparative ease with which the amount was raised, 
in sharp contrast to the difficulties he encountered in soliciting 
funds for Dah Sun, was no doubt due primarily to the fact that 
investment of land traditionally had been regarded as the soundest 
form of investment. However, his success in establishing Dah Sun 
did no harm to his reputation as an entrepreneur.12 
The backing of Governor-general Liu proved to be a real blessing. 
For what Chang Chien and others had regarded as "wasteland" 
turned out to be completely owned. Nearly every section of the 
land was under someone's title. The system of ownership along the 
salt-producing coast of Kiangsu was complex. Generally there were 
two types of ownerships. Under one, the salt merchant owned 
everything; the land, the stoves for boiling salt, and the reeds, so 
that the salters who worked for him were merely hired laborers. 
Under the other type of ownership, the salter owned the land and 
the stoves, but the merchant held an exclusive franchise for the 
production of salt in a given area.13 It is the second type which 
caused T'ung Hai the most trouble, as both the displaced salter 
and the merchant had to be compensated. Naturally when the news 
was circulated that T'ung Hai wanted to buy a certain piece of 
land, its price would rise immediately. Not infrequently a stretch 
of unoccupied land with perhaps a single salt stove long out of 
use would be represented by its owner as a most valuable piece of 
property, with a flourishing salt business. A further complication 
arose out of the fact that two sections of land which Chang Chien 
wished to acquire for T'ung Hai belonged to two army garrisons. 
The effort to acquire all the needed land encountered innumerable 
delays. Only through the support of Governor-general Liu and the 
active aid of Li Fan-chih and Chang Yiin-t'i, two members of the 
gentry of Hai-men, could the task make any headway. By late 1901 
most of the needed land had been acquired and construction of 
dykes began.14 The complex business of gaining titles to all the 
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In 1910 the two sections of army garrison land were finally acquired 
by Tung Hai, in exchange for which the authorities received 
fifty-two shares of company stocks, valued at 4,500 taels in total.16 
Because of his other interests, Chang Chien needed someone to 
take over the active management of T'ung Hai. He found the 
perfect man for the job in the person of Chiang Tao-ming. Chiang 
was a former student of Chang Chien's at Wen-cheng Academy 
in Nanking and was later one of the three military-academy 
graduates who undertook the task of surveying the coastal areas.16 
Youthful in appearance and energetic by nature, he was to remain 
Chang Chien's right-hand man in land reclamation work for many 
years. He headed a small but dedicated group of managers, who 
lived in the field, directed the laborers working on the dykes, and 
supervised the settling of the tenant farmers, all at a pittance of 
what they could have earned in other lines of work.17 The success 
of T'ung Hai was due in no small part to their efforts. Chang 
Chien was fully aware of the devoted contributions of these men 
and paid them proper tribute in his report to the stockholders of 
T'ung Hai in 1922.18 
It was fortunate that the field managers were a hardy and 
resourceful group. When work began at the end of 1901, conditions 
were highly unfavorable. There were no roads or navigable water­
ways leading to the fields or among the various sections of reclaimed 
land. The necessary food and drinking water had to be supplied 
from outside the immediate area. The only available housing for 
the skeleton crew of field managers was the local temple of the sea 
god. This was converted into their temporary headquarters.19 In 
spite of these operational difficulties, work on the dykes and fields 
proceeded as planned. Within three months two of the seven 
sections had been drained and provided with earthwork dykes on 
their seaward sides. In the spring of 1902 two more sections were 
ready. At the height of building activities, upwards of 7,000 
laborers worked on the projects.20 Chang Chien himself drew up 
the regulations governing the relationships between T'ung Hai and 
its tenants. The first tenant occupied his plot in late 1902.21 
Just as the first phase of the establishment of T'ung Hai was 
reaching completion, calamity struck. On September 1, 1902, at the 
height of the typhoon season, severe winds battered at the newly 
completed dykes, breaking them in fifty places and causing the 
collapse of a total of 1,200 yards of dykes. The damages would 
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have been even more extensive had not the field managers and 
laborers stayed on their jobs throughout the emergency and made 
on-the-spot repairs wherever possible.22 Despite this discouraging 
setback, the work of the company did not stop. By the spring of 
1903 most of the damages had been made good, and work on 
improving the remaining portion of the company land was resumed. 
In 1903 also, the building of an entire village, aptly called Hai-fu­
chen (Village-recovered-from-the-sea), was started.23 In 1904 the 
shallow stream forming the northern boundary of the company was 
deepened and widened. This served the dual purpose of providing 
adequate drainage and irrigation for adjacent fields, while at the 
same time providing a side outlet to the sea for a portion of the 
waters of the Huai River system.24 
Almost three years to the day after the typhoon of 1902, another 
and more severe typhoon bore down on the Kiangsu coast. This one 
lasted five days. Cheng Chien has left a vivid account of this second 
onslaught on the property of T'ung Hai and its sister enterprise, 
T'ung Jen T'ai Salt Company: 
On August 25, 1905, I went to Shanghai in response to wired instruc­
tions of the provincial commerce bureau to facilitate the flow of 
accumulated goods there. On the night of September 1, the wind rose 
sharply and tides became menacing. The water reached a depth of 
three feet at many spots along the roads of the foreign settlement. By 
noon of the second, the tide had risen still further, until evening time, 
when the wind gradually abated. I thought of T'ung Hai and T'ung 
Jen T'ai, and the heavy damage they must have sustained. On the third 
I sent a courier across the Yangtze River to inquire into the situation. 
On the fifth letters reporting the general damages of the respective 
companies reached me. I proceeded to cross the river on the seventh, 
arriving at Ch'uan-hung Harbor in Hai-men. Because of the damages 
inflicted on the roads and bridges within two miles of the harbor, I took 
a smaller boat and went downstream to San-ho Outlet. A warehouse of 
the Dah Sun Branch Mill was located there. Water had left a mark on 
the walls of the warehouse three feet high. The bottom parts of the 
boxes stored in the warehouse were completely soaked. Upon further 
inquiry, I discovered that not a single dyke escaped heavy damage along 
the entire coast. I discovered that within an area of some twenty 
miles by six miles, houses were flattened everywhere; only a few which 
were located on higher grounds escaped destruction. Nine out of ten 
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persons lost their lives. The newly harvested maize and kaoliang were 
thoroughly soaked and spoiled. The fresh water streams had all become 
salty. Consequently a number of persons lost their lives after the typhoon 
because of the lack of drinking water. The bodies of dead men and 
carcasses of animals were everywhere. Within an area of 130 square 
miles the stench was unbearable, bringing all traffic to a standstill. 
This was the situation I found in the northern section of Ch'ung-ming 
and the eastern section of Hai-men.25 
He then went on to describe the losses sustained by T'ung Jen T'ai 
and T'ung Hai. For the latter he enumerated the damages to the 
dykes section by section, showing the exact location and the extent 
of each collapse, ranging from damage of 10 percent to total loss. 
Among the field managers some were forced to make temporary 
rafts or swim in the middle of the night, others mounted tables throughout 
the night, losing all their clothes and possessions, but none lost his life. 
Three of the ablest foremen, however, were drowned. A most grievous 
loss! It is known that high tide occurs on the third and the eighteenth 
of each lunar month. The typhoon of 1902 fortunately occurred 
before the first. Consequently the force of the tide was not comparable 
to the force of the wind. At that time T'ung Hai alone took the brunt 
of the assault. The fields protected by the main dykes were not affected, 
and the people remained in safety. This time, according to the forecast 
of the weather station at Ziccawei, the typhoon came from the Philippines, 
and its center remained for some time just off the coast of Kiangsu. 
The coastal areas of Shanghai, Nan-huai, Ch'uan-sha, Ch'ung-ming, 
Hai-men, and Nan-t'ung were situated squarely in the zone of the fiercest 
winds. Coupled with the high tide, the storm was the worst in some 
eighty or ninety years. The wind started in the evenings, and the 
tide came up in the night. That's why the people could not make prepara­
tions to meet the threat. Among the oldest inhabitants of the area 
it was said that even the great storm of 1848 did not match the severity 
of this year's typhoon.26 
The damage caused by this second typhoon was so extensive that 
appeals for more funds had to be resorted to. Of the original 
capital of 220,000 taels, all had been subscribed. Now Chang Chien 
asked for an additional 80,000 taels to round out the capital at 
300,000 taels. In addition, he appealed to the provincial Agriculture 
and Commerce Bureau for funds, to make up the estimated 120,000. 
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taels needed for thorough repair of the whole system of dykes and 
fields.27 The appeal went unanswered, and from the investors he 
received somewhat less than half of the 80,000 taels he asked for. 
As a result he had to proceed with the repair job on a piecemeal 
basis, depending on the additional capital received and the rent 
from the increasing number of tenant farmers recruited by the 
company.28 One thing he never had to worry about was the supply 
of labor. Three thousand men responded to his call for workers 
in the spring of 1906. The following year saw the complete repair 
of all damages, and in 1908 some of the earthwork dykes were 
replaced by new stone dykes.29 
The typhoons of 1902 and 1905 were costly setbacks, but they 
were calamities which were beyond human control. More infuria­
ting to Chang Chien was the overt and covert opposition from 
people who were against T'ung Hai. These were largely the salt 
merchants and the salt officials. Among the latter, one in 
particular, Chao Pin-yen, the salt commissioner of Liang-Huai, 
proved to be his personal nemesis. Commissioner Chao opposed 
every one of his measures to make the reclamation company 
a success.30 The commissioner's motivation is not difficult to 
conjecture. He reflected the general hostility among salt merchants 
and salt officials for reformers and entrepreneurs of Chang Chien's 
kind, who represented a genuine threat to the traditional and 
profitable salt business. 
The opposition which Chang Chien encountered throughout the 
years when he was attempting to build up T'ung Hai culminated 
in a six-point indictment which Commissioner Chao lodged against 
him in 1908. The indictment boiled down to two major points: 
(1) that the taxes on various types of reclaimed land were inequitable 
and the tax payments improper; and (2) that land reclamation was 
destroying the salt business.31 Chang Chien fought back by appealing 
directly to the Salt Bureau of the Board of Revenue in Peking, 
refuting each of the six indictments point by point, setting forth 
in detail the taxes as they applied to the reclaimed land and the 
guarantees to salt producers included in the original policies and 
regulations of the company. The indictment against Chang Chien 
was dismissed, but the salt merchants and officials salvaged a 
partial victory in the ruling of the Salt Bureau that no other land 
reclamation company was to be formed in Kiangsu.32 
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Spread of Land Reclamation in Kiangsu 
This stipulation lasted only as long as the dynasty. With the 
fall of the Ch'ing dynasty, Chang Chien and Chang Ch'a realized 
the opportunity to expand their land reclamation activities was at 
hand. Shortly after Chang Chien was appointed the Minister of 
Agriculture and Commerce, the two went ahead in 1914 and 
organized a second company, Ta Yu Chin, on land immediately 
adjacent to T'ung Hai. Since Chang Chien was away in the north 
the greater part of that year, Chang Ch'a was responsible for handling 
the details of its establishment. Ta Yu Chin covered an area twice 
as large as T'ung Hai, but the cost of establishing the former was 
comparable to that of the latter, since it benefitted from the expe­
rience gained in establishing T'ung Hai. 
The founding of Ta Yu Chin was the signal which touched off 
the establishment of a whole rash of land reclamation companies. 
No less than forty companies were started between 1916 and 1930.33 
Together they covered the greater portion of the coastal area from 
the boundary of Ta Yu Chin northward to the outlet of the Kuan 
River, encompassing a territory of some 3,800 square miles and 
stretching over a coastal strip of nearly 200 miles.34 Not all of 
these land reclamation companies were founded as a direct result 
of the efforts of Chang Chien and Chang Ch'a, but many of the 
companies were established by them and their associates, and all of 
them were influenced by the work of the Chang brothers. Due to 
this division between those that were directly established by the 
Chang brothers and their associates and those that were established 
by others, the land reclamation companies came to be known as 
the Nan-t'ung group and the non-Nan-t'ung group respectively.35 
The former included sixteen companies. Aside from T'ung Hai and 
Ta Yu Chin, of these sixteen Chang Chien was personally connected 
with four others.36 Chang Ch'a was instrumental in the founding of 
seven land reclamation companies, including the largest of them all, 
Ta Feng.37 
Without exception the founders of the companies experienced 
the same kind of difficulties that plagued Chang Chien in his initial 
attempt with T'ung Hai. When approached by the companies for 
their land, both salt merchants and the salters pursued the policy 
of asking for all that the traffic would bear. The price of individual 
stove sites jumped from 1,000 yuan (about 700 taels) to 3,000 yuan 
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after 1918.38 The companies also found it necessary to assume 
salters' debts to salt merchants on land they acquired from the 
salters. Nor were the latter honest in their dealings. All too frequent­
ly individual salters would pit the offer of one company against 
that of another in order to derive maximum profit from land that 
could no longer support them. Consequently the initial cost of 
establishing the land reclamation companies was abnormally 
high.39 
Partly to combat this and partly to facilitate the operations of 
the Nan-t'ung group of land reclamation companies, Chang Chien 
called the stockholders of the Nan-t'ung group companies to their 
first annual meeting in 1922. At that time it was decided to centralize 
the direction of all the companies represented by the creation of a 
Reclamation Office. Chang Chien was chosen its first director.40 
Three years later this agency was merged with the Textile Office, 
a similar agency which supervised the operations of Dah Sun and 
its affiliated cotton mills, to form the Head Office of Nan-t'ung 
Industries.41 
Land reclamation companies of both the Nan-t'ung and the 
non-Nan-t'ung groups were all modeled after T'ung Hai in organiza­
tion and operations. Each company had to undergo the costly and 
difficult initial process of making the land suitable for cultivation. 
This involved the construction of various types of dykes to keep 
the sea water out, the dredging of ditches for irrigation and drainage 
purposes, and the erection of sluice gates to control the influx and 
outflow of water.42 The first few years the company generally 
operated at a loss, since the land had to be made productive by the 
addition of animal and vegetable manure. In organization the land 
was divided into "fields," further divided into "sections," which 
were in turn divided into "units." Each unit averaged twenty-five 
mow (about four acres) and was generally alloted to one household 
of tenant farmers.43 At the time a tenant contracted to cultivate 
a unit he paid a deposit, which was refundable in case he vacated 
his land, but a smaller process fee, which he had to pay along with 
the deposit, was not refundable. In addition to this small risk, 
tenants must also build their own dwellings and provide their own 
tools, seeds, and fertilizers. These measures restricted tenants of the 
land reclamation companies to those who were serious in their 
endeavors and had the minimum amount of capital to make the 
attempt.44 
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In actual cultivation the tenant farmers had a free hand. Two 
crops were generally grown during the year, a main crop of cotton 
in the fall and a secondary crop in the spring, generally wheat or 
beans.45 For each mow of secondary crop planted the companies 
collected a minimum of ten fen (a tenth of a yuan). The primary 
interest of the companies, however, was in cotton. At harvest time 
40 percent of the yield went to the company.46 This arrangement 
sometimes led to friction between the land reclamation companies 
and their tenants, as some tenants attempted to evade giving the 
companies as large a return as they had expected by concentrating 
on the secondary crops to the neglect of the main crop.47 
The reclamation of land on the entire coast of Kiangsu had been 
one of Chang Chien's earliest projects. He had envisaged the success 
of the scheme in terms of providing livelihood for upwards of a 
million people.48 Yet by 1933, seven years after his death, the 
reclaimed land was supporting only 200,000 people, with most of the 
companies having gone out of operation before the 1930s.49 The 
reason for this general failure was threefold. First of all, a series 
of natural disasters struck the area successively in 1921, 1922, 1924, 
1926, which increased difficulties of the land reclamation companies 
manyfold and drove a number of them to ruin.50 Secondly, a 
number of the companies were speculative ventures, whose pro­
moters merely wished to preempt suitable sites for resale at a profit. 
Their lands remained unimproved when the natural disasters made 
their gambles a failure.51 Finally, the financial structure of the land 
reclamation companies was not sound. Most of them were under­
capitalized and would have had a difficult time of it even without 
the natural disasters. In the end only T'ung Hai and Ta Yu Chin, 
because of their stronger financial basis, showed a profit in their 
operations.52 
Chang Chien's efforts for land reclamation extended beyond his 
accomplishments in Kiangsu. During his term of office as Minister 
of Agriculture and Commerce in 1913-15, he attempted to convert 
many of his own ideas into national policy. Land reclamation was 
included in his general plans for the promotion of improvement in 
agriculture. In 1914 he proposed to Premier Hsiung Hsi-ling and 
the Ministry of Finance that the wastelands of the Huai region be 
the first area designated for reclamation work. Later in the same 
year he drew up the Provisional Regulations for Land Reclamation, 
in which the procedures of land reclamation by private organizations 
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and individuals were regularized. This was passed by the Parliament 
and duly promulgated in July of 1914.53 
Another project of his term of office as Minister of Agriculture 
and Commerce was his plan for land reclamation and colonization 
of Manchuria. He had become aware of the opportunity for agricul­
tural expansion in that part of the country on his three-month tour 
of Manchuria in the summer of 1911. He proposed entering into 
extensive land Reclamation projects there, thus providing livelihood 
for hundreds of thousands of farmers who would migrate into 
Manchuria.54 Unfortunately he was not destined to remain in office 
long enough to give his plans a fair trial. 
The Need for Salt Reform 
As has been indicated, Chang Chien's efforts in land reclamation 
grew out of the decline of the Huai-nan region in salt production. 
But land reclamation was not, and never could be, a direct solution 
to the problem of profitable salt production. The situation called 
for a more positive approach, the introduction of improved methods 
of salt production. This was the starting step by which Chang Chien 
became involved in salt reform. For he found it impossible to 
introduce new methods of producing salt without disturbing the 
status quo of the entire structure of the salt business. From his 
dealings with the salt officials and other salt merchants he came to 
realize the extreme injustice of the entire salt system, in which a 
few privileged merchants amassed huge fortunes at the expense of 
both the producers (the salters) and the consumers (which, of 
course, included everyone in the country). Therefore Chang Chien's 
interest and efforts in salt reform should be traced on two levels. 
First, his efforts to improve the method of salt production in 
Huai-nan, and second, his efforts to revise the national structure 
of the salt system, including the production, transportation, sale, 
regulation, and taxation of salt. 
The immediate situation which turned Chang Chien's interest to 
the salt problem was the deterioration of the natural conditions in 
the Huai-nan district under which the unique, traditional, salt-
producing method of this area had flourished. In contrast to other 
coastal salt-producing areas, where the sun-dry method was in 
general use, salt was obtained in the Huai-nan district by means 
of the ash-brine method. This was done because the humid climate 
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of the district made the adoption of the standard sun-dry method 
impractical.55 The ash-brine method was ingenious. Ashes from 
reeds burned as fuel were spread over certain designated fields, 
which had been made smooth and flat several years previously. 
With the aid of moisture in the atmosphere, the salt content in 
the soil was transferred to the absorbent ashes, forming salt crystals 
around ash particles. The crystals were gathered and dissolved in 
water to form brine. The brine then was boiled in huge kettles until 
the pure salt crystals were separated from the impurities. The reeds 
used to boil the brine provided more ashes to repeat the process 
all over again.56 
Even though the ash-brine method was more expensive than the 
sun-dry method, it had been particularly suited to the Huai-nan 
district. Conditions, however, had changed to the extent that even 
the ash-brine method was becoming impractical. Nature herself was 
responsible for this development. The sea fronting the Huai-nan 
district had been slowly receding eastward in the course of several 
centuries, thereby creating new land. As the distance between the sea 
and the original salt fields increased, the latter's salt content de­
creased, until many of them became useless for further salt produc­
tion. 
Establishment of T'ung Jen T'ai 
The opportunity for Chang Chien to assume an active role in 
coping with the salt problem of Huai-nan presented itself while he 
was touring in Japan in 1903. Hsu Hsien-min and Lo Shu-yiin, 
two of his fellow townsmen, founded a salt company at Lii-ssu on 
the coast of Nan-t'ung district near the Hai-man line. Chang Chien 
was informed of this development in Japan. He forthwith changed 
his itinerary and spent six days in the Japanese salt-producing 
districts, learning the Japanese method of making salt. Upon his 
return in August, Messrs. Hsu and Lo made him the director of the 
newly organized T'ung Jen T'ai Salt Company.57 
With an initial capital of 100,000 taels, largely raised by the 
original backers, Chang Chien began his direction of the company 
by taking several important steps. He changed the status of the 
salters under company control from individual producers to 
regularly hired laborers. This meant steady employment for the 
salter and greater efficiency for the company. He made a survey 
LAND RECLAMATION AND SALT REFORM 129 
of the existing reed fields and stove sites. Those which were too 
widely scattered were abandoned in favor of the more conveniently 
located fields and sites.58 These preliminary measures ate up nearly 
half of the initial capital, and in order to introduce improved 
methods for the production of salt, Chang Chien had to appeal 
for further capital in 1904. He proposed to the original backers 
that an additional 120,000 taels be raised.59 This met with a response 
of only 40,000 taels, but he managed to raise 50,000 taels from 
various moneylenders and 40,000 taels more from official sources.60 
With these additional funds he introduced the Japanese boiling 
method. Eighteen acres of land were acquired by the salt company 
from T'ung Hai for this purpose. In two years' time some 40,000 
taels were expended for this experiment. The venture resulted in 
the successful production of a superior type of refined salt, one 
which was good enough to receive a medal at the International 
Exposition at Milan, Italy, in 1906, but it proved to be commercially 
unprofitable.61 The failure was not due to any lack of effort on 
Chang Chien's part. He had sent several workmen to Japan to 
learn the process at firsthand and had employed three Japanese 
supervisors directly on the project.62 
Following this failure Chang Chien tried successively the Chekiang 
method and the Huai-pei sun-dry method, with no more success 
than his initial attempt. Salt produced by the Chekiang method 
turned out to be unattractive because the atmospheric conditions 
of the Huai-nan district gave it a dark gray color. The Huai-pei 
method was too costly because drying fields in the porous soil of 
the Huai-nan district had to be lined with brick or concrete. It was 
only when he tried the Sung-kiang movable-tray method that a 
limited measure of success was achieved.63 By this method the 
resourceful salters of the Sung-kiang district had gotten around the 
unfavorable climatic conditions for the practice of sun-drying salt 
by drying the brine in wooden trays, which could be placed under 
shelters in inclement weather. Naturally the initial cost was high, 
because in addition to building the shelters, the drying trays had 
to be specially made for maximum efficiency. Some 13,000 of them 
were ordered from Ningpo.64 The cost of introducing the Sung-
kiang method came to nearly 35,000 taels.65 
Chang Chien's difficulties with his salt venture extended beyond 
his search for an improved method of producing salt. The typhoon 
of 1905, so devastating to his land reclamation project, was equally 
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destructive to his salt enterprise. Upwards of 70 percent of the 
salt-field dykes was destroyed, all accumulated salt and reed ashes 
were lost, and all of the shelters sustained varying degrees of 
damage. Ten salters lost their lives in the catastrophe.66 The 
material losses were eventually made good, but at a cost which 
further strained the limited financial resources of the enterprise. 
Difficulties from another source came from the salt officials. 
Chao Pin-yen, the salt commissioner of the Liang-Huai district, 
proved to be as hostile toward Chang Chien's salt project as toward 
his land reclamation schemes. Commissioner Chao was adament in 
maintaining the position that salt produced by T'ung Jen T'ai not 
only would get no special considerations, it would not even enjoy 
some of the advantages allowed the regular Huai-nan and Huai-pei 
salt. During 1905 Chang Chien successively requested that the 
improved salt be permitted a higher selling price, that the company 
be permitted to open its own retail outlet, and that T'ung Jen T'ai 
salt be sent to parts of Kiangsi during a period of salt shortage 
there. These requests were all ignored or turned down by Commis­
sioner Chao.67 In the following years he further disallowed requests 
for sample sale of improved salt at reduced prices in Hupeh and 
for the sale in Kiangsi of salt produced by the movable-pan method. 
Because of the system of government salt supervision existing at 
the time, Commissioner Chao held the power of discretion in 
matters dealing with salt throughout the provinces of Kiangsu, 
Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh. Consequently his opposition 
to Chang Chien was formidable. Finally in 1907 Chang Chien took 
the case directly to the Salt Bureau at Peking, which after an 
investigation allowed most of his requests.68 This did not, however, 
mark the end of opposition against him. In fact, the continued 
opposition of salt officials and salt merchants was one of the primary 
reasons which prompted Chang Chien to turn his attention to the 
salt problem on the national level. 
The National Salt System 
The salt administration of the Ch'ing dynasty was an outgrowth 
of of the state-monopoly system which had existed with short 
interruptions since Han times. The system, however, had undergone 
a series of changes during these 2,000 years. The great T'ang 
official Liu Yen changed what had been a total state monopoly, 
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under which the state operated the entire salt business, from 
production, transportation, to sales, into a system which might be 
termed "turnover monopoly." Under this system the production, 
transportation, and sales of salt were undertaken by private produc­
ers and merchants, the government retaining only the right to 
purchase all salt produced, thereby requiring the merchants to 
repurchase the salt from the government. In this manner Liu Yen 
guaranteed to the government a set profit, while at the same time 
abolishing the large and unwieldly body of officials that had grown 
up around the salt administration. The power of regulation was 
concentrated in the hands of a few high officials, eliminating all 
opportunities for corruption by petty functionaries. The number of 
supervisory offices was reduced, covering the ten chief producing 
areas. Salt production in all other areas was prohibited. At the 
same time thousands of salt storage houses were constructed 
throughout the country, so that the government could control the 
practices of the salt merchants, and ensure a steady supply of salt 
to all parts of the country.69 
Liu Yen's system was further modified by Fan Hsiang in A.D. 1048, 
during the reign of Emperor Jen-tsung of Sung. Fan Hsiang 
introduced the "salt voucher," by means of which merchants 
would pay cash for vouchers, which would in turn permit them 
to obtain the stipulated amount of salt for transportation and sale. 
This system prevailed with no major changes until A.D. 1617, when 
it was replaced by the "enfranchised merchant monopoly" system. 
Under it the state retained the salt monopoly in theory, but the 
actual conduct of the salt business fell into the hands of a relatively 
small group of favored merchants. Each of these merchants, in 
exchange for a set sum which he agreed to turn over to the govern­
ment every year, retained the exclusive right to conduct the distribu­
tion and sale of salt in certain designated areas. During the revolt 
of Wu San-kuei (1674-81), when the government relied heavily on 
ready cash, the "enfranchised merchant monopoly" system became 
thoroughly entrenched.70 In time an elaborate system of division 
of spoils grew up around the salt business. The "enfranchised 
merchants," descendants of the originally designated merchants 
who received the franchises through inheritance, no longer handled 
the business personally but rented out their franchises to the "field 
merchants." The latter, having exclusive rights to purchase all the 
salt produced in certain areas, in turn permitted the "transport 
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merchants" to handle the transportation and distribution. The 
result was the growth of a powerful group of salt merchants who 
made most of the profits in the successive stages of the salt business, 
with the government > receiving only a small part of the total 
profit.71 The various levels of salt officials who were theoretically 
in control of the situation came to be identified completely with 
the interests of the salt merchants. The post of a regional salt 
commissioner was a much sought-after position, since it offered the 
incumbent many chances to enrich himself during his term of 
office. Because of this, few salt officials were allowed to retain 
office for long.72 Therefore, even if an official wished to pit his 
reforming zeal against the evils of the system, he would not have 
time to consolidate his efforts into permanent improvements. 
The "enfranchised merchant monopoly" system flourished 
throughout Ch'ing times with one notable exception. In the 1830s 
T'ao Shu, the governor-general of Liang-Kiang, who was the first 
governor-general to hold the post of regional salt commissioner 
concurrently, instituted the "salt ticket" system in the area under 
his jurisdiction. Under this system any merchant could engage in 
the salt business by paying the tax on the salt tickets, each of which 
allowed him to buy a set amount of salt. Although this system 
proved its worth by bringing in more revenue than the existing 
system had done, its practice did not extend beyond the Liang-Huai 
district. Eventually the "ticket merchants" became so entrenched 
that they were virtually indistinguishable from the "enfranchised 
merchants" elsewhere.73 
Liang-Huai district, in which the "salt ticket" system prevailed, 
was but one among eleven salt distribution districts in the country. 
The other ten were: (1) Ch'ang-lu, covering Chihli; (2) Feng-t'ien, 
including nearly all of Manchuria; (3) Shantung; (4) Ho-tung, 
covering Shansi; (5) Fukien; (6) Liang-Che, covering Chekiang 
and southern Kiangsu; (7) Szechwan; (8) Liang-Kwang, the 
regional term for Kwangtung and Kwangsi; (9) Yunnan; and 
(10) Shen-Kan, equivalent to Shensi and Kansu. Each of these 
districts took its name from the producing area whence the salt 
originated. In several cases, however, their area of distribution took 
in other territories in addition to the producing areas. The example 
of Feng-t'ien district, including Manchuria, has already been 
mentioned. In addition, Shantung district included a large part of 
Honan, and Szechwan district covered Kweichow province as well. 
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The largest of all the salt districts was Liang-Huai, which included 
most of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh. These 
provinces became a part of Liang-Huai because salt produced in the 
two coastal areas of Huai-nan and Huai-pei could be transported 
up the Yangtze river system to the provinces faster and cheaper 
than salt produced elsewhere. By Ch'ing times these economic 
considerations had been given legal backing; each of the salt 
distribution districts was made a self-sufficient unit, in which the 
circulation of salt produced outside the district was prohibited.74 
Efforts Toward Keform of the Salt System 
This was the situation which confronted Chang Chien when he 
became actively engaged in salt manufacturing. In 1904, one year 
after his taking over the directorship of T'ung Jen T'ai, he pub­
lished an essay with the resounding title, "On Changing the Salt 
Policy in Order to Guard the Nation, Aid the People, Transform 
the Smugglers, and Pacify the Bandits." In it he advocated a return 
to the system of Liu Yen, citing a list of sixteen expected benefits, 
headed by higher revenue and the eradication of salt smuggling. 
He followed this closely reasoned essay with another which dealt 
with the more practical aspects of the salt problem, blaming the 
low production of salt and the prevalence of smuggling on the 
existing setup of the salt fields and advocating the use of Japanese 
boiling kettles, as well as the use of steamships for salt transporta­
tion.75 These initial efforts on his part, devoid of results though 
they were, served to place him solidly in the camp of the salt re­
formers. 
It is pertinent to introduce at this point the account of Ching 
Pen-po (the better-known name of Ching Hsiieh-ch'ien) of his 
meeting with Chang Chien about this time. Ching later became the 
leading salt reformer of his day. In 1903, however, he was merely 
a minor official in Chekiang. He became familiar with the plight of 
the fishermen of the Ningpo and Wen-t'ai area. On their fortnightly 
trips out to sea the fishermen faced the unhappy choice of either 
having their catch limited by not carrying a sufficient amount of 
salt for curing the fish or taking the chance that they might have 
to dump all the excess salt. The salt dumping was forced upon 
them by the salt merchants, who had induced the Liang-Che salt 
commissioner to rule that any salt found unused eight days after 
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purchase was to be regarded as smuggled salt. This seemed so 
unjust to Ching that he became the fishermen's spokesman.76 
Just at that time Governor-general Chang Chih-tung, concerned 
by the appearance of Italian fishing vessels off the coast of China, 
organized a seven-province fishing company to boost the fishing 
industry. He chose Chang Chien to head the company. Ching 
Pen-po went to Nan-t'ung and laid the case of the Chekiang 
fishermen in front of Chang Chien, who assured him that the 
problem would be solved once the Chekiang branch of the fishing 
company was founded.77 Unfortunately the projected fishing com­
pany was never organized. Through this incident, however, Ching 
recognized in Chang Chien a sincere advocate of salt reform. 
The association between the two men was to last for many years. 
Ching Pen-po's meeting with Chang Chien also gave him the 
chance to learn of Chang Chien's decision to shelve his salt reform 
efforts for the time being. Chang Chien's outspoken advocacy of 
the "turnover monopoly" system had caused the Board of Revenue 
to take action. He had offered to form a company to underwrite 
any losses which the new system might incur. The board asked 
Governor-general Chang Chih-tung for advice. Governor-general 
Chang merely endorsed the opinion of his secretary, Ho Feng-shih, 
agreeing with Chang Chien in principle but asking the latter to 
guarantee the total salt revenue for an entire year while the scheme 
was being tested. As the sum came to about seven million taels, 
Chang Chien had to back down.78 Yet the salt merchants were not 
satisfied with this maneuver. They induced the Board of Revenue 
to consult the senior salt commissioner, Yen An-lan, on the 
matter. After lengthy procrastination Yen came out against the 
proposal on the ground that the proposed salt company might be 
a front for foreign capitalists! This convinced Chang Chien of the 
hopelessness of the situation. He told Ching Pen-po that the 
existing political situation was certain to be drastically altered 
within a decade and that salt reforms would have a better chance 
of success under the new form of government.79 
Here we must assume that Chang Chien was alluding to the 
establishment of constitutional government, because Ching Peng-po's 
account remains uncorroborated. Nowhere in Chang Chien's own 
writings does he mention his meeting with Ching and the subsequent 
details, except the fact that he was chosen to head the abortive 
fishing company. 
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The establishment of the provincial assemblies in 1909 and the 
announcement by the Imperial Court that a parliament would be 
set up spurred Chang Chien to renewed efforts on behalf of salt 
reform. In 1910 he drafted a tentative program for the Central 
Legislative Council, in which he called attention to the importance 
of salt tax as a source of revenue, denounced the existing salt 
system, and reaffirmed his belief in the efficacy of Liu Yen's 
system.80 
In 1911 the Ch'ing government, recognizing the need to centralize 
salt control, made a belated attempt to rectify the situation by the 
creation of the concurrent post of Minister of Finance and the 
Minister of Salt.81 Before anything came of this move the dynasty 
was overthrown. 
In the uncertain early days of the republic, the different salt 
districts operated largely on their own. The provisional government 
at Nanking, faced with a shortage of funds, sought to tap the salt 
revenue of the Liang-Huai region. Chang Chien was asked to 
assume the post of salt commissioner of that region. Before he 
would take the post, however, he laid down the condition that the 
Kiang-nan district, which traditionally had been included in the 
Liang-Che region, be placed under his supervision. He therefore 
had the effective control of salt production in all of Kiangsu. 
He held the post for one year, during which time he had a chance 
to try out his ideas, including a modified form of the "turnover 
monopoly" system. He resigned in October of 1912, and with his 
resignation the Kiang-nan district was again placed under the 
Liang-Che region.82 
Before he resigned from the post of Liang-Huai Salt Com­
missioner, Chang Chien felt that the time was propitious for him 
to make known his salt reform policy. He gathered together all his 
ideas into a comprehensive Plan for the Reform of the National Salt 
Policy. This document began with an unequivocal statement. 
The salt policy of China perpetuates the policy of a thousand and some 
hundred years ago; and because it remains unchanged, it is complex, 
contradictory, and difficult to understand. Today, in attempting to 
reform it, our aim is to abolish completely all the old, outmoded regula­
tions, because they are not worthy of systematic study.83 
After briefly setting forth the existing salt policy, he outlined the 
eight points of his reform program: 
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1.	 To concentrate all aspects of the salt business under government 
control, in order to achieve standardization throughout the country. 
2.	 To increase revenue from salt without raising the taxes. 
3.	 To provide salt at reasonable prices throughout the country. 
4.	 To eliminate all illegal salt by means of effective control in producing 
areas, thereby removing the necessity for cumbersome control 
agencies in the rest of the country. 
5.	 To abolish the system of salt distribution districts, without affecting 
the livelihood of the salters and the salt merchants. 
6.	 To differentiate salt prices in conformity with quality, the difference 
in the cost of production to be adjusted by differential tax rates. 
7.	 To find means to reduce production cost, thereby cutting salt prices. 
8.	 To equalize the supply and demand of salt.84 
For the realization of the above goals, Chang Chien advocated 
the eventual establishment of complete government monopoly. 
He drew up what might be termed the "private-production, 
government-transfer, merchant-transportation, private-distribution" 
scheme. This was to be in full operation after six years. Under such 
a scheme the production of salt would be left in the hands of 
individual salters, under general government supervision. All the 
salt produced must be sold to the government. It would then 
resell the salt to salt companies, the profit of this transaction 
replacing the salt tax. The salt companies would make their profits 
by transporting the salt to various parts of the country and reselling 
the salt to privately operated salt shops. Salt transportation com­
panies would not be allowed to operate retail outlets themselves. 
Although the actual transportation of salt would be conducted by 
the privately organized salt companies, the government would retain 
a heavy controlling hand. It would designate the eligible companies, 
require them to post heavy securities for the privilege of trans­
porting salt, and allow them to purchase from any government 
agencies, but restrict their operations to specific areas. In addition, 
the government itself was to transport salt to those outlying areas 
where the excessive transportation cost would discourage private 
companies from supplying these areas.85 In spite of all these con­
ditions, Chang Chien fully expected the profits made in the trans­
portation of salt to be sufficiently high to attract private companies 
into the salt business. As a further inducement, government subsidy 
was to be made available to companies that needed help initially.8-6 
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The securities deposited by the companies with the government 
were to be used for three purposes: to recompence the owners of 
certain of the less economical salt-producing areas which would be 
shut down; to build storage facilities for salt; and to make the 
necessary improvements on harbors, boats, and other adjuncts of 
salt transportation.87 The total cost of all these activities was 
estimated at 38,500,000 yuan (27,500,000 taels), of which 35,000,000 
yuan were to be realized from the securities deposited by the 
companies.88 
To facilitate the financial transactions involved in this scheme, 
Chang Chien suggested the establishment of a salt bank with a 
capitalization of 20,000,000 yuan (about 14,000,000 taels). This 
bank would be wholly independent from other government banks 
and concerned solely with the financial aspect of the salt business.89 
The significance of Chang Chien's proposed plan of salt reform 
lies in the fact that by arguing for the government monopoly 
scheme he abandoned the "turnover monopoly" scheme which he 
had espoused for a decade. To be sure, the actual transportation 
of salt was to be undertaken by merchants under both schemes, 
but in contrast to an absolutely free hand which the merchants 
would enjoy under the "turnover monopoly" system, the "govern­
ment monopoly" scheme sought to place them under effective 
government supervision. In a letter to Premier Hsiung Hsi-ling in 
1913, Chang Chien freely admitted this switch, giving as his reason 
the confused state of salt affairs at the time, which required a period 
of readjustment. He believed that this would be most effectively 
done under the "government monopoly" scheme, but he specifically 
reserved the right to return to advocating the "turnover monopoly" 
system at a later date.90 He asserted virtually the same thing in 
answer to William J. Calhoun, the American minister in Peking, 
to whom Chang Chien had sent his plan for comment. Calhoun was 
sympathetic toward the scheme, but stated his personal preference 
for a single-tax system.91 Chang Chien admitted that this was also 
his eventual goal, but defended his plan on the basis that it would 
have the greatest immediate effect in coping with the entrenched 
interests of the salt merchants.92 
From this we might deduce that Chang Chien adopted the 
"government monopoly" system as a matter of tactics. On this point 
Ching Pen-po's account again offers some revealing information. 
In 1912, according to Ching, Yuan Shih-k'ai was putting pressure 
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on Chang Chien to go to Peking by promising to discuss the entire 
salt situation. Chang Chien wired Ching to meet him in Shanghai. 
There Chang Chien stated that, since the active salt reformers were 
but a mere handful compared to the number of powerful salt 
merchants, they ought not to weaken their position further by 
offering conflicting reform schemes. Ching concurred, but went on 
to state that if the two of them were to come to a common course 
of action, they should devote themselves completely to this task 
in the next few day to the exclusion of all other business. Chang 
Chien agreed to this. The evening following this conversation 
Ching received word to come to the Shanghai office of the Dah 
Sun Company. There he found the lights of the building turned off 
and the gates locked. It turned out that Chang Chien had instructed 
the gatekeeper to inform all callers that Chang had returned to 
Nan-t'ung, in order to remain uninterrupted with Ching. In the 
darkened building the two men, accompanied by a few trusted 
colleagues, thrashed out their differences in three hours. Ching 
prevailed upon Chang Chien to accept the necessity of adopting the
4
'government monopoly" scheme. The basic outline of the salt 
reform plan was drawn up at this meeting.93 This incident seems 
entirely plausible, but again we have no corroborating evidence 
from Chang Chien himself. 
Upon the publication of the salt reform plan, the salt merchants 
at once organized opposition to the proposal. The opposition took 
two forms. On the one hand the merchants exerted pressure on the 
responsible government officials, especially those in the Ministry of 
Finance and in the Salt Bureau within the ministry. On the other 
hand they attempted to discredit Chang Chien. For this purpose a 
pamphlet entitled Detailed Refutation of Chang Chierfs Salt Reform Plan 
was published by an organization calling itself National Salt 
Business Federation (T'ung-kuo Yen-yeh Lien-ho I-hui). This 
pamphlet enumerated fifty-five specific objections to Chang Chien's 
proposals. Several of these objections struck at the basic assump­
tions of the plan. Chang Chien's belief that smuggling would cease 
under an equitable system of salt transportation was disputed. The 
scheme for the government to purchase all the salt produced was 
seen as leading to the possibility of overproduction. Chang Chien's 
assertion that improved methods of salt production would lead to 
cheaper prices was challenged. The pamphlet further attacked his 
motives and ability, seizing upon the stipulation that the commercial 
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use of salt was to be exempt from certain regulations as evidence 
that he was favoring his private interests. It took exception to his 
statement that "the old regulations are not worthy of systematic 
study" and disputed .his figures on the country's population and 
salt production. Moreover the pamphlet, in the name of "republican 
ideals," protested the elimination of the "field merchants," who 
were engaged in the business of buying salt from the salters and 
selling to "transport merchants." It also asserted flatly that, under 
Chang Chien's plan, no merchant would be foolish enough to 
conform to the new specifications only to be eliminated in a few 
years when the full government-monopoly scheme would go into 
effect.94 Despite some cogent arguments presented by this pamphlet, 
the real reason for the salt merchants' opposition—that they wanted 
to remain free from any outside interference in the continued 
operation of a lucrative monopoly—was carefully concealed under 
a mass of minor objections to Chang Chien's plan. 
From 1912 on the continued fight of Chang Chien and Ching 
Pen-po for salt reform became thoroughly enmeshed in the intricate 
political happenings of the time. Histories of this period have 
generally concentrated on the political aspects of the changing 
events to the neglect of other aspects. We must, therefore, resort 
once again to the writing of Ching Pen-po for an account of salt 
reform efforts as it affected the political scene. 
Ching relates that in 1912 he accompanied Chang Chien to 
Peking to talk with Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chou Hsiieh-hsi, the 
Minister of Finance. Chou, a native of Anhwei, came from a 
wealthy gentry background and was himself an "enfranchised 
merchant" of the Liang-Huai district. In spite of these facts Chang 
Chien believed Chou would be sympathetic to his cause and appealed 
to Chou on patriotic grounds. Because Chang Chien had the backing 
of Yuan Shih-k'ai, Chou could not oppose Chang Chien openly. 
He saw to it, however, that details of Chang Chien's plan were 
leaked out prematurely to newspapers opposed to the plan, and 
when submission of the plan to the Parliament could no longer be 
put off, he submitted simultaneously a second plan, which resembled 
Chang Chien's plan in all except the few key points.95 
Faced with these maneuvers of Chou, and realizing that Yuan 
Shih-k'ai was not deeply concerned with the salt problem as he had 
professed to be, Chang Chien decided to return to Nan-t'ung for 
the time being. On the eve of his departure he and Ching Pen-po 
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held a long conversation. Ching believed that the cause of salt 
reform needed to be publicized. To that end he asked Chang Chien 
to support his efforts to organize a society and to publish a period­
ical. Chang Chien asked Ching if the latter was willing to devote 
three years of his life solely to the cause of salt reform. Ching 
replied that so long as the situation remained unimproved, he 
would never abandon his efforts. The two men then came to an 
agreement. Ching would remain in Peking to run the society and 
publish the periodical, while Chang Chien would provide the 
necessary financial support.96 
The Salt Administration Discussion Society (Yen-cheng T'ao-lun 
Hui) was organized in December of 1912. The following month 
the first issue of the Salt Administration Magazine (Yen-cheng Tsa-chih) 
was published.97 The society became the center of salt reform 
activities, and the periodical served as the vehicle by which the 
views of the salt reformers were made known throughout a large 
part of the country. No better evidence of the periodical's influence 
can be found than the publication of a rival periodical by the salt 
merchants of Chekiang, which had an identical format with that 
of the Salt Administration Magazine, even to the cover design. 
Known as the Salt Discussion Miscellany (T'an-yen Ts'ung-pao), the 
publication featured articles designed to refute articles in the Salt 
Administration Magazine. This rival periodical did not last out its 
first year of existence. In contrast, the Salt Administration Magazine 
maintained publication even after Chang Chien had ceased to 
support it after 1914, and, with one short break, continued publica­
tion through the 1910s and 1920s.98 
Meanwhile, in 1912, the struggle over salt policy did not end 
with the efforts of Chou Hsiieh-hsi to thwart reform efforts by the 
introduction of two salt reform schemes to Parliament. The 
Parliament was then the battleground upon which the T'ung-meng 
Hui, which soon became the Kuomintang, was opposed by the 
Kung-ho Tang (Republican Party) and a number of lesser parties. 
The salt issue soon became a bone of contention in party politics. 
Because Chang Chien was one of the organizers of the Kung-ho 
Tang, Chou Hsiieh-hsi joined the Kuomintang and attempted to 
introduce a counterscheme to Chang's plan under Kuomintang 
auspices. This move was vetoed by Sung Chiao-jen, the active 
parliamentary leader of the party. Chou then introduced a motion, 
calling for the retention of the Salt Bureau within the Ministry of 
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Finance, instead of being set up as an independent agency, as the 
reformers wished. He succeeded in making this a key issue between 
the Kuomintang and the Kung-ho Tang." 
At the same time another element entered into the struggle over 
salt reform. This was the Reorganization Loan negotiations 
between China and the five-power consortium. China wanted 
twenty-five million pounds to liquidate some of her most pressing 
financial obligations abroad and to stabilize her fiscal position. 
Negotiations had proceeded to a point where the question of 
securities came up. The only sizable source of unpledged income 
which China still had was the salt tax. If it was to be the security 
for the Reorganization Loan, direct foreign supervision could not 
be avoided. Chou Hsiieh-hsi saw in the successful conclusion of the 
loan agreement a way to remove the salt question from any further 
interference from the reformers. Accordingly he bent every effort 
to push through the loan. In this matter Chou was going with the 
interest of Yuan Shih-k'ai, who wanted the loan himself in order 
to be free from financial dependence upon the Parliament. With 
little regard for proper parliamentary procedures, Yuan signed the 
Reorganization Loan agreement on April 27, 1913.100 
The signing of the Reorganization Loan brought to China a 
foreign inspector general of salt in the person of Sir Richard Dane. 
"Honest and independent of spirit, bluff and hearty in manner," 
Dane represented the best in the tradition of able British civil 
servants.101 He had compiled an enviable record in India and had 
risen to be the first Inspector General of Excise and Salt in India 
before retiring in 1909. His appointment to China was a move 
inspired by the career of Sir Robert Hart, who had ably served as 
Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs ever since 
1863.102 
For Chang Chien the signing of the Reorganization Loan and the 
appointment of Dane by no means represented the end of his salt 
reform efforts. In the latter part of 1913, soon after Hsiung Hsi-ling 
was chosen to be the premier and before he himself was appointed 
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Chang Chien wrote to 
Hsiung, pointing out that the salt tax was but one aspect of the 
entire salt question. He urged the speedy consolidation and super­
vision of salt-producing areas in order to check smuggling. He went 
on to add, "If the production of illegal salt is not stopped because 
the salt producing areas are not controlled, the foreigners would be 
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sure to demand the power of supervision over the salt fields on the 
ground that it affects the salt revenue. It is permissible to allow the 
foreigners power over the salt tax, but if they control the production 
of salt, it would affect the livelihood of several millions of salters 
and the lives of four hundred million Chinese."103 Soon after the 
sending of this letter, Chang Chien took on ministerial duties and 
had to devote his attention to other matters. 
One of Dane's first acts upon arrival in his new post was the 
decision to introduce the Indian salt-tax system to China. This 
system was similar to the original proposal of Chang Chien. It 
called for the free sale of salt after the payment of one unified tax.104 
This scheme, however, ran counter to the wishes of the reformers, 
nearly all of whom favored the "government monopoly" scheme. 
Ching Pen-po held several long talks with Dane and finally con­
vinced him of the necessity to conduct an extensive personal 
survey of the entire salt situation in China before committing 
himself to any one scheme.105 Dane proposed to spend three years 
for the survey. 
From 1913 to 1915 Dane had the good fortune to have Chang 
Hu as his Chinese colleague. A member of the Salt Administration 
Discussion Society, Chang Hu had been connected with some 
phase of the salt administration throughout most of his official 
career. One of his foreign contemporaries had characterized him as 
"brilliant, well-informed, and a versatile administrator."106 Together 
he and Dane were largely responsible for raising the salt revenue 
from 19,000,000 yuan (about 13,500,000 taels) in 1913 to 60,000,000 
yuan in 1914.107 Chang Hu's progressive ideas, however, were not 
kindly received by the more conservative officials. When Chou 
Hsiieh-hsi was appointed to his second term of office as Minister 
of Finance in March, 1915, he set out to discredit Chang Hu. 
The latter was accused of malfeasance and corruption and finally 
forced to resign.108 
The attempt of Yuan Shin-k'ai to make himself emperor in 1915 
marked the end of the initial phase of salt reform efforts under the 
republic. The activities of the Salt Administration Discussion 
Society were suspended until 1922, when Ching Pen-po revived the 
organization.109 Although Chang Chien's name was again promi­
nently mentioned in the publications of the society, he himself had 
ceased to associate actively with it. Strictly speaking, Chang Chien's 
efforts in salt reform terminated in 1915. Thus his years of struggle 
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against the entrenched salt interests ended, devoid of immediate 
results. Through his support of Ching Pen-po, however, he con­
tributed directly to the cause of salt reform. The publications and 
the activities of the Salt Administration Discussion Society served 
to publicize the need for salt reform to an increasingly larger group 
among the articulate segment of the population. 
On the regional level, the limited success of the T'ung Jen T'ai 
Salt Company demonstrated the possibility of introducing im­
proved methods of salt production in the Huai-nan area, but because 
production of salt was so closely related with other aspects of the 
salt business, the result of Chang Chien's efforts in the Huai-nan 
area was inconclusive. As it turned out, his land reclamation efforts 
held greater promise for that part of Kiangsu than his salt reform 
work. Nevertheless in land reclamation also, Chang Chien was 
hampered by the existence of an outmoded and inflexible salt 
administration. For if government supervision of land reclamation 
in Kiangsu had been placed under an independent government 
organ charged with this specific function, the result could con­
ceivably have been quite different. Thus, for Chang Chien, the 
interrelation of land reclamation and salt reform remained crucial 





IN CHANG CHIEN'S life several events made lasting impressions upon 
his memory. The Yellow River flood of 1887, which began with 
the breaking of the dykes at Cheng-chou, Honan, was one of them. 
He was then thirty-four, and had not yet begun his more active 
career. He had followed his patron, Sun Yiin-chin, to K'ai-feng 
in May, 1887, upon Sun's appointment to be the prefect of that 
city. There were already indications then that the Yellow River 
might cause trouble again that year. In the course of consulting 
with Governor Ni Wen-wei on the possible means of averting the 
impending disaster, Sun brought up Chang Chien's name and 
prevailed upon Governor Ni to use him.1 
As Sun well knew, Chang Chien had been interested in the 
problem of water conservancy for some time. He had read the 
writings of some of the greatest conservationists of former times, 
men like P'an Chi-hsun of the Ming dynasty and Chin Fu of the 
Ch'ing dynasty.2 He was well acquainted with the number of times 
that the Yellow River had changed its course; the sixth and the 
most recent one had occurred only thirty-two years previously, in 
1855. On that occasion it had abandoned its southern channel, 
which led due east from K'ai-feng to the sea, and had assumed a 
course which permitted it to flow northeastward to the Shantung 
coast. There was no certainly that it would not change its course 
once more. 
Upon his assignment by Governor Ni, Chang Chien at once set 
out up and down the river to check on the situation in person. 
Almost at the very beginning he was aware of being handicapped 
by the complete lack of accurate data. He became convinced that 
no permanent solution could be reached without extensive surveys 
of the Yellow River. He wrote a series of letters to Governor Ni, 
setting forth his ideas. While the governor was still considering 
his proposals, the August rains came and continued without letup 
for a week. The water level of the Yellow River rose rapidly. On 
the seventh one of the tributaries which joined the Yellow River 
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at Cheng-chou, upstream from K'ai-feng, overflowed its banks. By 
the tenth the flood crest of the Yellow River reached the critical 
mark of thirty-three feet above its normal level, and urgent messages 
for help streamed into the Governor's office at K'ai-feng. In the 
early hours on the morning of the thirteenth, the dykes at Cheng­
chou broke along a mile-wide front, and the full fury of the angry 
water snuffed out thousands of lives in a matter of hours.3 The 
released water quickly fanned out over th'e flat Honan countryside, 
where those who escaped the initial onslaught had to fend for 
themselves as best they could. Here and there could be seen "a long 
rope tying seven or eight elders, women, and children together, 
with a dog at the end; an infant in swaddling clothes; people crowd­
ing rooftops and tree branches, or hanging on to oxcarts, turning 
over and over with the swirling waters."4 For days the full force 
of the flood water scoured the countryside. Most of the water 
drained into the Chia-lu River, thence to the Yin River, which in 
turn flowed into the Huai, causing further floods along the course 
of these rivers. It took fully a year to plug up the breach in the 
dykes at Cheng-chou and to turn the Yellow River into its northern 
course once again. 
Chang Chien never forgot this experience. Years later he was to 
refer to it again and again. His interest in water conservancy 
acquired an added sense of urgency. He soon turned his attention, 
however, from the Yellow River to the Huai River. Although not 
as long as the Yellow River, the Huai was equally prone to periodic 
floods and had plagued the provinces of Anhwei and Kiangsu for 
centuries. 
The Huai System 
The source of the Huai is located near T'ung-pe on the Honan-
Hupeh border, from whence it follows a course eastward through 
Honan, Anhwei, into Kiangsu.5 As a series of mountain ranges run 
nearly parallel to the Huai south of the river, its southern tributaries 
are short and comparatively unimportant. In contrast, its northern 
tributaries are sizable rivers in themselves. From the source of the 
Huai eastward, a number of northern tributaries flow through the 
central, southern, and eastern parts of Honan and northern Anhwei, 
forming a network which, together with a number of shorter 
southern tributaries of the Huai, makes up the Huai watershed. 
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Since 1855 the Huai has been without a natural outlet to the sea. 
A small part of the combined waters of the Huai and its tributaries, 
upon reaching Hung-tse Lake, is lost through evaporization. The 
remainder flows into the Yangtze through two routes. The greater 
portion leaves Hung-tse Lake at San-ho-k'ou, then flows eastward 
through San Ho (Three River) into the series of lakes known 
collectively as Kao-pao Lake, and from thence southward through 
several short distributaries into the Yangtze at San-chiang-ying. 
The other route of discharge leads northeastward through the 
Ch'ang-fu River to Ch'ing-k'ou, where it meets the waters of the 
Grand Canal, then southward through the latter to join the first 
outflow in discharging into the Yangtze at San-chiang-ying. The 
section of the Grand Canal between Ch'ing-k'ou and the Yangtze 
is commonly known as the Inner Grand Canal. 
East of the Inner Grand Canal in Central Kiangsu there is a 
basinlike low area, which is dissected by a gridlike system of water­
ways collectively known as the Inner Lower Rivers (Li-hsia Ho). 
This system is connected with a number of shallow, winding streams 
running eastward to outlets on the coast. The coastal strip through 
which they flow has been gradually built up in the past thousand 
years as the sea receded. The land is so flat that during high tides 
seawater still penetrates deep inland, through such openings as 
She-yang-k'ou, Tou-lung-k'ou, and Wang-chia-kang. Between the 
low area and the coastal strip runs a north-south waterway called 
the Ch'uan-ch'ang River, which extends from the Yangtze north­
ward almost to the former course of the Yellow River. 
Northern Kiangsu contains two rivers which are generally 
considered as a part of the Huai system, although both have their 
own outlets to the sea. These are the Shu and the Yi, both of which 
originate in Shantung and follow a generally southward course 
before making wide turns northeastward into the sea. The outlet 
of the Shu is at Lin-hung-k'ou, while the Yi discharges its water 
through Kuan River at Kuan-ho-k'ou. 
History of Huai Control 
In ancient times the Huai ranked with the Yellow, the Chi, and 
the Yangtze as the four main rivers of East China.6 As late as the 
Sung dynasty the Huai was still a busy artery of water transportation. 
At that time the Huai flowed free and clear directly into the sea. 
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In 1194, the Yellow River, after repeated usurpation of the lower 
Huai channel during floods, assumed this course permanently as its 
southern channel. Part of the Yellow River still flowed through a 
northern channel at that time, but in 1492 a series of disastrous 
floods on the northern channel caused Liu Ta-hsia, the Yellow 
River commissioner, to divert all the waters into the southern 
channel, sealing off the northern channel altogether. Henceforth 
the silt brought down by the Yellow River, which had begun to 
clog up the lower reaches of the combined Yellow-Huai channel, 
accumulated even faster. As a result the Huai began to back up 
around the village of Hung-tse, gradually forming a large but 
shallow lake. 
Toward the end of the sixteenth century the problem of sedimen­
tation had reached such an acute stage that two opposing solutions 
were offered in coping with the situation. These two schemes of 
river control were respectively championed by two famous con­
servation officials, P'an Chi-hsiin and Yang I-k'uei. P'an's 
proposal, summarized in the phrase "Build up the Ch'ing (Huai 
River) to scour the Huang (Yellow River)," consisted of containing 
the Huai with a system of dykes and deepening its junction with 
the Yellow River at Ch'ing-k'ou, so that the force of the accelerated 
Huai water would help carry the silt into the sea. For fourteen 
years (1578-92) P'an occupied the post of Director of Water 
Conservancy and labored hard to put his plan into effect. He was 
never entirely successful, as recurrent floods on the Huai would 
break through various sections of the dykes from time to time. 
A series of particularly bad floods led to the removal of P'an and 
the installation of Yang I-k'uei in his place. Yang's ideas, that 
of "separating the Huang and guiding the Huai," was to open new 
outlets for the Yellow River to reach the sea, while diverting much 
of the Huai water away from joining the Yellow River at Ch'ing­
k'ou, and leading it down several of the Inner Lower Rivers and 
thence to the sea. This plan also failed to achieve complete success. 
After the fall of the Ming dynasty, the Manchus inherited the 
task of dealing with the Huai and the Yellow rivers. The K'ang-hsi 
Emperor was deeply concerned with the problem, ranking it with 
the maintenance of grain transportation and the crushing of the 
revolt of Wu San-kuei as the three foremost tasks of his reign. 
He chose Chin Fu for the job of controlling the rivers. Chin's 
plans were essentially the same as those of P'an Chi-hsiin. He was 
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largely successful in carrying them out, but later became involved 
in a controversy with Yii Ch'eng-lung concerning the best method 
for the draining of the low area in central Kiangsu. Chin Fu died 
before the controversy could be settled. His successor, Chang 
P'eng-ho, continued his policy in controlling the Huai and the 
Yellow River with good results. 
In spite of these efforts, the increase of silt on the lower reaches 
of the Yellow River continued. By the time of the Tao-kuang 
Emperor (1821-51), the excess water of the Huai began to flow 
into the Yangtze. Henceforth the Huai became more and more a 
tributary of the Yangtze. This process reached its ultimate stage 
in 1855, when the Yellow River once again changed its course, 
from the southern to the northern channel. Without the force of 
Yellow River's water maintaining even a shallow channel, that 
portion of the Yellow River from Ch'ing-k'ou to the sea rapidly 
dried up. From that time on the Yangtze became the Huai's sole 
outlet; only during the flood season would a portion of the Huai 
water escape to the sea through its old channel. 
In the nineteenth century two scholars in particular were deeply 
concerned with the problem of the Huai. Feng Tao-li of Tung-t'ai, 
Kiangsu, published in 1839 the Illustrated Discourse on the Water 
Conservancy of the Huai and the Yangtze,1 in which he called attention 
to the seriousness of the problem. In 1866 Ting Hsien of Shan­
yang, Kiangsu, advocated returning the Huai to its old course and 
the creation of a Huai River Control Commission.8 Neither man 
was in the official capacity to carry out his ideas. Among the 
Liang-Kiang governors-general of late Ch'ing time, Tso Tsung­
t'ang gave evidence of his concern over the long-term implications 
of the Huai problem, but he was shifted to another post and 
official concern died with his departure. 
Efforts to Tame the Huai 
The ideas of P'an, Chin, Feng, and Ting all had considerable 
influence upon Chang Chien's thinking. For some time after the 
Yellow River Flood of 1887 he had no chance to apply himself 
to water conservancy work. By 1903 the increasing stability of his 
business and educational enterprises allowed him to turn his atten­
tion to other fields of endeavor. He began his water conservancy 
work with a small project to deepen and widen an extension of the 
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Inner Lower Rivers which flowed through Nan-t'ung and Hai-men. 
This was undertaken in conjunction with his land reclamation 
projects, but he thought of it in more than local terms. It was to be 
the first move in his efforts to provide outlets for the water of 
the Huai.9 
In 1906 Tuan-fang became the newly appointed governor-
general of Liang-Kiang. Recently returned from his trip to Europe 
and America as a member of the constitutional mission, Tuan-fang 
seemed to Chang Chien to belong to a small group of Manchu 
officials who were not totally devoid of initiative and energy. 
In the summer of 1907 another serious flood devestated Kiangsu. 
Prompted by this, Chang Chien approached Tuan-fang with the 
proposal of setting up a joint official-gentry corporation on the 
kuan-tu shang-pan model, whereby a government-supervised organi­
zation would be run primarily under private control, to be given 
the power to cope with the entire Huai problem.10 This was a 
radical idea, since the power of river conservancy had traditionally 
belonged to the responsible officials or government agencies. 
Under the circumstances it was not surprising that Chang Chien's 
ideas met a cold reception. His further suggestion that surveying 
work on the Huai be initiated was accepted by Tuan-fang. There 
were other officials, however, who privately obstructed Chang 
Chien's efforts in this direction. Yang Wen-ting, the intendant of 
the Huai-Yang districts in Kiangsu, advised Tuan-fang to order the 
official surveyor to falsify the statistics obtained in order to make 
Chang Chien's proposals seem totally inadequate and thereby 
discredit his efforts.11 It was apparent that Chang Chien's ideas were 
not popular with those officials who wished to see the status quo 
maintained. 
Tuan-fang was reassigned to the governor-generalship of Chihli 
in 1909. That same year the Kiangsu Provincial Assembly was 
organized, in conformity with the plan adopted by the Ch'ing 
government for the limited reform of the Chinese political system. 
Chosen by the delegates to head the assembly, Chang Chien sought 
to relate river conservancy work with the assembly's activities by 
organizing the Kiang-Huai Water Conservancy Company under the 
auspices and supervision of the assembly. To make the arrangement 
attractive to assembly members, Chang Chien stipulated that 
30 percent of the future profits from reclaimed and improved 
land should revert to the assembly. The company's first concern 
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was to be surveying work.12 At this point he was faced with a 
shortage of trained surveyors. He had anticipated this need several 
years before, and had added surveying courses to the curriculum 
of the Nan-t'ung Normal School. Now the group of forty graduates 
were put to work as a partial solution to the shortage,13 and he 
went ahead with the establishment of a surveying bureau at 
Ch'ing-chiang-p'u, where the Grand Canal crosses the former 
course of the Yellow River. Operations started in 1911. The Kiang-
Huai Water Conservancy Company was set up to operate over the 
Huai Basin in Anhwei as well as Kiangsu. Consequently Chang 
Chien took the step of obtaining the support of the Anhwei 
Provincial Assembly as well, but for the time being he depended 
solely on Kiangsu for financial support.14 This question of support 
was to plague him for some time to come. The surveying bureau, 
which continued a precarious existence until 1926, had to suspend 
operations more often for lack of funds than for political disturb­
ances in the field. There is no evidence that Anhwei ever supported 
it to any substantial extent. The surveying work which the bureau 
managed to accomplish, however, was of acceptable quality. Its 
efforts, together with the later surveying work done by the Kiang-pei 
Grand Canal Engineering Bureau, the Huai-Yang-Hsii-Hai Topo­
graphical Surveying Bureau, the Anhwei Water Conservancy 
Surveying Bureau, and the Shantung Grand Canal Engineering 
Bureau made the Huai the most completely surveyed river basin in 
China.15 
Shortly after the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty, the Kiang-Huai 
Water Conservancy Company received some unfavorable publicity. 
In 1912 the American Red Cross Society had shown an interest in 
helping to cope with the Huai problem. Charles Davis Jameson, 
an American engineer who had been in China since 1895, had been 
asked by the society to make a preliminary survey of the situation. 
For some reason Jameson and Chang Chien developed an intense 
dislike for each other.16 During the eight months Jameson was in 
the Huai region, he felt that he was given insufficient cooperation 
by Chang Chien.17 Upon his departure he published a report 
criticizing the work of the surveying bureau, against which Chang 
Chien issued a characteristically vigorous rebuttal.18 
This episode probably contributed to the promptness with which 
a petition was jointly submitted to the government by Ch'eng 
Te-ch'iian and Po Wen-wei, respectively the military governors of 
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Kiangsu and Anhwei, calling for the creation of an official agency 
for the control of the Huai to be headed by a director and two 
associate directors, one from each province.19 The petition was 
actually written by Chang Chien, and he was duly appointed in 
December, 1912, the Director of the Central Bureau of Huai 
Control, with Po Wen-wei and Hsii Ting-lin as his associates. 
Po, a revolutionary of some years standing, had an abiding interest 
in ridding Anhwei of the menace of Huai floods. His ideas may 
even have influenced Chang Chien on certain points.20 Hsii was an 
old friend of Chang Chien's, the two having often exchanged 
ideas on the Huai ever since 1906.21 
Chang Chien's first move in his new position was to push for 
the creation of a National Water Conservancy Bureau, a move 
which was brought to success with his being chosen the Director 
General of Water Conservancy in December, 1913. In reality this 
position was so lightly regarded by the government that he was 
granted funds to add only six men to the existing staff of the 
Kiang-Huai Water Conservancy Company.22 At that time he was 
also the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, and this was 
generally considered the more important of the two positions he 
was occupying concurrently. 
As Director General of Water Conservancy, Chang Chien 
announced the four projects which he hoped to carry out. They 
were: (1) the control of the Huai; (2) the building of a canal between 
the Liao and the Sungari rivers in Manchuria; (3) the creation of 
a hydraulic engineering school; and (4) the establishment of an 
agricultural bank.23 The Liao-Sungari Canal project suggested 
itself to him as a result of his tour of Manchuria in 1911. It was 
designed primarily to facilitate the shipment of goods by water 
from the Amur-Sungari region to southern Manchuria and China. 
As for the establishment of an agricultural bank, it had a twofold 
purpose. Officially, the bank, to be jointly operated by government 
and private interests, was to provide the needed capital for river 
conservancy projects. At the same time it was to be a source of 
rural credit to those farmers who wished to improve their own 
lands.24 Neither the Liao-Sungari Canal nor the agricultural bank 
projects were followed up. Instead Chang Chien concentrated his 
efforts toward controlling the Huai during his term of office. 
The central core of his ideas on the Huai was set forth in a 
document which he made public in 1913. Basically he favored the 
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dredging of a new outlet to the sea while retaining the outlet to 
the Yangtze at San-chiang-ying. For the new outlet he proposed 
to widen and deepen Kuan-ho-k'ou at the mouth of the Kuan 
River. This was a modification of both his original idea to return 
the Huai to its old course and his later two-outlet idea, with the 
sea outlet at Lin-hung-k'ou. He came to favor Kuan-ho-k'ou over 
Lin-hung-k'ou because the former would be more economical. 
One point remained unchanged. He continued to stress the impor­
tance of including the Yi and the Shu rivers in any comprehensive 
plan for the Huai basin.25 
For the realization of his plans he needed more men trained and 
experienced in hydraulic engineering than those available at the 
time. Chang Chien recognized the necessity of relying heavily upon 
foreign engineers for the initial stages of any water conservancy 
project—he was particularly impressed with the achievements of the 
Dutch and preferred Dutch engineers to those of any other nation­
ality26—but he believed that Chinese should be their assistants from 
the very beginning, so that with experience the Chinese would 
eventually be able to dispense with the service of foreigners. To 
supply these assistants, Chang Chien returned to an idea he had had 
for some time, the establishment of a hydraulic engineering school. 
This would be a special school opened to all qualified youths of 
the nation. Each year the provincial governors would appoint for 
entrance a total of one hundred graduates of middle schools, who, 
in exchange for three years of all-expenses-paid training, would 
agree to serve the nation for a stipulated number of years after 
graduation.27 For the location of such a school Chang Chien 
considered a number of places in Nanking and Shanghai, finally 
deciding on the ready facilities of the Provincial Assembly buildings 
in Nanking, unoccupied since the dissolution of the assembly in 
1912. When he tried to obtain the necessary approvals from the 
other departments of the government, he encountered the usual 
amount of inertia and procrastination. He managed to go ahead 
with the establishment of the school by reaching an agreement with 
the responsible officials of Chihli, Shantung, Chekiang, and Kiangsu, 
each to contribute annually 7,000 yuan (5,000 taels) to the support 
of the school.28 This school merged with several other schools to 
form the National Central University in 1927.29 
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Meanwhile, early in 1914 Chang Chien began negotiations with 
the American Red Cross for a loan to finance the Huai Project. 
This was contrary to his original wish to steer clear of contracting 
foreign loans, but he was forced to it by the difficulties he had in 
trying to obtain funds from official and private sources. The 
negotiations, conducted through the good office of the American 
Minister Paul Reinsch, were prolonged by the insistence of Chang 
Chien on certain detailed stipulations.30 He was extremely careful 
to eliminate the slightest possibility that Jameson might be placed 
in the position of chief supervising engineer. He had nothing but 
the greatest distrust for Jameson.31 Further complications came in 
the form of objections from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
favored a loan from Belgium rather than from the United States. 
These obstacles proved to be surmountable, but the negotiations 
really bogged down because Chang Chien and the American Red 
Cross had conflicting ideas about the manner in which the projected 
loan should be used. The Red Cross came to regard Chang Chien 
as an obstructionist.32 In any case the negotiations had to be broken 
off in 1914 with the outbreak of World War I. 
To familiarize himself with the actual conditions, Chang Chien 
interrupted the negotiations in April, 1914, and made his first 
systematic tour of the Huai basin. Accompanied by a Dutch 
engineer, he spent a whole month traveling over that area of the 
Huai from Huai-yuan, Anhwei, to the sea. One night while staying 
over at Ch'en-chia-kang on the coast, he "heard the reports of 
bandit gunfire," a not uncommon occurrence in the bandit-infested 
northern Kiangsu of the time.33 On another occasion, while the 
party was sailing across Hung-tse Lake, they seemed to encounter 
only favorable winds. Whenever they changed their course, the 
wind would change directions with them. Even the Dutch engineer 
remarked upon this strange occurrence.34 The trip increased Chang 
Chien's firsthand knowledge of the river which he hoped to tame. 
He returned to Peking on May 28. 
As the flood season approached late in the summer of 1914, 
Chang Chien again asked and received permission to be relieved of 
his ministerial duties so that he could go south to Kiangsu once 
more.35 At about that time the American Red Cross sent an engi­
neering team over into the Huai danger area. The team, headed 
by Colonel William L. Sibert, who had just completed the Gatun 
lock and dam on the Panama Canal, included two other outstanding 
154 CONTROLLING THE HUAI 
engineers, Professor Daniel W. Mead of the Ohio Flood Commission 
and Mr. Arthur P. Davis, chief engineer of the United States 
Reclamation Service.36 They spent the months of August and 
September in the field, but were unable to visit northern Kiangsu 
because of renewed bandit activities. They did, however, request 
for and receive all of the pertinent data gathered by the successive 
survey organizations. Upon the termination of their visit, they 
issued a report, stating that they believed the existing single outlet 
to the Yangtze, if properly improved at a cost of thirty million 
dollars, would be sufficient to handle all of the Huai flow.37 Chang 
Chien promptly voiced his criticism by publishing an article entitled 
"When Seeking a Solution to the Huai Problem It Is Necessary 
to Study Its History and Geography!"38 This was a pointed 
reminder to the Red Cross-sponsored group that they were relatively 
late-comers among those who had sought a solution to the Huai 
problem. 
In 1915 Chang Chien asked for permission to attend the Inter­
national Water Conservancy Conference to be held in the United 
States. This would have allowed him to visit America for the first 
time, but his request was turned down by Yuan Shih-k'ai because 
of his advanced age.39 As we have seen, he soon resigned all his 
official positions and returned to Nan-t'ung. 
The year 1916 was marked by the most severe flooding of the 
Huai region in several decades, surpassing the havoc wrought by the 
1914 flood. The effect of this disaster gave renewed emphasis to 
the need for a permanent solution. Chang Chien's own compre­
hensive plan appeared in 1918. A year later the Anhwei Water 
Conservancy Surveying Bureau issued its plan. This was in turn 
followed in 1920 by the plan of a well-known American engineer, 
John Ripley Freeman, who had been retained by the Chinese 
Government on a consulting basis. 
Chang Chien's ideas were embodied in a lengthy, detailed plan 
which was drawn up at his direction by his associates in the Kiang-
Huai Water Conservancy Surveying Bureau. Based on the latest 
data accumulated over a span of years, it went into great details 
concerning the financial and technical aspects of the enterprise. In 
essence, however, it modified the basic concepts of his previous 
recommendations only to the extent that, instead of locating the 
sea outlet of the Huai at Kuan-ho-k'ou, the Huai River was to 
reach the sea by way of the former course of the Yellow River. 
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Where sedimentation had raised the former riverbed so high as to 
make the cost of dredging prohibitive, an alternate channel was to be 
formed by constructing a new levee parallel to the old north-bank 
levee. The latter thus would be on the south bank of the new 
channel. Otherwise the double-outlet scheme remained sub­
stantially unchanged. Of the total volume of water discharged by 
the Huai into Hung-tse Lake, 20 percent would be retained in the 
lake, 56 percent would flow through the San Ho Channel, the 
Kao-pao Lakes, and into the Yangtze at San-chiang-ying, while the 
remaining 24 percent would then be discharged through the 
Ch'ang-fu River, the former Yellow River, into the sea. Thus 
Hung-tse Lake would become a retention basin, with only a portion 
of the lake turned into reclaimed land. The plan was projected on 
a nine-year basis, at an estimated annual cost of ten million yuan. 
Labor was to be supplied by the demilitarization of a million 
soldiers of the private armies who were then waging civil wars 
across the land. The bulk of the financial burden of the project 
would be paid out of the money saved from disbanding these 
armies. The eventual accumulation of income through the sale of 
reclaimed land and the taxation of land improved by the project, 
as well as transportation charges on increased water traffic, would 
repay the cost of the project severalfold. This plan did not en­
compass the improvement of the Huai above the Hung-tse Lake, 
but did include the improvement and control of the Yi and the 
Shu.40 
The plan announced by the Anhwei Water Conservancy Survey­
ing Bureau differed with Chang Chien's plans on the following 
points: 
1. All of the Huai water was to be released through the two outlets, 
in the proportion of 30/37 to the Yangtze and 7/37 to the sea. With the 
dredging of two channels leading the water through Hung-tse lake, the 
remainder of the lake would all be drained and converted into farm lands. 
2. The sea outlet would be located at the mouth of the She-yang 
River, south of the mouth of the former Yellow River. Water to be 
discharged here would be led through a portion of the lower Inner 
Rivers system. 
3. The Yi and the Shu would have a joint outlet. 
4. The estimated cost was eighty-eight million yuan. The eventual 
benefits were estimated to be nearly five times this amount.41 
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The boldest of the proposed solutions to the Huai problem was 
the Freeman Plan. John Ripley Freeman, an American engineer of 
wide experience on such major rivers as the Mississippi and the 
Colorado, was generally regarded as one of the world's leading 
experts on hydraulic engineering.42 From 1917 to 1920 he served 
as Consulting Engineer to the Chinese Government on the improve­
ment of the Grand Canal. His interest in the Huai was further 
heightened when Sung Hsi-shang, a graduate of the Nan-t'ung 
Normal School and one of Chang Chien's proteges, consulted him 
on the problem of the Huai.43 In 1919 he made a trip of several 
months' duration to China. As a result of the trip, he drafted what 
he called a "tentative plan." He departed from all the other sugges­
tions by calling for the dredging of an artificial channel from 
Wu-ho in Anhwei direct to the sea at Lin-hung-k'ou. The perfectly 
straight channel was to have only one slight change of direction, 
at the point where Ch'ang-fu River meets the Grand Canal. The 
channel was made straight so that the scouring action of the 
comparatively swift-moving current would keep the accumulation 
of sediment at a minimum. In order to obtain the desired swiftness 
of current, all of the Huai water was to be concentrated to flow 
through the channel; the Yangtze outlet would be sealed off. In 
addition, the waters of the Shu and the Yi, which ordinarily flow 
into the sea at Ling-hung-k'ou and Kuan-ho-k'ou respectively, 
would be diverted to the new channel. The northern half of Hung-tse 
Lake would be made into a reservoir, while the southern part would 
be reclaimed. Freeman believed no more than twelve million yuan 
would be required for the project.44 
It is not within the scope of this study to judge the relative 
merits of these differing proposals. There was general agreement in 
the need to provide for the Huai's outflow. The key question was: 
Should there be one or two outlets ? The proponents of the single-
outlet solution were split between the Yangtze and the sea outlets, 
while those who favored two outlets disagreed as to the location 
of the sea outlet. 
The single-outlet idea was generally attacked as inadequate for 
the passage of all the water of the Huai during flood season. Both 
the Red Cross Plan and the Freeman Plan were based on the peak 
flow figure—i.e., the maximum amount of water flowing past a 
given point—of 1914: 5,660 cubic meters per second, whereas later 
data snowed that the figure could reach as high as 12,500 cubic 
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meters per second, as it did in the floods of 1916.45 As for the 
Anhwei Plan, its suggestion of locating the sea outlet at the mouth 
of the She-yang River received scant support. Chang Chien's ideas 
were in turn criticized by Freeman, who regarded the cost of the 
project as excessive and doubted whether anything less than the 
total flow of the Huai through the former channel of the Yellow 
River could keep the problem of sedimentation from getting out 
of hand.46 Chang Chien himself admitted that he was induced to 
favor the former mouth of the Yellow River over Kuan-ho-k'ou 
as the sea outlet because of the outspoken opposition of the salt 
field owners of the Kuan-ho-k'ou area.47 
None of the plans discussed above was actually carried out, but 
Chang Chien's efforts toward solving the problem of the Huai 
prompted the government to appoint him to the post of Director 
of the Grand Canal in Kiangsu in 1920, with his colleague Han 
Kuo-chiin as Associate Director. From the very first he was faced 
with the old problem of the lack of operating funds. For although 
a budget of one million yuan was allotted to him for his three-year 
term, its expenditure had to be approved by the Ministry of 
Finance.48 Most of the available fund was used for surveying work. 
When he submitted a comprehensive plan for improving the canal, 
he was told to continue his work of piecemeal improvement with 
a limited budget. Knowing that he would never be allowed to have 
a free hand, he handed in his resignation in 1921, but without 
success. He tried four more times to resign, but each time the 
government refused to release him from his post.49 
In 1921 another disastrous flood ravaged Anhwei and Kiangsu. 
Both the Yangtze and the Huai were badly swollen, and reports of 
extreme conditions came from up and down the Huai River. 
Accompanied by Han Kuo-chiin, Chang Chien, then in his sixty-
eighth year, traveled widely over the threatened area, supervising 
the work of checking the flood. Meanwhile he was selected to go 
to the United States as one of the senior advisers to the Chinese 
delegation attending the Washington Conference, but he felt that 
his presence was needed in Kiangsu and declined the post.50 On 
August 23 his official party arrived at Chao-kuan Dam, near 
Kao-yu, Kiangsu. There they were greeted by a mob of several 
thousand refugees, half of whom, those whose homes were up­
stream of the dam, demanded that the dam be fully opened, while 
the other half were equally determined to prevent this from 
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happening and thereby further endangering their downstream 
homes. Both sides made representations to him, and the situation 
became extremely tense. He, however, held fast to his decision not 
to make a move before ascertaining the exact situation both up­
stream and downstream of the dam. When the official party moved 
on to Kao-yu, they were met by more people fleeing from disaster, 
clamoring that the dam be opened. They surrounded the temple in 
which the official party was staying, pressing their demands, and 
it was only with great difficulties that Chang Chien, Han Kuo-chiin, 
and the others managed to get away without suffering bodily harm. 
Chang Chien finally decided against opening Chao-kuan Dam 
because the country downstream of the dam was already inundated 
by eight feet of water.61 
This incident acted as a spur to his efforts to carry out a partial 
solution of the Huai problem. This was a plan, begun earlier in the 
year, to divert some of the Huai water from its course between 
Kao-pao Lake and the Yangt2e through a side outlet to the sea. 
Such an outlet was to be provided by Wang-chia-kang. Water 
from Kao-pao Lake would flow eastward down the southernmost 
channel of the Inner Lower Rivers to the new outlet. As this route 
had very little gradient and was affected by the fluctuations of the 
tides, the work at Wang-chia-kang consisted of the straightening 
of the channel and the construction of a dam to allow the outward 
flow of water at low tide while holding back the high tides.52 Chang 
Chien was able to complete the straightening of two thirds of the 
channel before funds ran out. Most of the financial support had 
been raised through his personal connections, including a loan of 
10,000 yuan from the salt merchants of the Huai-nan area, but 
appeals to the provincial authorities were in vain. As a result, the 
remainder of his program, including the construction of the dam 
and a comprehensive scheme to create a secondary network of 
canals linked to the Ch'uan-ch'ang River, was never carried 
out.53 
The winter of 1921-22 also saw him turn to the problem of the 
Yangtze. Impatient with the inaction of the provincial authorities, 
he issued a call for nine of the lower Yangtze localities in Kiangsu 
—Kiang-ying, Ch'ang-shu, T'ai-ch'ang, Pao-shan, Ch'ung-ming, 
Ch'ing-kiang, Ju-kao, Nan-t'ung, and Hai-men—to send repre­
sentatives to a meeting held at Nan-t'ung on November 9 to 
discuss possible joint action. A second meeting was held in Shanghai 
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in the spring of 1922, as a result of which the provincial authorities 
formed an agency to survey the Yangtze.54 This was the extent of 
Chang Chien's efforts toward the Yangtze. He realized that a piece­
meal solution to the Yangtze problem was unsatisfactory, and that 
the Yangtze must be treated as a whole. Consequently when his 
son, Chang Hsiao-jo, was appointed Chairman of the Yangtze 
Waterway Commission in 1926, he wrote to his son, with the 
hope that the latter would carry out some of his own ideas.55 
Chang Chien's lifelong concern with China's perennial problem 
of flooding rivers was not untypical of conscientious officials and 
gentry throughout much of Chinese history. He was, however, one 
of the earliest to appreciate the value of applying Western technology 
to the task of river control. He pioneered in the establishment of a 
permanent agency for the systematic collection of scientific data. 
In his writings he demonstrated a capacity for combining the 
experience gained by successful conservationists of the past with 
the method of control based on the most up-to-date information. 
He did not hesitate to consult qualified foreign engineers—his own 
plan for controlling the Huai was submitted to Freeman for critical 
appraisal—but he had little use for those who ignored the regional 
particularities presented by the problem. His greatest difficulty was 
the shortage of funds, as his private resources were completely 
inadequate for such vast undertakings. He sought to obtain govern­
ment support for his projects by being appointed to official posi­
tions, but the unstable political situation in the early years of the 
republic deprived him of any real financial backing from the govern­
ment. 
In summary it seems clear that Chang Chien's efforts to tame 
the Huai ended in failure. Despite the grandiose schemes made and 
the number of survey maps drawn, precious little actual result 
accrued over the entire span of years during which he worked to 
promote the control of the Huai. This troublesome river continued 
to ravage the countryside periodically. The reason for this state of 
affairs is not difficult to pin down. The Huai flowed through Honan, 
Anhwei, and Kiangsu on its way to its meeting with the waters 
of the Yangtze. Control of the Huai would require cooperation 
among the three provinces, something which was beyond the power 
of Chang Chien to ensure. He was fully aware of the fact that it 
required a national agency with adequate power and funds to do 
the job. This was what he sought to achieve when he attained the 
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post of Director General of Water Conservancy in 1913. Un­
fortunately he was never given the proper backing by Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, and any hope he had of raising funds through the good 
office of the American Red Cross was completely dashed when 
World War I broke out. The failure of Chang Chien to tame the 







WE HAVE traced Chang Chien's career as an industrialist, an educator, 
a conservationist, and a government official. It has been indicated 
that patriotism was the underlying motivation which prompted 
him to undertake his various endeavors. The account would not be 
complete, however, if his civic and philanthropic efforts in Nan-t'ung 
were not related to the rest of his career. More than anything else, 
they emphasized the tenor of his life and his accomplishments. 
To Chang Chien all he undertook reflected his interest in his 
native district. His establishment of the Dah Sun Cotton Mill was 
due in part to the fact that Nan-t'ung was a cotton-producing 
district. After Dah Sun yarn became a commercial success, he did 
not institute machine weaving on a large scale, because home 
weaving was an important subsidiary occupation in Nan-t'ung. 
His educational effort was directed primarily toward providing 
Nan-t'ung with a complete school system. His conservation efforts 
in water conservancy, land reclamation, and salt reform, though 
they were to achieve national significance, originated out of his 
concern with the welfare of his native district. In short, throughout 
his manifold career, Chang Chien was guided by his desire to reach 
a specific objective: achieving "local self-government" for Nan-
t'ung. 
It may be argued that there appears to be a logical inconsistency 
here: that if patriotism was Chang Chien's basic motivation, his 
primary concern for his native district would seem to be a contradic­
tion. In reality the apparent inconsistency arises only through a 
difference in the usage of the term "local self-government," which 
we associate with local political independence from the central 
authority. Chang Chien used the term t^u-chih (self-government or 
local rule) in a much broader sense. It embraced every aspect of 
"self-strengthening" on the local level, including industry, educa­
tion, conservation, philanthropy, and public works. His efforts in 
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these directions were not designed to build up Nan-t'ung at the 
expense of the nation as a whole. On the contrary, he was firmly 
convinced that only through the improvement of each locality 
could the nation as a whole be effectively strengthened. In 1915, 
when he made a move to put all his local projects on a self-
sustaining basis, he aptly summed up this point of view: 
I believe that national strength is based on local self-government. Local 
self-government in turn is dependent upon industry and education. 
And in order to make up for the inadequacies in the society, we must 
rely on philanthropy. From 1895 on I concerned myself with industry. 
From 1901 on I was occupied with education. It was not until 1907 
that I took up philanthropy. For if nothing is done for the people who 
are uneducated and uncared for, their effect on local self-government 
may be slight, but their effect on national welfare would be very great.1 
Civic and Philanthropic Enterprises 
The majority of Chang Chien's many civic and philanthropic 
projects in Nan-t'ung were realized after 1912. This was due as 
much to his preoccupation with industrial and educational efforts 
in the early part of his active career as to the fact that the replacement 
of the Ch'ing dynasty by a politically unstable republic in effect 
gave him a free hand in Nan-t'ung. His interest in promoting local 
welfare, however, may be traced as far back as 1883. At that time 
he had just returned from Korea, declining all proffers of official 
appointments. He had not yet won his chii-jen degree. So in the 
course of preparing for further scholastic advancement, he con­
cerned himself with local affairs. The first matter that engaged his 
attention was the traditionally heavy commodity tax which was 
levied on the native cloth produced in Nan-t'ung. Largely due to 
the effort of Chang Chien and Shen Hsieh-chiin (who was later to 
become one of his staunchest supporters in the establishment of 
Dah Sun), the tax was reduced.2 In 1884 he was responsible for the 
erection in his birthplace of Ch'ang-lo village of a public granary, 
in which surplus grain was kept for use in lean years.3 Three years 
later Chang Chien sought to aid in the reestablishment of the 
P'u-shan T'ang, a benevolent institution for the relief of the 
destitute, in Hai-men. The people of Hai-men had sought official 
permission for its reestablishment in vain for three years, when 
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Chang Chien decided to lend a hand. He also found the official red 
tape almost insuperable, and the matter was not favorably settled 
until 1897.* 
Until 1908 Chang Chien was primarily occupied by Dah Sun and 
the beginnings of a school system in Nan-t'ung. Whenever he had 
time, however, he would turn his attention to matters of local 
welfare. He realized that further efforts toward the improvement 
of Nan-t'ung must be preceded by the completion of a compre­
hensive survey and mapping of the locality. This was essential not 
only for his plans to establish a system of primary schools in 
Nan-t'ung, but also for his proposed network of paved roads. 
Accordingly, he added a course on surveying in the normal school. 
By 1908 he had obtained the required number of competent sur­
veyors to initiate the project. Up to eight groups of surveyors were 
sent out to cover the district. Altogether 400 days were spent for 
the actual fieldwork. Another additional 240 days were required to 
complete the maps. Two sets of maps were produced, scaled at 
5,000:1 and 20,000:1 respectively, at a cost of some 33,000 yuan 
(about 23,500 taels), most of which went for salaries. As a result 
Nan-t'ung was the most completely mapped locality of its size in 
the country and one of the few localities that had been surveyed up 
to that time.5 
The survey maps proved to be of immediate benefit, for one of 
the pressing problems which plagued Nan-t'ung at the time was the 
rapid rate of erosion which threatened the district's Yangtze River 
front. In 1909 Chang Chien seized on the opportunity of a visit by 
Governor-general Tuan-fang to point out to him the seriousness 
of the situation. That same year he attempted unsuccessfully to 
borrow 500,000 taels from the official government bank to finance 
the project of building an embankment along the river front.6 
The following year he requested the provincial officials to forward 
his petition for a local exemption of the tax on cotton yarn to 
finance the project, but this request also met with a refusal. By that 
time the erosion had reached such a point that the river front came 
to within two miles of Nan-t'ung city, whereas thirty years before 
the river and the city were separated by four times that distance.7 
Chang Chien then turned to a foreign bank in Shanghai to obtain 
the necessary 500,000 taels through a twenty-year loan at 6 percent 
annual interest, pledging the 2,600 acres of river-front land as 
securities, but again officials failed to approve the transaction.8 
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With the end of the imperial government, Chang Chien hoped 
that the new republican regime would be more sympathetic toward 
the plight of Nan-t'ung. Accordingly, he renewed his request for 
tax exemption, stating that it would be used as part payment for 
the proposed long-term bank loan. To his disappointment, the new 
government also failed to give its consent for the tax exemption.9 
Chang Chien then made one more attempt to settle the financial 
aspect of the project by arranging for a new loan of 500,000 taels 
at 5.5 percent interest per annum from the Bank of Belgium, 
through the good offices of the Belgian Consul in Peking. Since 
negotiations for Belgium to back the Huai River project were still 
in progress at the time, the consul insisted on the inclusion of this 
loan in the Huai River discussion in order to benefit from the 
expert advice of Western engineers. The failure of the Huai River 
discussion thus brought this to nought also.10 
In 1909 Chang Chien turned to the problem of improving the 
local prison. Like prisons throughout the country at the time, the 
one in Nan-t'ung was dark, dank, and filthy. Seven years were to 
elapse before the remodeling of the prison. The new prison was a 
two-storied brick structure, with over one hundred rooms for the 
inmates and eight prison workshops, ranging from soap and print 
shops to tailoring and carpentry shops. To finance the remodeling, 
Chang Chien had to borrow 30,000 yuan (about 21,000 taels) over 
the years. Eventually the financial load of maintaining the upkeep 
of the prison became too much for him, and he had to request the 
provincial government in 1920 to assume its maintenance.11 
Chang Chien's interest in improving the prison was more a 
reflection of his desire to alleviate the lot of the unfortunate rather 
than an interest in police matters. Nevertheless he deemed it 
important that Nan-t'ung should have its own law-enforcement 
agency. The plant guard which he set up with the establishment of 
the Dah Sun Cotton Mill in 1899 became the Nan-t'ung, T'ai-chou, 
Hai-men Industrial Police Guard.12 He also set up police training 
schools to provide basic training for the raw recruits, who had little 
knowledge of the most elementary police procedures. By 1920 the 
local force had proved its worth. Under the command of Chang 
Jen, son of Chang Ch'a, it successfully fought off incursions by a 
gang of Shanghai rowdies in 1914 and bandits in 1916.13 Police 
expenses, however, like the cost of maintaining the prison, proved 
beyond the capacity of Chang Chien. Having paid over 100,000 yuan 
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(about 71,000 taels) to provide for police barracks, police stations, 
the prison, and other public buildings, he had to ask the provincial 
government to take over the financial burden. The significant point 
here is that, until 1920, both the national and the provincial 
authorities apparently pursued a "hands-off" policy in regard to 
Nan-t'ung. In contrast, other cities in Kiangsu, such as Huai-yin 
and T'ung-shan (Hsu-chou), received full government subsidy for 
their local law-enforcement agencies.14 
Chang Chien's chief philanthropic efforts centered around 
several institutions in which he took an early interest, an interest 
which he maintained throughout his life. These institutions were: 
a foundling home, homes for the aged, workshops for the poor, 
a medical clinic, a home for the disabled and a school for the blind 
and dumb. 
The institution of the foundling home had existed in traditional 
China. The original foundling home in Nan-t'ung was established 
in 1664. Since 1774 a number of other foundling homes came into 
existence, so that by 1875 there were no less than six, some of which 
were in the outlying sections of Nan-t'ung district.15 By the end of 
the nineteenth century, however, most of the foundling homes had 
fallen upon hard times through poor management and the lack of 
funds. In 1906, at the prompting of his wife, Chang Chien completed 
at a cost of 23,400 yuan (about 16,700 taels) his new foundling 
home, a one-story brick structure in T'ang-chia-cha. Upwards of 
1200 children could be provided for.16 The infants were either 
illegitimate or from destitute families. Since most of the children 
were abandoned there by unidentified parents at night, the home 
bowed to convenience and provided an ingenious receptacle 
outside the door. It was connected to a bell, so that the receptacle 
need only be turned around to alert the home that another infant 
had been left in its care.17 The foundlings, most of them girls, were 
cared for either at the home itself or farmed out to families until 
they reached the age of ten. Children from four to seven were taught 
in a kindergarten attached to the home. When they reached seven 
years of age, they were sent to the nearby lower primary schools. 
At ten they were sent either to higher primary schools or directly 
to the various factories.18 The foundling home was supported 
largely from Chang Chien's private funds. On a number of occasions, 
from 1907 on, he sold samples of his calligraphy to finance the 
home.19 This was a common method of raising contributions for 
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charity in those days. Chang Chien had no great difficulties in 
obtaining the necessary funds because his fine calligraphy was well 
known. 
The end of the Ch'ing dynasty gave fresh impetus to Chang Chien 
in his philanthropic activities. Plans for the first home for the 
aged were drawn up in the early part of 1912, and the institution 
accepted its first inmate in November of 1913. Built at a cost of 
6,000 yuan (about 4,300 taels) largely from the money which his 
friends contributed on his sixtieth birthday, the home stood on 
three acres of land and accommodated over a hundred men and 
women.20 Another home was established in 1922.21 
The year 1913 saw the establishment of workshops for the poor 
and a small medical clinic. The 66,000 yuan (about 47,000 taels) 
that went into the establishment of the workshops came from 
Chang Chien's salary as the Liang-Huai salt commissioner, which 
he declined to use himself and allocated for this purpose instead.22 
Three workshops were set up: one in I-cheng, one in Tung-t'ai, 
and one in Nan-t'ung.23 The latter was established in October, 1914. 
A number of handicrafts were carried on in these shops, notably 
carpentry, tailoring, and weaving. The main idea of the workshops 
was to provide some kind of work relief to the destitute and the 
homeless until they were able to stand on their own feet again. 
The medical clinic was an establishment attached to the medical 
school. By 1920 it had acquired X-ray and operating facilities, 
under the general direction of a German physician, Dr. Hans 
Scheidermann, who served until 1924.24 By then the clinic had 
grown into a hospital of four wards and five clinics, with eight 
doctors and twenty nurses, caring for as many as a hundred patients 
monthly.25 
Still another of Chang Chien's philanthropic projects which 
received its impetus in 1912 was a home for the disabled. The 
original plans had to be delayed while he was serving as Minister 
of Agriculture and Commerce in Peking. After his resignation in 
1915 he took up the project once again, building the home near 
the foot of Lang Shan (Wolf Hill). In March, 1916, the home was 
formally opened with the acceptance of forty-nine inmates. By 1920 
the institution was caring for 123 persons. The initial cost of 
6,000 yuan (about 4,300 taels) and the cost of maintenance, like the 
support of the foundling home, came from periodical sales of his 
calligraphy.26 
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One project which appealed particularly to Chang Chien because 
it was both philanthropic and educational was the school for the 
blind and dumb. He first broached the subject to a Kiangsu provin­
cial official as early as 1907, hoping for government support for 
the project. Apparently he did not succeed, for five years later he 
took up this project personally. First he instituted training in the 
method of teaching the blind and the dumb. Then in 1916 he 
established the school itself, which taught the handicapped by 
means of a modified braille system. In an article written when he 
first instituted training for the teachers of the handicapped, Chang 
Chien deplored the fact that no Chinese school of that type existed 
at the time. He emphasized their importance by citing the figure of 
0.2 percent as being the percentage of the blind and dumb in the 
population in the West. Applying the figure to China, he estimated 
that there were 800,000 people who were thus handicapped in the 
country.27 
As a result of all these philanthropic endeavors, Nan-t'ung was 
singularly free of beggars, which were found in every other locality 
of its size in China. A resident in Nan-t'ung, writing in the periodical 
Education and Vocation (Chiao-yu ju Chih-jeh) in 1926, reported this 
fact, and went on to add that, with the possible exception of the 
school for the blind and dumb, all other institutions were enjoying 
a flourishing existence.28 
Institutions like the foundling home and the workshops for the 
poor were worthy projects, but their establishment merely carried 
on the tradition set by some of the more public-spirited gentry 
members in various localities in the country. Chang Chien, however, 
did not stop with their establishment. He wanted to provide 
Nan-t'ung with all the public services and institutions which befit 
a modern urban center. To this end he founded in Nan-t'ung a 
publishing house, a museum, a library, a meteorological station, 
and a theater with an attached dramatic school. 
The Han Mo Lin Publishing House was founded in 1904 as a 
direct result of the establishment of the normal school. The original 
function of the publishing house was to supply the normal school's 
needs for textbooks and other printed matter. Later on it was put 
under the management of a Korean scholar who, out of his hatred 
for the Japanese, had fled his country to seek refuge in Nan-t'ung. 
Under the direction of this Mr. Kim, who was to spend the 
remaining thirty years of his life in Nan-t'ung, the publishing 
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house expanded its activities to serve the needs of the entire 
community.29 
Another institution which began as an adjunct of the normal 
school was the museum. Six acres of land near the school were set 
aside for its establishment in late 1905. Chang Chien contributed to 
the museum much of his personal collection, such as the ceremonial 
robe awarded to him by the Korean king in 1882, and invited others 
to send their collections to the museum. A three-storied structure 
was built to house the accumulated objects, with separate floors 
given over to the display of each of three categories of exhibits: 
natural objects, objects of historical interest, and works of art. 
Altogether, nearly 3,000 items had been acquired by 1914, the year 
of its opening. The grounds surrounding the museum were 
utilized to exhibit a variety of plants, and a small zoo and aviary 
was attached to the institution. When the fossil skeleton of a marine 
creature, measuring over forty feet in length, was unearthed on the 
grounds of T'ung Hai Reclamation Company, it was housed in a 
separate building constructed on the museum grounds.30 
Adjoining the museum grounds stood the library, occupying 
what was once a Buddhist temple. Chang Chien initiated the project 
in 1908, writing to the provincial authorities for permission to 
convert the temple into a library.31 He apparently failed to receive 
this permission at the time, for he had to wait until 1912 before 
putting his plan into effect. The work of remodeling the temple and 
the addition of a second building were completed in 1917, at a 
total cost of 26,243 yuan (18,745 taels), all from Chang Chien 
himself.32 By 1924 the library contained 150,000 chuan of Chinese 
books, 600 Western-language books, and 300 Japanese books.33 
Two thirds of the books were donated by Chang Chien himself, 
with the rest coming from Chang Ch'a and other contributors in 
Nan-t'ung and the surrounding localities.34 It is interesting to note 
that, according to the library's first catalogue issued in 1914, all the 
Western-language books were contributed by the Association for 
Research in Constitutionalism (Hsien-fa Yen-chiu Hui) and natu­
rally consisted mostly of books in the field of political science. 
Some of its titles were: Aristotle's Treatise on Government?h Bentham's 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, Blackstone's Commentaries on Law 
of England, Malthus' Principles of Population, and Veblen's Theory of 
the Leisure Class*6 For a city of Nan-t'ung's size the library was 
a fine one. Unfortunately it was not a free library and was seldom 
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visited by readers. Although it stayed open from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M. 
daily, the admission charge of twenty fen (a fifth of a yuan) appar­
ently kept many potential readers away. This was illustrated by the 
fact that, for the entire year of 1918, only a little over one hundred 
readers used the library.37 
The meteorological station was another project which took 
several years to realize. Chang Chien had long regarded accurate 
weather reporting as essential for the improvement of farming. In 
early 1913 he began the construction of a station on the summit of 
Chun Shan (Army Hill). However, it was not fully operative ufttil 
December of 1916.38 It received radio weather reports twice daily 
from the Ziccawei meteorological station neart Shanghai. Readings 
of instruments measuring the climate and atmosphere were taken 
eight times a day, and reports issued accordingly.39 The station also 
served as a training school for aspiring meteorologists. In the 
summer of 1919 the first class of seven trainees was graduated. 
One other project contributed to the cultural life of the com­
munity. This was the theater for Chinese opera and the attached 
dramatic school. In this matter Chang Chien's own love of opera 
was a strong motivating force. To provide the proper setting for 
the staging of performances, he built a three-storied auditorium 
with a capacity of 1200 in 1919 at a cost of 70,000 yuan (50,000 
taels).40 The following year a dramatic school was established as 
a step in the maintenance of a permanent opera company. The 
school, however, was more than just a vocational institution; 
courses in science and languages were offered in addition to music 
and drama. Under the direction of Ou-yang Yii-ch'ien, an out­
standing opera star, the school offered five years of free training 
for any deserving youth in return for two years of service with 
the opera company after graduation.41 Started at a cost of 20,000 
yuan (about 14,000 taels), the school at its most flourishing stage 
had over fifty students. The school went through ups and downs 
and finally closed along with the theater in 1925, but during its 
existence it produced a number of competent performers.42 
An interesting sidelight of Chang Chien's venture in establishing 
the theatre was his effort to introduce modern rules of etiquette 
among the theater-going crowd. The seats at the theatre were all 
numbered and reservation was required for attendance. Moreover, 
he introduced the practice of applauding as a sign of appreciation 
rather than the standard practice of vocal approval. Those were 
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innovations at the time, and their introduction indicated Chang 
Chien's concern for the behavior of the inhabitants of what he 
fondly regarded as his "model district."43 
Within the city of Nan-t'ung Chang Chien went to great lengths 
to beautify the place by the improvement of the existing park and 
the addition of new ones. By late 1917 five parks had been opened 
to the public. First of all, the old park was improved and renamed 
North Park. By its attractive lake were added tennis courts and a 
rifle range. Next a brand new East Park was constructed, designed 
with the children in mind. Its playgrounds were installed with 
swings, slides, and spins for their enjoyment. South Park was 
characterized by its beautiful lily pond. In this park was erected a 
pavilion called "Yii-chung T'ang," the equivalent of a local hall of 
fame, in which were placed the names of all the local sons who had 
distinguished themselves throughout history. The fourth park, 
West Park, was given over to active recreation. It had playgrounds, 
drill fields, and swimming pools, as well as a boat dock where 
boats used on the adjoining lake were kept. For the children a 
collection of animals was kept in a small zoo. The Nan-t'ung 
Clubhouse was later built just outside West Park. Finally, there was 
Central Park, built on the site of a local scenic spot. In this park 
no less than half a- dozen pavilions, offering varied views of the 
surrounding lake, were located amongst beds of flowers and rare 
plants.44 Upon the completion of Central Park in September, 1917, 
Nan-t'ung held a celebration to commemorate the event. 
Chang Chien also saw to the public improvement of Nan-t'ung in 
other ways. Outside the city of Nan-t'ung he promoted a tree-
planting campaign in 1917 to alleviate the generally denuded 
condition of the countryside. This was carried on as a part of the 
school program to teach the students the importance of conserva­
tion. In the city itself he added to the usefulness and good appearance 
of public structures by repairing the district office building and the 
courthouse building.45 In early 1915 he completed what became the 
outstanding landmark of the entire Nan-t'ung district, an eighty-foot 
clock tower which served the additional function of a fire tower.46 
Through these projects the city of Nan-t'ung gradually took on the 
appearance of a modern municipality. 
Of Nan-t'ung's water conservancy projects, the Yao-wang 
Harbor project ranks next in importance only to the Yangtze 
river-front embankment project. The building of the seven sluice 
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gates at Yao-wang Harbor was begun in November, 1918, under 
the general supervision of a young Dutch hydraulic engineer, 
Hendrik C. de Reike. It was completed in December, 1919, at a 
cost of 140,000 yuan (100,000 taels), paid for entirely by the funds 
of the T'ung Hai Land Reclamation Company. Unfortunately de 
Reike did not see the completion of the project. He died in 
September, 1919, of cholera contracted while supervising the 
project.47 
De Reike was born in Japan, where his father had been the 
supervising engineer in the building of Yokohama harbor. Follow­
ing in his father's footsteps, he had been employed on the Whangpoo 
Water Conservancy Project before coming to Nan-t'ung in 1916 
at the invitation of Chang Chien. He was placed in charge of all 
construction projects in the district. In the short period of three 
years he supervised the construction of ten sections of the river 
embankments, two sluice gates, and a bridge. At the time of his 
death he had already drawn up plans for the construction of five 
locks, seven weirs, and three roads. His tragic death was a keenly 
felt loss to Chang Chien, who, after informing the Dutch Consul 
at Shanghai of de Reike's death, requested that he be duly honored.48 
He was buried at the foot of Chun Shan. 
One of Chang Chien's proudest achievements was the building 
of a network of paved motor roads radiating from the city of 
Nan-t'ung to the outer reaches of the district. He prepared for the 
construction of this road system in 1914. Four years later, he 
announced the plan to build two main roads, one leading eastward 
from the city of Nan-t'ung to the seacoast, one leading northward to 
the Ju-kao line. In addition, a secondary road would be built from 
the city of Nan-t'ung in the direction of the town of Hai-men, 
together with five shorter roads connecting the city of Nan-t'ung 
with T'ang-chia-cha, T'ien-sheng Harbor, and Lang Shan (Wolf 
Hill). Chang Chien foresaw the need for the erection of a total of 
thirty large bridges and 120 smaller bridges, the total cost of which 
would amount to 60,000 yuan (about 43,000 taels).49 With the 
concurrence of his brother, Chang Chien in 1918 allotted 1 percent 
of the total capital from all the enterprises in Nan-t'ung, including 
Dah Sun, T'ung Hai, and T'ung Jen T'ai, for the financing of road 
construction. This sum came to 75,000 yuan (about 54,000 taels). 
Later on another 42,000 yuan (30,000 taels) were raised.50 The 
actual construction of the entire network of roads was entrusted 
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to a local Board of Highway Construction, which owned three 
steam rollers, as well as a fleet of eleven American-made buses. 
Part of the materials for paving the roads was provided by tearing 
down the wall of the city of Nan-t'ung. In February, 1921, the first 
section of the east-west main road, between Nan-t'ung and Chang 
Chien's native village of Ch'ang-lo, was opened to traffic. Two 
years later the entire length was completed. As he rode on the new 
highway, Chang Chien could not refrain from comparing the three 
hours which it now took to travel from Nan-t'ung to the seacoast 
with the condition of twenty years before, when T'ung Hai was 
first organized. Then the same trip took three days to complete.61 
The buses of the local Board of Highway Construction were all 
purchased by Dah Sun through its Shanghai office. Beginning in 
June, 1920, regular service was instituted to Lang Shan and to the 
docks at T'ien-sheng Harbor.52 
For the streets of the city of Nan-t'ung Chang Chien introduced 
gas illumination at night before 1910, switching to electric street­
lights in 1917. Electricity was provided by the four 50-kilowatt 
generators of the T'ung Ming Electric Light Company, established 
with a capital of 60,000 taels in 1917. The facilities permitted the 
transmission of 4,000 volts up to a distance of two miles.53 Un­
fortunately T'ung Ming's generators did not produce sufficient 
electricity to provide the power for Nan-t'ung's numerous indus­
tries. It was one of Chang Chien's lifelong regrets that his master 
plan of a two-million-yuan, joint private-government electric 
company was never realized.54 
Efforts to Maintain the Institutions 
It has been noted that nearly all of the many civic and philan­
thropic institutions were financed solely by Chang Chien and his 
brother, Chang Ch'a. As the Chang brothers approached their 
seventies they were well aware that the various institutions would 
not be permanent unless they put them on a self-sustaining basis. 
All attempts to acquire official support had failed. Both before and 
after the establishment of the republic, Chang Chien had failed to 
gain some measure of tax relief.55 By 1915 the combined yearly 
expenses which the Chang brothers had to bear had reached the 
figure of 270,000 yuan (about 193,000 taels).56 That year he tried a 
new approach. Relying on his past association with Yuan Shih-k'ai, 
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he wrote the president requesting that some 23,000 acres of 
wasteland in the neighboring district of T'ai-chou be set aside as 
endowment for the educational and philanthropic institutions of 
Nan-t'ung, promising to repay the full land price in twelve years.57 
This was duly approved. Subsequently the government canceled the 
debt,58 but apparently the purchase of these wastelands did not solve 
the problem. In 1920 Chang Chien made another attempt to put the 
status of the various Nan-t'ung institutions on a permanent basis. 
He issued two million yuan (about 1.4 million taels) worth of local 
public bonds, payable either at 6 percent interest per annum in 
twenty years or at a graduated scale in less than twenty years.59 
We are unable to determine the results of this drive for funds 
because of a lack of information. Judging from the fact that most 
of the civic and philanthropic institutions failed to survive after 
the passing of the Chang brothers, we must assume that the scheme 
was not successful. 
In 1920 Chang Hsiao-jo, Chang Chien's son, organized the 
Nan-t'ung Local Self-government Association. Since his return 
from the United States in 1918, Chang Hsiao-jo had been given 
increasing responsibilities by Chang Chien, who hoped that he 
would eventually take over most of the responsibilities resting upon 
his father and his uncle. Yet the establishment of the Local Self-
government Association, according to Chang Hsiao-jo, originally 
did not meet with Chang Chien^s full approval. Only after Chang 
Hsiao-jo repeatedly pressed for its establishment did Chang Chien 
give his consent.60 For a while the association served the purpose 
of centralizing all local civic and philanthropic endeavors, but it 
never fully became the effective agency which Chang Hsiao-jo had 
hoped. 
As he approached his seventieth birthday (according to Chinese 
calculation) in 1922, Chang Chien began making plans to hold an 
exhibition coinciding with the celebration of his birthday. The 
exhibition was to be a kind of summing up of Nan-t'ung's progress 
in the fields of industry, education, conservation, philanthropy, and 
public works during the previous quarter century. This would 
constitute his final report to the people of Nan-t'ung and to the 
world, after which he had every intention of entering full retirement. 
No pains were spared for the occasion. A special planning bureau 
was set up in 1921 to handle the details. Arrangements were 
initiated with the government to exempt imported items of exhibit 
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from the regular custom duties. The exhibition was to last three 
months, beginning in late March of 1922.61 Unfortunately while the 
preparations were still under way in August, 1921, another of the 
periodic typhoons hit Nan-t'ung severely for four days, ending 
August 22. The dikes and embankments suffered damages to the 
extent of 200,000 yuan (about 140,000 taels). If the local water 
conservancy problem was to be tackled thoroughly, another 
200,000 yuan would be needed for the construction of dams and 
sluice gates. Due to this natural calamity, Chang Chien called off 
the exhibition and the attendant celebrations, leaving only a mass 
athletic meet to be held. He postponed the celebration to 1927, 
when Nan-t'ung would be commemorating the thirtieth anniversary 
since the start of its modernization.62 Chang Chien's death in 1926 
cut short this last hope.63 
CHAPTER NINE

Chang Chien as a Modernizer 
IF IT WAS Chang Chien's life goal to modernize his nation, the 
question must be asked whether he succeeded or failed in the main 
to achieve his objective. In 1929 the noted Chinese scholar Hu Shih 
wrote in his foreword to the biography of Chang Chien: 
No one can deny that in the history of modern China Chang Chien was 
a great but ultimately unsuccessful hero. He single-handedly blazed 
innumerable new trails and played the part of a pioneer for thirty years. 
He gained livelihood for millions, benefitted an entire region, and in­
fluenced the whole country. Yet because he embarked on so many 
projects and took upon himself such enormous tasks, he died with many 
plans uncompleted.1 
This constitutes a fair reflection of the sentiment in which Chang 
Chien was held in the years immediately following his death. 
He was generally thought of with admiration and regret; admiration 
for all that he managed to accomplish in a quarter of a century, 
and regret that his career, remarkable though it was, generally 
ended in failure. This judgment of his being a "heroic failure" has 
held firm among his countrymen to the present. Recently two 
of his associates have published studies of his life. Liu Hou-sheng's 
Chang Chien Chuan-chi, published in 1958, concludes somewhat 
curiously with several negative conclusions: that Chang Chien was 
neither a political figure nor an industrialist, or for that matter, 
even an accomplished writer.2 In 1963 Sung Hsi-shang, in the 
preface to his Chang Chien ti Sheng-p'ing, regrets that Chang Chien 
was unable to realize his hopes in any of his major endeavors.3 
From these judgments of people who have known Chang Chien's 
career best, the general conclusion that his failures far outweigh 
his successes seem inescapable. 
Why was Chang Chien considered a failure ? He was so considered 
for two reasons. One was the situation in Nan-t'ung after his death. 
The great accomplishments he effected there was not sustained. We 
have already seen how Dah Sun, the most important of Nan-t'ung's 
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industries and the financial source of much of the district's civic 
and philanthropic enterprises, steadily lost money and became 
heavily indebted in the 1920s. Nan-t'ung as a whole declined along 
with Dah Sun.4 This came about partly as a result of the generally 
unstable and stagnant situation in China as a whole in the 1920s 
and 1930s, but partly also as a result of factors inherent in the 
situation in Nan-t'ung itself. Chang Chien himself must share in the 
blame. Among his colleagues and associates, he chose to concentrate 
his hopes for a successor in the person of his son, Chang Hsiao-jo, 
but the younger Chang did not live up to his father's expectations.5 
He lacked his father's commanding personality, executive ability, 
and breadth of vision. It could almost be said that his greatest 
achievement was in finishing the task of editing of his father's 
collected works, and in writing the first biography of his father. 
On a broader level, Chang Chien was considered a failure 
because his career was generally outside the mainstream of con­
temporary history. Throughout his life Chang Chien suffered from 
a degree of provincialism. In spite of his concern with national 
affairs, he was always isolated from the larger movements of his 
time. Politically, he was never affiliated, either before or after 1911, 
with the group which became dominant. During the Ch'ing 
dynasty he supported the government against the revolutionaries, 
yet his constitutional and self-government efforts were apart from 
government efforts in the same direction.6 After the dynasty was 
overthrown, he was among the group which initially supported 
Yuan Shih-k'ai but later lost its influence when it withdrew its 
support as Yiian's imperial ambitions were revealed. Socially, also, 
some of the major changes which occurred in the first quarter of 
the twentieth century touched Chang Chien but lightly. His basic 
beliefs altered remarkably little from the time he first conceived of 
the idea of setting up a cotton mill to the day he died. He accepted 
few of the Western-inspired ideas, such as individualism, the 
equality of the sexes, and the pursuit of truth for its own sake. 
He remained basically a product of classical training. Intellectually, 
Chang Chien remained aloof from the ferment which stirred China 
during the latter part of his life. A wave of new ideas flowed in 
from the West, partly through books, but more through the efforts 
of returned scholars from abroad like Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Hu Shih. 
These men brought back with them new conceptual schemes and 
new methodologies, all profoundly influential in the minds of the 
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rising younger generation. Chang Chien found himself out of touch 
with these new developments. 
Both these indictments can be considered valid, but to judge the 
success and failure of Chang Chien's career solely on these two 
counts is to overlook the historical context under which he operated. 
When he first embarked on his modernizing career in 1895, the 
Ch'ing dynasty was beset by upheavals from within and agressions 
from without. When he died in 1926, even the partial measure of 
national unity which came as a result of the Northern Expedition 
of 1926-28 had not yet been realized. Throughout his life Chang 
Chien operated in an unstable political environment. Moreover, the 
slowness and unevenness with which the necessary economic and 
social factors for economic development came into existence in 
China must also be taken into account. At the time of Dah Sun's 
founding, the country did not possess even the rudimentary legal 
and social framework for the transaction of modern business. 
Laws governing corporate bodies were promulgated in 1904.7 
Such essential facilities as banking, insurance, and modern trans­
portation were almost entirely concentrated in the treaty ports, and 
designed primarily to serve the foreign commercial interests in these 
ports. Outside the treaty ports they were practically nonexistent. 
These difficiencies in the economic sphere were symptomatic of 
Chinese society as a whole, in which many customs and beliefs 
quite incompatable with a modern society continued to hold sway 
throughout the period of Chang Chien's active career. 
Chang Chien's accomplishments and failures must also be 
judged in the light of the inner makeup of the man as well. He 
was among the last generation of men nurtured in the traditional 
environment and classical training of the official-gentry class. The 
initial responsibility for coping with the challenge of the West had 
fallen on this elite group in Chinese society. And by the very 
nature of their training and experience, they were ill equipped to 
assume such a responsibility. The mainspring from which the 
beliefs of the official-gentry class flowed was Confucianism. Its 
moral concept and philosophy of life had been the guiding philoso­
phy of the nation for centuries. To a follower of Confucius, moral 
superiority was of much greater import than mere technical 
knowledge. Since the concept of change and progress could be 
applied only to material things, it was therefore of secondary 
importance and had no effect upon the basic Confucian precepts of 
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human conduct and human relationship. Even the so-called 
progressive officials like Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Li 
Hung-chang, and Chang Chih-tung—men whose "enlightened" 
ideas have been much emphasized of late by scholars interested in 
China's reaction to the West—never seriously questioned the basic 
Confucian precepts which formed the guiding principles of their 
lives. Their outlook was summed up neatly in Chang Chih-tung's 
famous dictum of "Chinese learning for the foundation, Western 
learning for utilization." Chang Chien transcended the strictures of 
the Confucian view of life held by these contemporaries to the 
extent that he saw nothing incompatible with Confucianism in the 
introduction of industrialization, universal education, and local 
self-government into China. However, in his system of values and 
in his mode of thought, he remained steadfastly Confucian. 
Given the historical conditions of the time and the inner makeup 
of the man, we should not be unduly surprised either by the fact 
that Chang Chien's successes were balanced by his failures or by 
the fact that some of his successes did not last. His failures, more 
often than not, were the reflection of larger failures on the national 
scene, while his achievements were primarily the results of his own 
vision, energy, and persistence. Nor can we say that his successes 
were important only for Nan-t'ung. The founding of Dah Sun 
and the creation of a modern school system, for example, were of 
national significance. These, and even some of his less successful 
ventures, such as land reclamation and salt reform, were known 
throughout the country and served as inspirations for men of the 
following generation. 
The unique contribution of Chang Chien was that his career as a 
modernizer represented an alternative pattern to those of other 
reformers in modern China. The leading figures at the time, like 
K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen, all concentrated on finding a 
political solution to the country's problems. It was their contention 
that without fundamental political change there was no hope of 
effecting basic social or economic changes in China. Moreover, in 
the impatience of trying to pull the country swiftly out of the 
morass, they assumed nothing significant could be achieved except 
at the national level, by efforts of the central government. Chang 
Chien was a living refutation to the exclusiveness of these assump­
tions. He did not scorn political action, but he chose to concentrate 
on basic problems in the areas of industry, education, and conserva­
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tion, which were outside the immediate concerns of political 
reformers. Except for his brief terms of office, he carried out all 
of these basic reforms in the capacity of a private individual, on 
the local level. 
_.Of course, he was not altogether free from official associations. 
In a country where the basic level of governmental administration 
operated through the local gentry, his high prestige as a top scholar 
guaranteed him a certain privileged status. Also through his 
scholastic attainments he gained the support of some of the most 
powerful officials of the realm. In any case, with the existing 
political structure of his time, he could not have operated entirely 
free from governmental interference even if he had wished to. 
Chang Chien, however, functioned as a modernizer largely outside 
of the official political structure. Although the government had 
permissive power over his projects, he was committed to carry them 
out on his own. Much of his difficulties in raising funds stemmed 
from the fact that he was not in a position to divert official funds 
to his projects, as Chang Chih-tung and Shen Hsiian-huai did. 
Instead he had to rely on his own reputation and achievement to 
acquire the needed capital. It must be admitted, however, that in 
his later years he wielded so much power in Nan-t'ung that for all 
practical purposes his position was close to that of a regularly 
appointed official. 
Although Chang Chien confined most of his activities to the 
local scene, he never lost sight of his larger purpose, that of mod­
ernizing all of China. On one occasion, in a speech welcoming a 
group of Chinese visitors from Southeast Asia, he said that in 
building up Nan-t'ung his "aim was to gain self-government for 
one district, so that when foreigners saw it, they would know that 
China still has men with ideas."8 
For most of his projects Chang Chien followed a realistic, 
down-to-earth approach. His course of action was determined by 
his practical nature. He wanted to start projects which would 
benefit the people of his native district, and which would show 
results within a reasonable period of time. He was always willing 
to tailor the means by which he intended to achieve his ends to 
the possible. His experience strengthened this tendency on his part. 
His greatest successes came in those areas where his own efforts, 
combined with favorable factors, were adequate to tackle the prob­
lem at hand. His sharpest failures were in projects where his own 
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resources were inadequate. His approach was at all times pragmatic, 
and seldom followed a consistent and clearly defined doctrine. If he 
appeared at times to be a democrat, a champion of private enter­
prise, or a proponent of a decentralized system of education, it was 
because his experience taught him that such values and systems were 
practicable in China, not because he was ideologically wedded to 
these values and systems. 
Chang Chien as a modernizer did not abandon the traditional 
values in which he was steeped. He was proud of China's heritage 
and never turned his back on it, as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao did for a time. 
Stripped of his material accomplishments, he betrayed a moral core 
of Confucianism which was a testament to the solid grounding of 
traditional training which he had undergone. He valued rationality 
and abhored violence. It was not weakness on his part that he 
failed to exalt the glory of fighting and dying for a cause; it was 
his belief that violence offered no solution to any problem. Only 
when patriotism was involved did he condone the taking up of 
arms as a necessity. His aversion to the use of force was matched 
by his distaste for social upheaval. Revolution in any form did not 
appeal to him. Wherever possible he introduced reforms without 
tearing down and destroying the old institutions. Politically he 
favored legitimism, and in 1911 it was not until events had gone 
to the length of bringing the republic into existence that he gave 
his support to the new regime. 
Yet, despite his belief in Confucian principles, he was able to 
depart from the Confucian frame of reference in important respects. 
He entered the business world, engaged in the culturally despised 
vocation of commercial undertakings, and made a success of it. 
Without extensive experience abroad, he was able to overcome the 
ethnocentric bias of the cultured Chinese and to deal with foreigners 
on equal terms. He gained a great deal of knowledge in Western 
technology. By modern standards he did not thoroughly master 
much of his technical knowledge, but his deficiencies should be 
considered against the fact that his long years of training in classical 
studies scarcely prepared him for absorbing technical knowledge. 
Thus, the secret of his success was his ability to transcend the 
bounds of his culture, without at the same time rejecting it altogether. 
In this respect, he was symptomatic of his times. Until the Revolu­
tion of 1911 doomed once and for all the efforts of the moderate 
reformers, the prevailing spirit of those who were concerned with 
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China's salvation was of the middle road. In Chang Chien's case 
it was at once his strength and his weakness. Ability to bridge the 
old and the new made it possible for him to accomplish what he 
did as a modernizer. That same combination of the old and the 
new made it difficult for him to sympathize with the rising generation 
which took over the country in the 1920s. In many ways Chang 
Chien can be thought of as the epitome of the transitional figure 
in modern China. 
China in the twentieth century has seen an unmitigated series of 
calamities and frustrations, the occasional respites notwithstanding. 
A good measure of her troubles, to be sure, stemmed from external 
sources. Yet a closer examination betrays an internal deficiency 
which was quite as crucial as the country's external impotence. 
That was the repeated mistake, on the part of the Chinese people, 
to seek a panacea, a "single solution." First it was the unreasoning 
xenophobia of the Boxers, then the demand for a constitutional 
government. These were replaced by the adoption of the republican 
form of government in 1911, the failure of which led in turn to 
the one-party rule of the Kuomintang and the Communists. In the 
course of attempting to realize these successive illusory hopes, 
certain positive results were achieved, notably the literary reforms 
of the May Fourth Movement and the educational and industrial 
growth of the 1930s. By and large, however, the Chinese as a people 
have been caught up alternatively between the two poles of either 
a feeling of despairing resignation, or one of feverish adherance to 
some all-encompassing cause. In such a prevailing climate it is little 
wonder that the spirit and accomplishments of a man like Chang 
Chien would seem curiously out of place, that the outcome of his 
limited success, achieved largely at the local level, should be more 
pitied than praised. No one would deny that, for every country 
and society, rapid change cannot be accomplished without vision, 
direction, and energy on the national level. It is nonetheless true 
that the real accomplishments in modernization of a backward 
country, Japan for instance, depended also upon the countless and 
largely unknown people who did their part, large and small, to 
help bring about change and reform on the "grass-roots" level. 
Had China had more men like Chang Chien, his own career might 
not have seemed so unique and outstanding, but the country as JL 
whole would have benefitted enormously in her attempts to find a 
place among the developed nations of the world. 
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Response to the West, pp. 215-19; and George M. Beckmann, The Modern­
isation of China and Japan, p. 154. Franz Michael and George Taylor, 
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ous Age" {Sheng-shih Wei-yen), in which he advanced many then 
revolutionary ideas. Kung-chuan Hsiao, "Weng T'ung-ho and the 
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